The Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR), founded in June 2011, is a non-governmental, independent group that is considered a primary source for the OHCHR on all death toll-related analyzes in Syria.

An Instrument of Death and Disappearance:
How the Syrian Regime Uses Military Field Courts Against Activists and Dissidents

A Total of 7,872 Death Sentences Carried Out and 24,047 Cases of Enforce Disappearance in Connection to the Military Field Court Recorded Between March 2011 and August 2023
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I. Exceptional Criminal Courts in Syria are Instruments in the Hands of the Head of the State, the Minister of Defense & the Security Machinery, Whose Only Purpose is to Crush All Opposition and Perpetuate Enforced Disappearance:

Since March 2011, exceptional criminal courts, which are courts founded in accordance with abnormal laws specific to the context of the conflict in Syria, have tried tens of thousands of detainees and individuals forcibly disappeared by the Syrian regime in connection with the conflict and their political views. On October 15, 2020, The Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR) released a report that provided more expansive details of one of those exceptional courts, namely the Counterterrorism Court. This report will focus on a second exceptional court – the Military Field Court, which is one of the worst exceptional criminal courts ever created in Syria’s history. We’ve chosen to dedicate a report to this court for two main reasons:

First: its monstrous operations made it one of the main apparatuses founded by the Syrian regime to effectively streamline crimes of enforced disappearance, and provide a chillingly efficient instrument to eliminate and crush dissent, terrorizing dissidents and civilian activists, including children and women, through the power of its sentences.

Second: The sheer, harrowing number of the victims who have been lost to these courts, as confirmed by SNHR’s data, which will be detailed in this report.

Contrary to conventional wisdom, most detainees, when referred to a court, are NOT referred primarily to the Counterterrorism Court. Indeed, SNHR has documented that, as of October 2020, no fewer than 10,767 individuals, including 896 women and 16 children, had undergone trial at the Counterterrorism Court since its establishment in July 2012. However, SNHR’s data indicates a strong correlation between enforced disappearances and Military Field Courts, which leads us to believe that many of the 96,000-plus individuals classified as forcibly disappeared by the Syrian regime have been tried by Military Field Courts. We arrived at this conclusion based on our methodology in compiling this report, as we have found strong indicators suggesting an organic correlation between enforced disappearance and Military Field Courts. Some of these indicators are:

1. Those courts were founded with the stated objective of fighting what the regime called “crime threatening national security and public safety”. Those crimes include for instance, attempts to overthrow the regime, participating in anti-regime activities, conspiring against the state, espionage, and acts of terror.

2. Ever since the Baath Party came to power in 1963 and announced a permanent state of emergency, forming exceptional criminal courts have been a way for it to consolidate power. First came the National Security Courts and the Military Martial Council in 1963, then exceptional military courts in 1965, followed by the High State Court of 1968. As it stands, there are three exceptional criminal courts – the Military Field Courts, the war crimes that the regime sanctions ad hoc in accordance with Legislative Decree No. 87 on October 1, 1972, and the Counterterrorism Court founded in accordance with Law No. 19 on July 19, 2012.
First: It must be remembered that enforced disappearances in regime detention centers are systematic in nature, rather than random, resulting from deliberate and calculated decisions and directives issued by a highly sophisticated security, military, and judicial hierarchy including all the echelons and apparatuses of power associated with detention centers, from the President of the Republic and the Vice-President on Security Matters, to the National Security Council, Ministry of Defense, the various security directorates, exceptional judicial institutions, the Command of the Military Police, the Command of the Military, the Ministry of the Interior and other regime agencies down through the chain of command. That is to say that the massive number of victims of enforced disappearance at the hands of the Syrian regime have been fed to this security, military, and judicial hierarchy, the most notable of which are the exceptional judicial institutions. We have elaborated upon the Syrian regime’s enforced disappearance practices in Syria in our annual reports, the most recent of which was our 12th annual report released on this year’s International Day of the Disappeared – August 30, 2023.

Second: One notices some differentiation in the complex procedures adopted by the Syrian regime to deal with victims who died due to torture and medical negligence and those who were executed. These differences apply to both these victims’ medical reports, and the procedures followed in registering them in the records of the Military Police. While these differences were fewer in some years when the procedures adopted to deal with the bodies of victims who were executed and those who had died due to torture and medical negligence were identical due to the high numbers in both categories, some disparity is found in the details of the procedures followed between the two categories in disposing of/burying the victims’ bodies; that is to say, the treatment of the bodies of victims who were executed and of those who died due to torture and medical negligence is completely different. These differences concern various aspects of this process, such as documenting burials in Military Police’s records and the parties responsible for the disposal or burial process. Usually, only and exclusively victims executed by Military Police personnel are buried, a different fate to that of the bodies of the victims who died due to torture and medical negligence. We previously addressed those procedures at some length in a study we conducted into the photographs of some of the victims of torture, which were leaked from Syrian military hospitals.

Third: The Syrian regime has resorted to referring detainees and forcibly disappeared persons to the Military Field Court since March 2011, i.e., since the very early days of the popular uprising for democracy. Many of the sentence documents issued by the Military Field Court, which we have stored in our archives, reflect this fact. We believe that before the establishment of the Counterterrorism Court in July 2012, the overwhelming majority of people arrested between March 2011 and mid-2012 who went on to be categorized as forcibly disappeared persons appeared before the Military Field Court. Needless to say, the Military Field Court has also continued to try detainees and forcibly disappeared persons in subsequent years.

Fourth: Analysis of the data included in this report show a clear correlation between the number of victims forcibly disappeared at the hands of the Syrian regime and the victims referred to the Military Field Court. Meanwhile, there is a large disparity between the number of people who were tried by the Military Field Court and survived and those who were tried by the Counterterrorism Court and survived. It is worth noting that this comparison only concerns those two exceptional courts and does not include other ordinary courts to which detainees and protestors were referred by the Syrian regime.
II. Methodology

For clarity’s sake, we will list key terms and their definitions here in order to avoid any confusion as to the meaning of those terms when they are used:

- **Enforced disappearance**: We use the definition proposed by the Declaration for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in its resolution 47/133 on December 18, 1992, as a set of principles for all states. According to that declaration, enforced disappearance occurs when “persons are arrested, detained or abducted against their will or otherwise deprived of their liberty by officials of different branches or levels of Government, or by organized groups or private individuals acting on behalf of, or with the support, direct or indirect, consent or acquiescence of the Government, followed by a refusal to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the persons concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of their liberty, which places such persons outside the protection of the law.” In our methodology, we classify a person as forcibly disappeared if 20 days have passed since their arrest without their family being able to obtain information from the official authorities about their arrest or whereabouts, and with the authorities responsible for the arrest refusing to acknowledge the person’s being in their custody.

- **Legislative Decree and Law**: A legislative decree is issued by the President of the Republic who invokes the legislative powers afforded to them. While, in reality, a legislative decree has the same weight and effect as a law, there is a difference in that a law is passed by the People’s Assembly of Syria as the official legislative branch of the country. This means that the only difference between a legislative decree and a law is the entity responsible for issuing it. Therefore, we may use the two terms interchangeably since both have the same legislative weight and power.

- **Military Field Court(s)**: When using this term, we refer to the court as a fully-fledged legal institution. We use the plural term Military Field Courts to refer to the courts affiliated with the Military Field Court, of which there are two.

- **Criminal offenses**: Syrian law recognizes three distinct levels of crimes depending on their seriousness or severity. Those are in an ascending order: 1. Infractions; 2. Misdemeanors; and 3. Felonies. Broadly speaking, any action punishable by a prison term of at least three years is considered a felony. Therefore, when using the term felony in the context of the charges leveled against detainees and forcibly disappeared persons, we are referring to felonies that are punishable by a minimum sentence of three years imprisonment and a maximum of a death sentence.

- In this report, we distinguish between **arbitrarily arrested detainees and forcibly disappeared persons**. In describing a person as an arbitrarily arrested detainee, we adopt the five criteria proposed by the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention.
Since 2011, SNHR has documented violations related to unlawful detentions and arbitrary arrest, including torture, enforced disappearance, and unjust trials. We have released hundreds of reports to date documenting multiple types of gross violations, some of which amounted to crimes against humanity. The whole of Syrian society has been adversely affected by the experience of these massive and terrible violations that have continued nonstop since March 2011. This report will shed light and provide some detail on and analysis of the history of the establishment and evolution of the Military Field Court in Syria, along with its formation, jurisdiction, procedural law, legitimacy from a constitutional and human rights standpoint, and how it came to be completely hegemonically controlled by the head of state and Minister of Defense. The report will also detail how this court fails to adhere to the most basic guarantees of a fair trial, such as the right to attorney, the right to a public trial, and the right to appeal, as well as revealing that its judges do not report to the judiciary with regard to various functions such as appointments, transfers, inspection and disciplinary matters. That is to say that the Military Field Court is, in reality, an instrument wielded by the head of the state, the Ministry of Defense, and the state security apparatus to perpetuate the regime's tyrannical rule and crush anyone who dares to involve themselves in any dissident action.

In light of the nature of the complexities of the Military Field Court in Syria and the Syrian regime’s enforced disappearance practices and how these are interconnected, we opted to use multiple analytical tools to process the data in the hopes of arriving at accurate findings based on the contents of SNHR’s regularly updated database on detainees and forcibly disappeared persons which has been built up through daily monitoring and documentation since 2011. All the figures on detainees and forcibly disappeared persons taken from our database have been verified according to each individual’s name, the date, place and conditions of their arrest; the party responsible for the arrest, any information on their subsequent enforced disappearance and torture, any relevant documents and other information on any trials and other details. Our IT team has developed specialist software to create a database for each party to the conflict that enables us to categorize entries by governorate, sex, social/marital status, age group, place of arrest and other features, with data being entered and sorted automatically. We have ensured that SNHR’s databases are fully secure, and have created multiple backup copies stored in different locations.

Since March 2011, with thousands of detainees and person forcibly disappeared by the Syrian regime being tried by the Military Field Court, we have constantly endeavored to track and monitor its procedures, processes, and mechanisms. Having monitored those trials for approximately 12 years, we can say with some confidence that we’ve managed to gain expert insight into the Military Field Court in terms of its legal, structural, and operational aspects, attaining an excellent understanding of its mechanisms and procedures despite the infamously shadowy and secretive nature of the Military Field Court’s operations. We have also contacted hundreds of families of detainees referred to the court, with many family members also getting in touch with us. We also spoke with cooperative lawyers, and a number of former officers from the regime’s Military Police and various security agencies, who defected. We’ve also spoken with many former and current detainees tried in the Military Field Court, whether they’ve been released or are still held in the central prisons across Syria. Over the years, we’ve been able to analyze and cross-check much of the information and data we received from families and detention survivors.
For this report, we conducted over 156 interviews, taking care at all times to be considerate of and sensitive to the safety and security of the victims and eyewitnesses, as well as SNHR’s team members. These interviews were conducted through various means, including in person, by phone, or via different communication software programs, with some interviewees in Syria and others abroad. This report includes 15 first-person accounts collected directly by SNHR, with none taken from any second-hand sources. We have used aliases for interviewees in some of those interviews at their request in order to protect their privacy and prevent them facing persecution or pursuit by security forces. The interviewees received no financial or other compensation or promises of such remuneration for agreeing to do these interviews. Moreover, we informed all interviewees of the purpose of this report, and obtained their permission to use the information they provided in service of the report and our documentation efforts. Our interviews are conducted in accordance with SNHR’s rigorous internal protocols which we have developed over the years, and we constantly endeavor to ensure the highest levels of psychological care for the victims.

Based on all the above, we have attempted to the best of our capabilities and according to the data we have at hand to distinguish those detainees and forcibly disappeared persons who appeared before the Military Field Court from others who have not been put on trial or who have been tried by other courts, through a complex process, in which we face various difficulties and challenges (one of which is the extreme difficulty of obtaining detainees’ records, and data on referral, sentences, and other key information and documents). As such, the figures included in this report reflect only what we have been able to document on our databases, which is the bare minimum in terms of detail. We have attempted to conduct many comparisons of the data we have collected in order to evaluate the extent to which Military Field Courts have been used as an instrument of enforced disappearance. This report contains the findings of approximately 15 processes of analysis carried out on the data related to the Military Field Courts which was taken from SNHR’s database.

III. The Legal Context Governing the Establishment and Development of the Military Field Court, its Jurisdiction, and Procedural Law

The Military Field Court was founded on August 17, 1968, in accordance with resolution No. 2 by the Interim Regional Command of the Arab Socialist Baath Party on February 25, 1966. At the time, the Command had legislative power in accordance with Legislative Decree No. 109. The Military Field Court had exercised its jurisdiction until a decision was made to dissolve the Court on September 3, 2023, in accordance with a legislative decree issued by the Syrian regime, as will be explained later. The court’s founding text specified that it had jurisdiction over the crimes which fall within the confines of military courts should the minister of defense decide to refer such crimes to it, as well as retroactively in regard to the events of the Naksa, and the Golan Occupation, both of which events predated the establishment of the court by over a year. In other words, the Military Field Court was founded to hold accountable the people who were

3. Published in the official gazette in 1968, Vol. 38, P. 12542
4. Article 1 of Legislative Decree 109/1968 in the following events: times of war - during military operations - when facing the enemy.
responsible for those defeats, which is evidenced by the definition of ‘warfare operations’ specified in Article 2 of the founding legislation on its mandate: the actions and movements carried out by the army or some of its units, or when an armed clash takes place with the enemy.

On January 15, 1969, the Military Field Court’s system was amended for the first time in accordance with Legislative Decree No. 12, which explicitly gave the Public Prosecution Service, which also has the powers of a military examining magistrate, the authorization to absolve itself from compliance with the due procedures and rules specified in the applicable legislations. This authorization was only applicable to the court. In other words, had it not been for this amendment, the Public Prosecution Service, acting in the capacity of an examining magistrate, would have been compelled to comply with general law, including respecting the right to attorney for a defendant under investigation.

A second amendment was promulgated in accordance with Legislative Decree No. 61 of February 1, 1970, which expanded the Military Field Court’s jurisdiction to include crimes committed before the enemy (in the presence of enemy forces), following a referral by the minister of defense, in addition to its original jurisdiction over crimes committed in times of war or during warfare operations.

As the conflict between the regime and the Muslim Brotherhood escalated in the early 1980’s, the Military Field Court’s jurisdiction was further expanded with a third amendment that came into effect in accordance with Legislative Decree No. 32 on July 1, 1980. According to that decree, the Military Field Court was authorized to investigate crimes committed ‘in times of internal strife’. This amendment gave the Military Field Court the right to try Muslim Brotherhood members during the 1980’s event, which culminated in the regime’s Hama Massacre of 1982. The same amendment was used as grounds to try people involved in the popular uprising that began in March 2011.

It should be noted that SNHR’s documents archive strongly suggests that the Syrian regime founded a second field court in 1980, which played an integral role during the climax of the military clashes in Hama city at the time. We believe that this court was subsequently dissolved in early 1990 after it had served its purpose of trying thousands of detainees arrested at the time and taking some of the workload off the original Military Field Court. However, that second court was re-established in early 2012, again at a time when Syria was going through a massive way of arbitrary arrests and enforced disappearance at the hands of Syrian regime forces.

This type of court is established in accordance with a decision by the executive branch, personified by the Minister of Defense. More than one military field court can be established ad hoc. Such a court is composed of three officers, with the head of the court required to have a rank of a Major (Raed) or higher, while the other two members must be Captains (Naqib) or higher. Naturally, an officer cannot be tried by another office of a lower rank. It is worth noting that the Military Field Court’s founding text does not require any of the court members to have a degree in law or to be judges, save for the chairs of the Public Prosecution.

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5. Published in the government gazette in 1969, Vol. 5, P. 2214.
8. On April 1971, in accordance with Legislative Decree No. 3 that declared the President of the Republic the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Military Forces, and gave their person powers that previously were designated to the Minister of Defense according to many of the applicable legislations at the time, including founding Military Field Courts. All of these powers were given to the Commander-in-Chief who, following this decree, was the one who has the power to establish the courts, appoints its judges, determines which crimes referred to said court, approve its judgements, and has the power to reduce or repeal sentences. This was changed again on July 15, 1980, with Law No. 54 that came as an abrogation of Legislative Decree No. 109 of 1968 that contained the legal texts governing Military Field Courts. Accordingly, the regulatory powers related to this court was reassigned to the minister of defense.
9. It is commonly known that the head of the Military Judiciary Directorate (a judge) is currently presiding over this court. However, there is nothing in the law that prevents the minister of defense from naming officers with no law background.
As mentioned earlier, this Military Field Court’s specialty is crimes falling under a military jurisdiction whenever they are committed in times of war, during warfare operations, or in times of internal strife, following an assessment by the Minister of Defense who has the power to refer cases without appeal. Therefore, the Military Field Court wields a wide jurisdiction that is, in reality, difficult to quantify. Furthermore, the criteria adopted by the minister of defense to refer cases to this court appear ambiguous and difficult to understand.

Article 47 of the Military Penal Code and Military Procedural Law, adopted in accordance with Legislative Decree No. 61 on February 27, 1950, concerns the Jurisdiction of Military Courts. According to this, a Military Field Court handles crimes when:

1. The crime in question is named in Article 47 of the Military Penal Code.

2. The crime in question is referred to the court by the minister of defense.

As with other military courts, the Military Field Court has the power to try both military servicemen and civilians, whether they are perpetrators, accomplices, or otherwise connected to the alleged crime according to Article 50 of the Military Penal Code.

The Military Field Court is absolved from the need to comply with due procedures as specified in applicable legislations, such as the right to attorney, or the right to a public trial. The rulings of the Military Field Court cannot be appealed, and are not carried out until after they are approved by the Minister of Defense, except for the death sentence which requires the approval of the head of state, with both having the power to ease, replace, or repeal the sentence based on their specialty, or even to order an abatement or retrial. The head of the state and the defense minister can wield those powers even after a sentence is approved.

10. Article 47 of the Military Penal Code states:
   1. Military courts handles:
      1. The military crimes specified in Section 1 of the Volume 2 of this Law.
      2. Crimes committed in military camps, military institutions, and with relation to places and items occupied by military servicemen in service of the army and armed forces.
      3. Crimes committed against the interests of the state directly.
      4. Crimes which military courts have been authorized to handle in accordance with the relevant regulations and laws.
      5. Crimes committed by military officers affiliated with allied armies based on Syrian lands, and all crimes against the interests of those armies, unless there are special alliance agreements between the government of those countries and the Syrian government. Military courts can be authorized to handle crimes threatening the state’s domestic security in accordance with a decree by the Cabinet based on a proposal of the minister of defense and the minister of justice.
      6. The crimes specified and criminalized by Article 123 of this Law and are committed by publications of any kind, provided that the articles of the Law on Publications are upheld except for appeal, where the rulings of the military court are subject to appeal only under the Military Procedural Law.
      7. A. Crimes committed by officers, non-commissioned officers, members of internal security forces, personnel of the Political Security Division, and personnel of the customs authority, while discharging their duties.
         B. Orders of pursuit on officers, non-commissioned officers, members of internal security forces, personnel of the Political Security Division, and personnel of the customs authority shall be issued pursuant to a decision by the General Command of the Army and Armed Forces in accordance with Article 53 of the Penal Code and Military Procedural Law and its amendments.
      8. The crimes specified in:
         A. The Law on Weapons & Ammunitions promulgated through Legislative Decree No. 51 on September 24, 2011, and its amendments.
         B. The Law on Explosives promulgated through Legislative Decree No. 53 on August 10, 1977.
11. Usually, the minister of defense refers crimes to the Military Field Court based on recommendations from the security and intelligence officers who investigate those crimes to begin with.
12. Articles 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, and 8 of Legislative Decree No. 109 of 1968.
The following chart illustrates the hierarchy of command of the Military Field Court:

- **President of the Republic**
  - "Commander-in-Chief of the Army"

- **Minister of Defense**
  - "Vice-President on Security Matters" "Deputy Prime Minister"

- **Director of the Military Judiciary Directorate**

- **Head of the Military Field Court**

The Military Field Court’s headquarters is located in the headquarters of the Military Police in al-Qaboun area in Damascus city. In 2012, a second Military Field Court was established, also based in Damascus. As such, there are today two Military Field Courts - one in al-Qaboun and the second, we believe, in the University Training Camp in al-Demas near the Equestrian Club in Rural Damascus governorate (Rif Dimshaq). Besides those two headquarters, the information provided by eyewitnesses and survivors indicates that the court holds many sessions/trials in regime detention centers, primarily in military prisons, such as Sednaya Military Prison, and other security branches, which we will detail later, with these trials among the contraventions of Procedural Law committed by the Military Field Court.
An Instrument of Death and Disappearance: How the Syrian Regime Uses Military Field Courts Against Activists and Dissidents

Photo of the Military Police's headquarters in al-Qaboun neighborhood in Damascus city, which houses the Military Field Court - May 2023

Photo showing the route taken by detainees to reach the Military Field Court in Damascus city
On September 3, 2023, the Syrian regime promulgated Legislative Decree No. 32 of 2023, which ended the effectiveness of Legislative Decree No. 109 of August 17, 1968, and its subsequent amendments, including the establishment of Military Field Courts. According to Legislative Decree 32/2023, all cases currently handled by Military Field Courts are to be referred to the military judiciary and to be processed in accordance with the Military Penal Code (Legislative Decree No. 61/1950 and its subsequent amendments). Legislative Decree 32/2023 is to be implemented with immediate effect. We, at SNHR, believe that this dissolution was part of a range of policies and procedures adopted by the Syrian regime in its efforts to sweep the enforced disappearance issue under the rug, as this move came after the regime issued its ostensible amnesty decrees and registered forcibly disappeared persons as dead in the civil registry records, and may well presage other similar regime decisions in the future.

Fadel Abdul Ghany, SNHR Executive Director, says:

“The Syrian regime’s decision to dissolve the Military Field Court is part of its strategy to close the cases of 96,000 forcibly disappeared Syrian citizens. First came the amnesty decrees, and then death certificates, and now the dissolution of the Military Field Court, which could very probably be followed by a new amnesty. However, dissolving the Military Field Court has no meaning without holding those who are responsible for killing and disappearing tens of thousands of Syrians accountable. It is also important to note that referring people to the Military Judiciary is similar to referring them to the Military Field Court, with minor, insignificant differences.”

IV. The Executive Branch’s Hegemony Over Military Field Courts Contravenes the Constitution, Criminal Trial Procedures, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

In many of our past reports, we spoke about the executive’s intrusion into the powers of the legislative and judicial branch, and how the executive controls the process of issuing laws, effectively turning the Higher Judicial Council or the Constitutional Court into a facade the only purpose of which is providing legal cover for the practice of the executive branch and its security agencies, and its explicit contravention of the constitution which was established solely by and for the benefit of the regime itself in 2012 and the laws regulating the judiciary. **All of this can be found clearly in the work of the Military Field Court.**
A. Its independence

According to the Military Field Court’s founding law, the executive branch, embodied in the President of the Republic and the Minister of Defense, has absolute power over it. This manifests itself in:

1. The court is formed by a decision made by the Minister of Defense who appoints three officers who are not required to have a law degree or to be judges, contrary to the commonly accepted rule of a judge having to be a legal specialist. However, the public prosecution is legally required to be composed of judges, according to Article 4, Paragraph A: “The functions of the public prosecution [in the Military Field Court] shall be performed by a judge or more from the Military Public Prosecution, and shall be named by the Minister of Defense.”

2. The Court handles the cases referred by the Minister of Defense according to Article 1 of the same text, contrary to the proper procedure in which a court’s jurisdiction is established by law.

3. The founding text also gives the executive authority full control over its sentences, where:
   - The Military Field Court’s sentences do not take effect until receiving the approval of the Ministry of Defense, while a death sentence requires approval from the head of the state.
   - In death sentence cases, the minister of defense and the head of the state have the power to ease, replace, repeal, or dismiss the punishment. Such cases are treated as general amnesties.
   - The Minister of Defense has the power to order a retrial before another military field court, whether the outcome was a conviction or exoneration.
   - The minister of defense has the power to suspend any punishment, except for a death sentence.
   - Even after approving the sentence, the Minister of Defense and the head of state have the power to ease, replace, repeal, or dismiss a death sentence. Such cases are treated as general amnesties.

The exercise of all these powers afforded to the Executive, such as approving sentences, easing, replacing, or repealing penalties, dismissing cases, or suspending the execution of a sentence, should be solely restricted to the confines of the judiciary, and more specifically should be in the hands of a higher court, rather than the executive branch, embodied in the Minister of Defense or the head of state. This abuse of these powers constitutes an egregious violation of the concept of constitutional autonomy as established in Article 132 of the 2012 Syrian Constitution, Article 10 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and Article 14-1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

In this context, it is important to clarify that the powers afforded to the head of the state in this law with regard to approving a death sentence cannot be likened to the head of state’s sovereign power to repeal a death sentence as specified in Article 454 of the Criminal Procedural Law. In the latter case, the head of state only has that power after all appeal options have been exhausted, and the case has been evaluated by the amnesty committee at the Ministry of Justice. Only after these criteria have been met can the head of state exercise their power to approve a death sentence or replace it with a life sentence. In the case of the Military Field Court, the head of state has the power to approve, ease, replace, repeal, dismiss, or suspend the implementation of a death sentence, all powers that should be confined to the judiciary as mentioned earlier.
B. Guarantees related to the trial

Article 51 of the Military Field Court’s founding text gives the Military Field Court the power to absolve itself from the need for compliance with due process as specified in the applicable legislation. This means that the court does not have to uphold the guarantees established in the Criminal Procedural Law, most notably:

1. **The right to defense and the right to attorney**: in the stages of investigation and trial, the law, due to the seriousness of a felony case, requires that the defendant should have a legal counsel to defend them. Said counsel must be present in all sessions and must be a witness to all procedures. This is part of the public system, which means it cannot be waived as a right. In the case of this attorney’s absence from a session, that session, and any procedures taking place during it, are to be considered null (This was further established by the Court of Cassation - Criminal Chamber Q416 T1967/4/25 [ق416 ات 25/4/1967]). This right is also enshrined in Article 51, Paragraph 3 of the 2012 Syrian Constitution, Article 10 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and Article 14, Paragraph 3, Items B, D of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Despite the importance of the right to a defense as a fundamental, indispensable part of a fair trial, it was dismissed in the law governing the founding and proceedings of the Military Field Court.

2. **The right to a public trial and a public verdict**: It is a key element of due process that trials are conducted in a public manner to be attended by whoever wishes to do so. This principle was established categorically in the Criminal Court (Article 278, Paragraph 3 of the Criminal Procedural Law), and the Military Judiciary (Article 65 of the Military Penal Code). Lawmakers established this principle for two reasons: First, it gives the defendant some assurances since the trial is held in the public eye, second, it protects the judge from suspicions and doubts that could arise if the trial were held in secret with no apparent legal cause. This is not the case, however, with respect to the Military Field Court. To make matters worse, the Military Field Court even held many sessions in detention centers to make procedures even more secretive and expedite the process of issuing rulings. This guarantee is enshrined in Articles 10 & 11 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and Article 14, Paragraph 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Nonetheless, the Military Field Court’s founding text fails to mention this fundamental guarantee, and even explicitly gives the Military Field Court permission to absolve itself from upholding it.

C. Right to appeal

Article 6 of the Military Field Court’s founding text stipulates that its rulings cannot be appealed in any way. The existence of a court of cassation ensures a consistent and unified conceptualization of the different legal issues by requiring rulings with interpretations. This right is enshrined in Article 51, Paragraph 3 of the 2012 Syrian Constitution and Article 14, Paragraph 5 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, both of which give a defendant the right to appeal a judicial ruling, yet the Military Field Court’s founding text ignores this fundamental right.

**It is evident, therefore, that we are not talking about an independent, impartial, and honest court, nor are we talking only about the usual, in the Syrian regime’s case, of the executive encroaching upon the judiciary, but about a formalized show court that has not the slightest shred of constitutional legitimacy or legality.**

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13. Article 5 of Legislative Decree 109/1968 states, “The Court and Public Prosecution can absolve themselves from complying with the procedures specified in the applicable legislations.”
15. Ibid.
V. The Mechanism Through Which Detainees and Forcibly Disappeared Persons Are Referred to the Military Field Court, and the Most Notable Death Penalty Offences Tried by the Court

The mechanism of holding and referring detainees to Military Field Courts rests upon the resolutions adopted by the security agencies that have been afforded unbridled powers regarding the treatment of those detained in connection to the popular uprising that began in 2011. These powers included practices of torture, enforced disappearance, and leveling accusations against detainees and forcibly disappeared persons based on information extracted under torture. It should also be noted that the Syrian regime has put in place various parameters and procedures to regulate these expansive powers, in order to maintain the organizational structure of its security apparatus, as opposed to having it operate in a disordered fashion. This is a point that we try to highlight in all of our reports, namely that the regime’s strategies for arrest, torture, and enforced disappearance, however dense and convoluted they seem, are not haphazard. Hundreds of eyewitneses have told us that they never received any information from an official source about their being referred to Military Field Courts, particularly when they were being held in security branches, nor were they informed of the allegations levelled against them. Due to the secretive nature of the Military Field Court, and the related impossibility of reviewing cases tried by it to gain an understanding of the type of cases referred by the defense minister to the Military Field Court (we believe those referrals are made based on the recommendations from the security branches where the detainees and forcibly disappeared persons were interrogated), we will provide an outline of the most serious and notable crimes punishable by death, which are the ones potentially handled by the Military Field Court based on Article 47 of the Military Penal Code, which is further referenced and specified in Articles 98-167 of the same legal text and the Syrian Penal Code. We should add that that we have acquired many documents that show that Military Field Courts also handles case related to the Counterterrorism Law of 2012:

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<tr>
<td>Fleeing from an enemy. (Article 102)</td>
<td>Fleeing from an enemy as part of a conspiracy [In this context, a conspiracy is defined as the agreement of two or more military servicemen to flee]. (Article 103)</td>
<td>Every Syrian who takes up arms against Syria with the enemy. (Article 263)</td>
<td>Death</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Declining to obey orders in attacking the enemy or rebels. (Article 112)</td>
<td>Disobedience and instigating disobedience in face of the enemy [In this context, this applies to any case where two or military servicemen adopt violence using weapons and refuse to obey their superiors to disperse and return to the regime]. (Article 113)</td>
<td>Every Syrian who conspires with or contacts a foreign state to encourage it to commit an act of aggression against Syria or provides said foreign state with the means to do so, provided that his or her actions result in an outcome. (Article 264)</td>
<td>Death</td>
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<td>Instigating disobedience in times of war or enactment of martial law. (Article 114)</td>
<td>Commit an act of violence against a wounded or ill servicemen with the intention of eliminating them. (Article 132)</td>
<td>Every Syrian who conspires with or contacts an enemy in order to assist them in having that enemy’s forces achieve victory. (Article 265)</td>
<td>Death</td>
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<tr>
<td>Any military serviceman who deliberately and by any means, burns, destroys or hampers construction of buildings, warehouses, watercourses, railways, electricity lines, phone lines, aviation centers, ships, vessels, or any transportable item of the army or items used in national defense. (Article 137).</td>
<td>Any military serviceman who abandons their post in face of the enemy. (Article 144)</td>
<td>Any Syrian who, by any mean, commits an act, with the intention of crippling national defense, to damage facilities, factories, ships, aerial vehicles, instruments, ammunition, livelihoods, or means of transportation, and broadly all items of a military character or intended to be used by the military and its affiliated forces, (or being the reason for such act) in the event that this act took place in times of war or in times when war is anticipated, or in the event that those acts resulted in the loss of life. (Article 266).</td>
<td>Death</td>
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<td>Any military serviceman who attempts or manages to render themselves indisposed, temporarily or permanently, in order to avoid their military legal duties in the event they did so in face of the enemy. (Article 146)</td>
<td>Every commander who surrendered their post to the enemy before exhausting all means of defense, or before doing everything dictated by duty and honor. (Article 152)</td>
<td>Stealing, for the benefit of a hostile state, items, documents, and intelligence that should have been otherwise concealed to ensure the safety of the state. (This felony is punishable by the heightened death penalty according to articles 274 and 247 of the Syrian Penal Code). (Article 272).</td>
<td>Death</td>
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<tr>
<td>Every commander who surrenders on the battlefield in the event where that decision led to ending the fight or if the commander contacted the enemy before doing everything dictated by duty and honor. (Article 153)</td>
<td>Every military serviceman who takes up arms against Syria. (Article 154, Paragraph 1).</td>
<td>Who, as a state employer or worker, was in possession of documents or intelligence that should have been otherwise concealed to ensure the safety of the state, and divulged such possessions with no valid reason to the benefit of a hostile state. (This felony is punishable by the heightened death penalty according to articles 274 and 247 of the Syrian Penal Code). (Article 273).</td>
<td>Death</td>
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<tr>
<td>Every captive who was captured and subsequently betrayed the state's trust and took up arms again. (Article 154, Paragraph 2).</td>
<td>Every military serviceman who surrenders to the enemy or to the benefit of the enemy the soldiers under their command or their post, or the weapons of the army, or munitions, or supplies, or war maps, or maps for workshops, ports, or trenches, or passwords, or secrets related to military operations, offenses, and negotiations. Article (155, Paragraph 1).</td>
<td>Anyone who heads any armed militias, or assumes leadership positions in said militias no matter their rank, with the intention of raising a city or a district, or a state property, or the properties of residents, or with the intention of attacking or resisting the public forces working against the perpetrators of such felony. In the event the individual took up an exposed or concealed weapon, or was wearing a foreign emblem, whether civilian or military, or committed acts of vandalism of buildings designating as being of public interest or for intelligence or transportation. (This felony is punishable by the heightened death penalty according to articles 301 and 247 of the Syrian Penal Code). (Article 299).</td>
<td>Death</td>
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<tr>
<td>Every military serviceman who contacts the enemy to facilitate its work. (Article 155, Paragraph 2).</td>
<td>Every military serviceman who participates in conspiracies intended to increase pressure on the officer in charge. (Article 155, Paragraph 3).</td>
<td>Those who are involved in armed militias formed to commit acts that instigate a civil war or sectarian strife through arming, or encouraging Syrians to take up arms against one another, or by inciting them to kill or loot in a district(s), or with the intention to raid a city or a district or a state property, or the properties of residents, or with the intention of attacking or resisting the public forces working against the perpetrators of such felony. In the event they took up an exposed or concealed weapon, or were wearing a foreign emblem, whether civilian or military, or committed acts of vandalism of buildings designated for a public interest or for intelligence or transportation. (This felony is punishable by the heightened death penalty according to articles 301 and 247 of the Syrian Penal Code). (Article 300).</td>
<td>Death</td>
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Anyone who divulges passwords, secret signs or secret codes, or who distorts news or orders when facing the enemy, or if they led the enemy to the locations of the armed forces or forces of allied states, or misled said forces, or caused a mass panic within one of the Syrian armed forces, or if they committed wrongful acts or acts intended to obstruct the assembly of dispersed soldiers, when committed during times of war or under martial law with the intention of aiding the enemy or harming the military or allied government forces. (Article 156).

Every serviceman who enters a warzone, a military facility, a military institution, a military workshop, a camp, or any army facility with the intention of obtaining documents or intelligence for the benefit of the enemy or if they believed it will benefit the enemy. (Article 158, Item A).

Every group of three or more people who roam public roads and rural areas as armed gangs with the intention of mugging pedestrians or assaulting individuals or assets, or engaging in any other act of theft. Anyone who tried to commit murder or committed torture or barbaric acts upon a victim (Article 326).

Death

Any military serviceman who gives the enemy intelligence that could endanger military operations or undermine the safety of military sites, facilities, or institutions, or if they believed they would do so. (Article 158, Item B).

Any military serviceman who conceals, through themselves or someone else, or is aware of spies or enemies without informing their superior officers. (Article 158, Item C).

Any act of terror that resulted in destroying, even partially, a public building or industrial institution, or a ship, or other facility, or damaged any vehicle used as a mode of transportation, or resulted in the loss of the life of a human being. (Article 305)

Death

Any enemy who wears a disguise and enters a war site, a military facility, a military camp, or any military point. (Article 159)

Any individual who instigates military servicemen to join the enemy or the rebels or who facilitates the means to do so while being aware, or recruits themselves or others in service of a country that is in a state of war with Syria. (Article 160).

Death

As the table shows, there are no fewer than 34 felonies named in the Military Penal Code and the Syrian Penal Code which are punishable by death. We believe that those felonies have been used as grounds for death sentences by Military Field Courts in a severe and indiscriminate way with no proof or evidence.
VI. The 22 Amnesty Decrees Issued by the Syrian Regime
Since 2011 Mostly Excluded Sentences/Death Sentences
Issued Through Summary Trials by Military Field Courts

Since March 2011, the Syrian regime has released to date 22 amnesty decrees. Most of those decrees grant a pardon for the full, half, or quarter of the sentence handed down, primarily for criminal felonies and misdemeanors. Some of those decrees refer, albeit in a very limited way, to those imprisoned for expressing their opinions or those arrested in connection with the popular uprising. SNHR previously released an extensive report which provided analyses of these 22 amnesty decrees from the perspectives of data-related, legal, and reality-based standpoints. Despite the relatively high number of decrees, they have failed to guarantee the release of any of the detainees and persons forcibly disappeared by the Syrian regime. Furthermore, the overwhelming majority of the decrees issued since March 2011 do not apply to crimes handled by the Military Field Court, and death penalty crimes, in accordance with the Military Penal Code and the Syrian Penal Code. This is significant since these accusations have been leveled in a widespread and indiscriminate manner by the regime’s security agencies against thousands of detainees and forcibly disappeared persons, including peaceful activists, with no grounds except for interrogation records containing ‘confessions’ extracted under the duress of torture, with countless detainees tried by the Military Field Court in recent years on the basis of these worthless allegations. These crimes are: 16

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Syrian Penal Code</th>
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<tr>
<td>Every military serviceman who takes up arms against Syria. [was included only in the amnesty decrees issued in 2012, and 2013] (Article 154, Paragraph 1).</td>
<td>Every Syrian who takes up arms against Syria with the enemy. (Article 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Every captive who was captured and subsequently betrayed the state’s trust and took up arms again. [was included only in the amnesty decrees issued in 2012, and 2013] (Article 154, Paragraph 2).</td>
<td>Every Syrian who conspires with or contacts a foreign state to incite it to commit an act of aggression against Syria or provides said foreign state with the means to do so, provided that his or her actions result in an outcome. (Article 264)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Every Syrian who takes up arms against Syria with the enemy. (Article 1)</td>
<td>Every Syrian who conspires with or contacts an enemy in order to assist them in enabling that enemy’s forces to achieve victory. (Article 265)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Every military serviceman who surrenders to the enemy or acts for the benefit of the enemy, using the soldiers under their command or their post, or the weapons of the army, or ammunition, supplies, war maps, or maps showing workshops, ports, or trenches, or who passes on passwords, or secret information related to military operations, offensives, and negotiations. Article (155, Paragraph 1).</td>
<td>Any Syrian who, by any means, commits an act, with the intention of crippling national defense, to damage facilities, factories, ships, aerial vehicles, instruments, ammunition, livelihoods, or means of transportation, and broadly all items of a military character or intended to be used by the military and its affiliated forces (or being the reason for such act) in the event that this act took place in times of war or in times when war is anticipated, or in the event that those acts resulted in the loss of life. (Article 266)</td>
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16 All amnesty decrees also exclude the only two crimes punishable by death in the Counterterrorism Law as stated in Articles 5, Paragraph 2, and Article, Paragraph 3.
Every military serviceman who participates in conspiracies intended to increase pressure on the officer in charge. (Article 155, Paragraph 3).

Anyone who divulges passwords, secret ciphers or secret codes, or who distorts news or orders when confronting the enemy, or if they led the enemy to the locations of the armed forces or forces of allied states, or misled said forces, or caused a mass panic within one of the Syrian armed forces, or if they committed wrongful acts or acts intended to obstruct the assembly of dispersed soldiers, when committed during times of war or under martial law with the intention of aiding the enemy or harming the military or allied government forces. (Article 156).

Stealing, for the benefit of a hostile state, items, documents, and intelligence that should have been otherwise concealed to ensure the safety of the state (This felony is punishable by the escalated death penalty according to articles 274 and 247 of the Syrian Penal Code). (Article 272).

Whoever, as a state employer or worker, was in possession of documents or intelligence that should have been otherwise concealed to ensure the safety of the state (This felony is punishable by the escalated death penalty according to articles 274 and 247 of the Syrian Penal Code). (Article 273).

As shown above, no fewer than 20 criminal acts are classified as being death penalty offences according to the Military Penal Code and the Syrian Penal Code which have been heavily used as grounds for bringing charges against detainees and forcibly disappeared persons. However, these 20 criminal acts were excluded by the amnesty decrees issued, except in the cases of a very limited number of detainees, and only in one or two amnesty decrees in the past 12 years. Moreover, as mentioned earlier, we could not access any data that shows clearly which crimes the defense minister does refer to Military Field Courts. As such, we believe there are other charges besides those identified in this report.
The data above also refutes the claims made by the Syrian regime\(^\text{17}\) in its official report, ‘The National Report that Includes Information provided by the State - Third Cycle,’ which purportedly provided details of Syria’s human rights records and was submitted to the Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review for the year 2022. In this report, the Syrian regime claims:

> “It should be noted that the death penalty is applied only in rare cases and for the most serious crimes, and its use is surrounded by restrictions and safeguards. In fact, a sentence of death is not carried out until the views of the Amnesty Commission have been canvassed and until the Head of State has given approval (art. 43 of the Criminal Code). Condemned persons can also benefit from amnesty laws under which their sentence is commuted to life imprisonment. This is consistent with article 6 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. According to statistics, 19 death sentences were handed down in 2017, of which just 3 were carried out while the other condemned persons benefited from an amnesty; 18 death sentences were handed down in 2018, of which just 6 were carried out; and 3 death sentences were handed down in 2019, all of them covered by an amnesty.”

Furthermore, according to information we received from eyewitnesses, none of the victims tried and executed by the regime enjoyed any of the elements of due process that should be present when a death sentence is issued, such as being afforded sufficient legal support by allowing them to appoint a defense lawyer, or ensuring that defendants have sufficient information about their rights and the legal procedures during all litigation stages, or the assurance that the court has relied on adequate access to material evidence in passing the death sentence, rather than being reliant on security records that include confessions extracted under torture or threats, or being passed due to regional or sectarian grudges.

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VII. No Fewer than 14,843 Death Sentences Have Been Issued by the Military Field Court, 7,872 of Which Have been Carried Out, Including Those of 114 Children and 26 Women

SNHR’s database uses various categories and subcategories that we’ve identified in order to ensure a comprehensive and holistic approach is taken in maintaining the data of every detainee and forcibly disappeared persons, and facilitating the process of sorting their details according to whatever determinants are required when compiling and releasing different statistics and reports. One of those determinants is the current ‘status’ of the detainee or forcibly disappeared person, with each detainee assigned one of eight classifications: (namely: released; forcibly disappeared; died due to torture; executed; arrested; released and then conscripted; released and died due to torture complications, and finally unidentified). Each one of these classifications also includes various subcategories to allow for more precise classification of cases. For instance, a ‘released’ detainee can be further categorized as released after serving their sentence, released as part of a settlement, released in accordance with an amnesty decree, released as part of a prisoner exchange, etc. We also investigate where detainees are being held (if known) and which court is handling their case, while in the case of forcibly disappeared persons, we also look into when they were last seen, and other information related to their disappearance. Records in all of these main categories and sub-categories are maintained and regularly updated based on our daily monitoring of the status of detainees and forcibly disappeared persons, which has continued for 12 years to date. These categories are assigned in each case based on credible, SNHR-approved sources from whom we obtain information, who are mostly detention survivors and detainees’ family members, in addition to primary eyewitnesses and whatever documents and data we obtain from various sources. Of course, simply gathering information as-is from such sources is not enough, with SNHR scrupulously verifying and cross-checking each item of information to ascertain its authenticity and accuracy. This is why we always reiterate that the documentation process is a complex and accumulative one, and in the Syrian context requires many years in order to get the whole picture. In the figures to follow, we focus exclusively on executions that took place in regime detention centers in accordance with rulings by Military Field Courts, and only those of detainees and forcibly disappeared persons who were tried by Military Field Court, and on ascertaining their probable fate. To identify the status of those detainees, we used the accumulative mechanism outlined above, including a composite cross-check process for all the data.

According to SNHR’s database, no fewer than 14,843 death sentences have been issued by Military Field Courts in Syria since March 2011, up until August 2023. Of these, no fewer than 6,971 sentences were reduced to timed/life imprisonment with hard labor, with most of these detainees still being held in detention centers. Meanwhile, death sentences were carried against 7,872 individuals; including 114 children, 26 women, and 2,021 military servicemen. None of these victims’ bodies were returned to their families following their execution, with the families also receiving no official notification of their loved ones’ deaths. We must emphasize that we believe this figure to be very much a minimum estimate of the actual number of executions carried out against detainees and forcibly disappeared persons in regime detention centers.

18. It should be noted that the Syrian regime promulgated Law No. 15 of 2022 that includes amendments to a number of the articles of the Syrian Penal Code promulgated in Legislative Decree 148/1949. The amendments included repealing the ‘times/life imprisonment with hard labor sentence’ in all current legislations, which was replaced with timed/life imprisonment.

19. What we mean by the term ‘military servicemen’ is all military servicemen who defected from, or deserted Syrian regime forces and individuals who joined armed opposition factions.
The chart below shows the distribution of the outcome of 14,843 death sentences issued through summary trials by Military Field Courts against arbitrarily arrested detainees and forcibly disappeared persons in regime detention centers between March 2011 and August 2023, according to the status of the detainees in question:

As shown on the chart above, the Syrian regime executed no fewer than 53 percent of all those sentenced to death by Military Field Courts, according to the information SNHR has been able to verify.

As shown on the chart above, only approximately two percent of the detainees sentenced to death ultimately survived and were released from detention, while at least 6,607 other detainees whose sentences were reduced to timed/life imprisonment are still being held in the regime’s various military, civilian, and central detention centers spread across Syrian governorates.
The chart below shows the distribution of the victims executed in accordance with death sentences issued following summary trials by Military Field Courts between March 2011 and August 2023:

As shown on the chart above, civilians account for no less than 74 percent of all people executed following summary trials. This proves that Military Field Courts deliberately primarily targeted civilian victims of enforced disappearance in a concentrated and widespread manner, followed by military victims of enforced disappearance.

As shown on the chart above, the years 2013, followed by 2014, then 2015 saw the highest numbers of executions of forcibly disappeared persons in regime detention centers. It should be noted that the year in which the execution took place is not related to the year in which the sentence was issued. The death sentence can be carried out after a few months or longer periods of time after the death sentence is passed (the longest period recorded is 31 months). This period includes the process of the sentence being formally approved by the Minister of Defense.
The chart below shows the average number of months that the 7,872 detainees executed spent in detention before their death sentences were carried out between March 2011 and August 2023:

As shown on the graph above, following sentencing, detainees spent an average of one to two years, and a maximum of two-and-a-half years, in detention before being executed. This suggests that the Syrian regime was deliberate in swiftly and quickly carrying out executions through summary trials as part of a calculated policy to dispose of forcibly disappeared persons.

The map below shows the distribution of the 7,872 detainees who were executed following summary trials by the Syrian regime’s Military Field Courts between March 2011 and August 2023, across Syrian governorates:

As shown on the map above, the largest proportion of detainees executed based on death sentences issued by Military Field Courts came from the governorates of Rural Damascus, followed by Damascus, Daraa, Hama then Homs.
The chart below shows the distribution of the average age of the 7,872 detainees that were executed following summary trials by Military Field Courts between March 2011 and August 2023:

As shown on the chart, the average age group was young adults (18-35), with children and elderly people accounting respectively for no fewer than 1.4 percent and eight percent of the detainees executed.

The chart below shows the distribution of the 7,872 detainees executed following summary trials by Military Field Courts between March 2011 and August 2023 according to their type of activism and background:

As shown on the chart, the death sentences issued by Military Field Courts have primarily targeted civilian activists in the uprising, then military servicemen, then teaching, medical, and media personnel, which leads us to believe that the Syrian regime has deliberately and systemically targeted activists for eradication, refusing to even consider releasing them, as a part of a calculated murderous policy inside its detention centers.

20. Civilians who were active in the various fields including relief aid, humanitarian activists, political activists, and peaceful activism in the context of the popular uprising for democracy of March 2011.
As shown on the chart above, no fewer than 54 percent of all execution victims, who were executed following a summary trial, were detained in regime military prisons, primarily Sednaya Military Prison, with the next highest numbers held in security branches based in Damascus city, followed by the central civilian prisons spread across Syrian governorates, with the largest of these being the Adra Central Prison in Damascus governorate.

VIII. No Fewer Than 240,47 Forcibly Disappeared Persons Have Been Referred to the Military Field Court, Including 98 Children and 39 Women, Between March 2011 and August 2023

SNHR’s database indicates that, as of August 2023, no fewer than 96,103 persons arrested by the Syrian regime since March 2011, including 2,327 children and 5,739 women, are still forcibly disappeared by the regime. Of these detainees, the families of approximately 24,047, including 98 children and 39 women, learned that their loved ones had been referred to the Military Field Court through detention survivors or meditators, although the families have been unable to obtain any information about their loved ones’ fate or even the most basic information about them since their disappearance. It should be noted that this figure does not include detainees still facing trial by the Military Field Courts who are being held in central and civilian prisons scattered across Syria.
Since the Syrian regime has not returned any of the bodies of the 7,872 executed detainees to their families, or informed their loved ones of their burial place, or even when they were executed, those 7,782 victims are still classified as forcibly disappeared, with the crime of enforced disappearance still taking place. As such, the number of enforced disappearance victims tried by the Military Field Court is no fewer than 31,919 (the original 24,047 plus the executed 7,782 detainees), including 212 children and 65 women.

Similar to the analysis above of the detainees executed, below is an analysis of the enforced disappearance victims referred to Military Field Courts.

The chart below shows the distribution of enforced disappearance victims detained in regime detention centers and enforced disappearance victims who have been referred to the Military Field Court between March 2011 and August 2023:

As shown on the chart above, enforced disappearance victims who have been referred to Military Field Courts account for no fewer than 25 percent of the overall number of the persons still forcibly disappeared by the Syrian regime. In other words, approximately a quarter of the persons forcibly disappeared by the regime have been referred to the Military Field Court. The families of these victims have not been able to obtain any information about their loved ones in all these years, increasing our fears that the Syrian regime has already executed them, and further underlining that Military Field Courts have been used as a primary and chillingly effective instrument of enforced disappearance through their secretive and barbaric sentences.
The chart below shows the distribution of persons who have been, and still are forcibly disappeared by the Syrian regime between March 2011 and August 2023 by year, with a running count:

As shown on the chart above, 2012 was the worst year in terms of numbers of enforced disappearances, followed by 2013, then 2011, and 2014. In other words, the first four years of the popular uprising for freedom saw the highest rates of enforced disappearance crimes in an attempt by the regime to end and crush the spirit of the popular movement.

When comparing the years that saw enforced disappearance crimes and the years in which we documented executions and the average number of months a detainee is held before being executed, one finds a strong correlation between these categories. This correlation primarily and notably emerges in the first four years, i.e., the years with the highest enforced disappearance numbers, in terms of both enforced disappearance and executions. For one, the year in which we recorded the highest number of enforced disappearances correlates with the year in which we recorded the highest number of executions, with the year in which execution was carried out coming one or two years after the year when the enforced disappearance began. For instance, 2012, the year that saw the most enforced disappearance crimes, matches with 2013, the year that saw the most executions, and so forth. This tallies with the findings of our earlier analysis which found that the executed detainees spent an average of one or two years in detention before their execution.
The chart below shows a comparison between enforced disappearance victims in regime detention centers and victims executed as a result of death sentences issued by Military Field Courts, according to the year in which the enforced disappearance incident took place and the year in which the execution took place:

As shown on the chart, there is a massive disparity between the number of survivors who had been tried by the Military Field Court and the number of detainees still forcibly disappeared who had been referred to Military Field Courts and whose fate is still unknown. The number of detainees still forcibly disappeared is three times greater than those who survived Military Field Court trials, which proves that Military Field Courts have adopted a deliberate policy of eliminating the detainees referred to the Court, with very few survivors.
IX No Fewer than 110 Names of People Executed as a Result of Summary Trials by Military Field Courts Were Found in Documents Obtained by SNHR from the Civil Registry Records

We divided these 110 cases into two patterns:

1. The names of fewer than 32 detainees executed following summary trials by Military Field Courts were found in the civil registry documents obtained by SNHR:

   On December 12, 2022, SNHR released a report that focused on analysis of hundreds of death certificates obtained by the group for persons forcibly disappeared by the Syrian regime, whose families had not been notified of their deaths, and whose deaths had not been made public in the civil registry records. As of this writing, we have obtained 547 new death certificates since the beginning of 2022 that have not been made public by the civil registry offices, with the families of the victims in question still not notified of their loved ones' deaths. We continue receiving new death certificates to this day, with our team working continuously to document and analyze the information found in these documents in compliance with our customary rigorous methodology. A total of 1,609 individuals; including 24 children, 21 women (adult female), and 16 medical personnel, had been forcibly disappeared and registered as dead in the civil registry's records between the beginning of 2018 and October 2022. The data we have obtained shows that two types of death certificates are found in civil registry records:

   - **First**: there are death certificates which are given to the families of the deceased, with the families receiving those documents when visiting civil registry offices and completing the paperwork necessary to obtain a death certificates. Most of these death certificates specify the place of death as Damascus, which is indeed the city with the highest number of detention centers where forcibly disappeared persons die; however, those death certificates do not identify the detention center where the person in question died.

   - **Second**: there are death certificates that are not shared with families, nor does the regime allow them to be shared, which remain stored in the civil registry's records. These death certificates do specify a place of death. SNHR has been able to obtain a number of these death certificates. Most of these death certificates give the place of death as Tishreen Military Hospital or the Military Field Court, which usually confirms that a death certificate was issued for the person in question.

   Death certificate for a person forcibly disappeared by the Syrian regime who was registered as dead in the civil registry's records, with the place of death named as the Field Court in Damascus.
An Instrument of Death and Disappearance: How the Syrian Regime Uses Military Field Courts Against Activists and Dissidents

As shown on the chart above, the year that saw the highest number of death certificates issued by the civil registry which mention Field Court/Military Field Court was 2013, followed by 2014, which are the same years that saw the highest number of execution of detainees.

No fewer than 78 cases where the detainees registered as dead were connected. The time of death in those documents was identical, which increases the probability of these individuals having been executed.

We documented no fewer than 78 cases where forcibly disappeared persons registered as dead in the civil registry’s records were connected with one another, such as a common job, blood relations, or common date/incident of arrest. These death certificates named an identical time of death, which again increases the probability that these forcibly disappeared persons received death sentences.

Abdul Sattar Abdul Fattah Khoulani, from Darayya city in southwestern Rural Damascus. We documented that he was arrested on Friday, July 22, 2011, by Syrian regime forces in Darayya city. When we studied the cases that surfaced recently, we found out that he was registered in the civil registry records as dead on Thursday, June 7, 2018, while the date of death written on the document that reached the civil registry records reflect that he died on Tuesday, January 15, 2013, meaning he died about five years earlier. He was killed along with his brother Majd al-Din Khoulani, who was a law student. Majd al-Din was arrested on Monday, August 8, 2011, in an ambush set up by Syrian regime forces in Darayya city. The two young men were both registered as dead in the civil registry’s office on the same day, with their family confirming to us that they had died inside Sednaya Military Prison in Rural Damascus governorate.
SNHR spoke, via phone, with Amina Khoulani, the sister of the victims Abdul Sattar and Majd al-Din. She told us that security forces arrested Abdul Sattar while he was trying to aid his brother Islam al-Dabbas, who, like Abdul Sattar, was a prominent peaceful activist in Darayya and who also subsequently died in Sednaya Military Prison: “Security forces also raided our home multiple times as they were searching for Majd al-Din. They finally captured him in an ambush in Darayya. When a relative went to the civil registry office to obtain a family statement, the clerk there told him that my brothers Abdul Sattar and Majd were registered among the dead. Majd and Abdul Sattar were leaders of the peaceful movement in Darayya. They were never involved in any activism promoting violence.” Amina added that her family was able to visit the two brothers in December 2012, and that multiple sources confirmed to the family that both brothers were executed in Sednaya Military Prison along with other detainees.

X. Detainees Appearing Before Military Field Courts Endure Torture, Degrading Procedures, and Horrific Conditions

Detainees whose cases are handled by the Military Field Court are usually held in military prisons – most notably Sednaya Military Prison in Rural Damascus, which is the main prison for such detainees, and in security branches based in Damascus city. Since the beginning of 2014, up until August 2023, the Syrian regime started incarcerating some detainees being tried by Military Field Courts in Adra Central Prison and other central prisons in the remaining governorates, due to the increasing number of detainees referred to Military Field Courts. Those detainees are usually transferred from the security branches and Sednaya Central Prison, and either await a court appearance, or are referred after sentencing and sent to a detention center to serve their sentence. From time to time, some detainee are reassigned from the central prisons to Sednaya Military Prison. Usually, when a detainee is placed in Sednaya Central Prison, his or her fate becomes unknown. There are only a very few, rare cases where detainees have survived the Military Field Court through paying massive sums of money, or through prisoner exchange deals between the armed opposition and Syrian regime forces.

The monstrous character of the Military Field Court is not limited to its sentences, but also applies to the conditions suffered by detainees referred to that court in the course of their trial, as well as the mechanism through which victims are informed of their sentences. We have identified at least 10 methods of intimidation and torture practiced by the Court during sessions against detainees, which exhibit a strategic and continuous manner:
1. **Detainees appear for literally mere minutes before the judge:** Usually, the detainee only appears before the judge for a few minutes. In dozens of cases, survivors told us that they appeared before the judge for no more than one minute, and the only relevant questions they were asked were their names and their place of origin. Naturally, no lawyer comes with the detainee. In other words, the detainee is denied the slightest chance of defending themselves, disproving the charges against them, or simply being heard.

2. **Mass trials for groups of detainees who are collectively sentenced:** In many cases, detainees appear together before a court under one case. We have documented many instances in which groups of detainees were tried under one case, even if those detainees have no connection to one another. Usually, the same sentence is issued for the entire group of detainees, with no regard for their involvement in the charges against them.

3. **Random charges and fabricated evidence included in detainees’ records and use of confessions extracted under torture:** The public prosecution usually relies on accusations extracted under torture and added to the individuals’ records in regime security branches to fit the charges or make them more severe. Many survivors told us that, when they appeared before the judge, officers presented ‘evidence’ such as weapons or metal implements and claimed falsely that those items belonged to them and were in their possession when they were arrested.

4. **Beatings, abuse, and inhumane degradation:** Most of those appearing before the Military Field Court are subjected to beatings, verbal abuse, and inhumane degradation, which often exhibits a sectarian character, by both the officers and the judges, especially when a detainee complains that the contents of the written records were extracted under torture, or simply because a detainee comes from a certain area that saw widespread anti-regime popular movement.

5. **Forcing some to record televised confessions:** Dozens of detainees have been forced to appear in grotesque ‘confession videos’ in which they’re filmed reading fabricated ‘confessions’ that were extracted from them under torture, based on the allegations levelled against them in regime security branches. This footage is broadcast by the Syrian regime’s official state media. These recorded ‘confessions’ have been filmed by regime security forces, as well as Military Field Courts, without any of the detainees being given any option to accept or refuse to be filmed, and facing the threat of even harsher sentences if they refuse.

6. **Forcing detainees to sign documents with their fingerprints without knowing their contents:** Military Field Courts have forced most of the detainees who attended trial sessions to sign documents with their fingerprints without allowing them to read or review those documents beforehand, or to refuse to provide their signatures.

7. **Detainees not being notified of their sentences or their legal status:** When the court session is concluded, detainees are not informed of the verdict or the sentence during or after the session. Usually, detainees must file multiple requests to the administration of the detention centers where they are being held or to the Court in order to discover their sentences.

8. **Appearing before the court blindfolded and handcuffed:** Most legal texts and conventions requires that a defendant shall appear freely before the court; this is disregarded in Military Field Courts, where defendants appear while still handcuffed, with their blindfolds only removed in the courtroom for a few minutes.
9. The presence of individuals wearing civilian attires with no known role: We were told by dozens of survivors about the presence during the Military Field Court’s sessions of individuals dressed in civilian attire, whose legal or functional role was unknown, and who kept intimidating defendants during the trials.

10. Defendants being informed that a sentence had been passed against them without even appearing before a judge: We were told by dozens of detainees that sentences had been passed against them without their even appearing before any court, attending any trial sessions, or seeing a judge. Most of these detainees were notified of their sentence informally by an officer either to extort them or as a form of psychological torture. These cases usually involved the detainee signing a document stating that they acknowledged the sentence passed against them without even knowing how the sentence had been issued or how the decision was reached.

Below are some accounts by survivors who were tried by Military Field Courts.

Talal Walid Aslan, born in 1979, from al-Shannan village in Jabal al-Zawiya in southern rural Idlib governorate, was working as an electronics repairman when he was arrested on Wednesday, July 13, 2011, by Syrian regime forces in Maaret al-Nu’man city in southern Idlib governorate. Talal was transferred multiple times during his imprisonment, and received a prison sentence of 20 years from the Military Field Court. He was released on October 30, 2019, from the Suwayda Central Prison.

Talal Aslan was interviewed by SNHR about this detention and trial:

“I was in Ma’aret al-Nu’man coming from al-Shannan village. I was surprised by a gunshot at my car. When I stopped, shotguns were pointed at my head by a Military Security patrol. They had me get out of the car and handcuffed me and covered my face. I was taken to a school in al-Hamidiya area in southern rural Idlib, and then I was transferred in a bus to the Military Security Intelligence Directorate in Idlib, and from there to Idlib Central Prison. They left me in a basement filled with detainees. We were referred to the Military Police branch in Idlib, and then to Damascus. I was transferred multiple times to branches 215, 291, and 248, and then to Sednaya Military Prison. During my imprisonment, I was subjected to all types of torture, and while I was in Sednaya Prison, I was transferred to the Military Police branch in al-Qaboun area, and then to the Field Court for the first time in December 2011, where I was put in a waiting room with about 21 individuals. When my turn came, I was taken to the judge while blindfolded. When I entered the courtroom, they took off my blindfold and I saw the judge. His name was Mohammad Kanjou and he was wearing a military uniform, and next to him on both sides were two people wearing civilian attire, in addition to the court reporter. I was accused by the judge of resisting regime forces, and [the judge claimed] that I was injured in my foot while doing so. I denied the charges and I told him I was hit by a stray bullet when I was at a protest. He asked the military officer to take me out of the courtroom. The sessions did not last for more than 1-2 minutes. A week later I was referred to the Field Court to attend another session, which was the last time I appeared before a court. In that session, the judge accused me of shooting at the regime military, as well as other charges. Again, I denied the charges and told him I was only involved in the demonstrations. He instructed the court reporter to write that I’d denied the charges and I was asking for mercy. They took me back to Sednaya Military Prison, and I was transferred again to the Suwayda Central Prison on July 8, 2012. I submitted an inquiry to the prison’s administration about the sentence I received from the Military Field Court, and was then

informed that the Military Field Court sentenced me to 20 years in prison over committing terror acts. I was forbidden to hire a lawyer or appeal the verdict. My family actually tried to reach out to lawyers, but once the lawyers were told that it was the Field Court they cut off communication with my family. I was held for [Suwayda] Central Prison for seven-and-a-half years. An amnesty decree was promulgated in 2014 and my sentence was cut by third in accordance with Article 305 of that decree (meaning my sentence was reduced to 13 years and a half). Another amnesty decree was issued in 2019, and my sentence was again reduced to eight years and a half, of which I had spent eight, at which point I submitted a request to lift one quarter of my sentence to the Field Court, in order to agree to have me set free. I sent an official letter to the prison’s administration, and a decision was made to release me from the Field Court on October 30, 2019.”

**Bashir Mohammad Nader al-Abdou**: born in 1985, from Jisr al-Shoghour city in western Idlib governorate, is a media worker and university student at the Faculty of Economics in Tishreen Virtual University. He was arrested on Friday, June 10, 2011, by Syrian regime forces, receiving a 20-year prison sentence with hard labor from the First Military Field Court on February 14, 2012. He was released on November 23, 2019, from the Suwayda Central Prison

SNHR interviewed Bashir Mohammad Nader al-Abdou about his detention and trial

“I was 26-year-old when Jisr al-Shoghour city joined the uprising. I would film the demonstrations in the city with other people. One day, we were filming while the regime was preparing to raid the city and the people were fleeing, so we took shelter in Hallouz village near rural Jisr al-Shoghour, and were ambushed by a pro-regime armed group that captured us. They put plastic bags over our heads and handcuffed us and took us to the church that was in the village, where we kept for an hour-and-a-half, during which we were beaten. Afterwards, some regime officers came and took us to Hallouz School for Elementary Education. We were placed in a classroom, and they threatened to kill us. Then, we were taken to Ishtbraq village, and then to a school in al-Qaraour village in rural Idlib, where we spent the night. Subsequently, we were transferred to the Military Security Intelligence Directorate’s branch in Hama city, and then to al-Balouna Prison in Homs city on June 13, 2011, and on the same day to the General Intelligence Directorate’s branch in al-Mazza area [in Damascus], where I confessed to filming the demonstrations. I was then transferred to branch 248, and then to the Military Police in al-Qaboun, and from there to Sednaya Military Prison. I was transferred then

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22. Interview conducted in 2021.
An Instrument of Death and Disappearance: How the Syrian Regime Uses Military Field Courts Against Activists and Dissidents

SNHR’s video interview with the survivor Bashir Mohammad Nader al-Abdou

Mohammad al-Ahmad, born in 1991, from Talbisa city in northern rural Homs governorate, was arrested on Friday, September 23, 2011, by Syrian regime forces from the military camp where he was serving in Mount Qasioun area in Rural Damascus governorate. Mohammad was transferred several times, before he was released in early 2015.

SNHR interviewed Mohammad al-Ahmad about his detention and trial:

“I joined the mandatory military service on April 1, 2010, with the Republican’s Guard Brigade 106 in Qasioun area. When the Syrian uprising started, I decided with some of my comrades to defect, but our plan failed when a security report was submitted by one of the servicemen informing the com-
mand of our attempted defection. They arrested all of us and I was detained in a prison in the Brigade's headquarters, and then I was transferred to al-Tahouna Prison in al-Mazza area in Damascus city, which is a prison affiliated with the Republican Guard, where I was held for approximately 10 days. I was transferred to a prison affiliated with the Republican Guard’s Security Office in al-Mazza, and to the Military Security Intelligence Directorate’s branch in Kafrsousa area, and then to Branch 248, and then to the Military Police branch in al-Qaboun area, and subsequently to Sednaya Military Prison on December 18, 2011. I suffered all kinds of torture during my imprisonment. In March 2012, I was transferred from Sednaya Military Prison to the Military Police branch in al-Qaboun to appear before the Military Field Court. I was transferred while handcuffed and blindfolded with a group of detainees in a military vehicle. When we entered the building, we waited for two hours sitting on the ground and it was cold. I appeared before a judge that was wearing civilian attire, and there were two people sitting next to him on both sides. The judge asked me if I’d tried to defect, and I denied the confessions credited to me. He asked me to sign a paper with a fingerprint, and I did not know what my sentence was. They took me back to Sednaya Prison and I remained there until I was released in early-2015, where I was transferred to the Military Judiciary in al-Mazza area for a day, and then to Military Police branch in al-Qaboun, and then to the Republican Guard’s Security Office, where I received a paper certifying that I was relieved from my military service. I was then transferred to the military service’s headquarters to finish my release procedures.”

Mohannad al-Haj, born in 1982, from Damascus city, lived in Rukn al-Din neighborhood in the city and was working as an employee at the Syrian regime’s Ministry of Defense, when he was arrested at his workforce by Syrian regime forces on Monday, February 27, 2012. Mohannad was transferred several times, including to Sednaya Military Prison in Rural Damascus governorate. He was released from Adra Central Prison in Rural Damascus governorate on Monday, June 9, 2014.

SNHR interviewed Mohannad al-Haj Yousef:

“I was in my workplace in al-Hama area in Damascus city when I was arrested by security officers. They handcuffed me and took me to the State Security’s branch in Kafrsousa area in Damascus. As soon as I entered an office in the building, while blindfolded, two officers beat me for two hours, even though I still did not know why I’d been arrested. I was taken to the Military Security branch. When I entered, I saw detainees hanging with no clothes. They beat me again and forced me to take off my clothes and put me in a solitary cell for three days naked. I could not sit on the ground because the cell was too cold. When they got me out, they gave me clothes and took me for interrogation. The interrogator beat me for half an hour with a green plastic club. I learned after that that I was accused of killing the doctor brigadier general [Amid] Eisa al-Khouli who was a doctor in Hamesh Hospital, in addition to other charges of committing acts of terror. The interrogator threatened to torture and kill me unless I confessed. When I confessed, he beat me for an hour, to the point that my body could not endure and I vomited and fell on the ground, at which point they took me to a solitary cell. On the next day, the interrogator told me that he knew that I wasn’t the killer, yet he still proceeded to beat me and torture me with electricity, and by burning my facial hair and pouring cold water over my body. After 45 days, the interrogator had me sign seven documents, and they then placed me in a car and took me to another branch. Two months after that, I was transferred to the Palestine Branch, where I suffered all types of torture. Another two months
after that, I was transferred to Branch 215, where I remained for a few hours, and then I was taken in a small bus with other detainees to the Military Police’s branch in al-Qaboun area. I appeared before a field court and I denied my confessions. On the next day, I was transferred to Sednaya Military Prison where I was held for four months, during which I suffered all types of torture that almost killed me. I was held in an overcrowded cell that contained a large number of detainees which lacked the most basic essentials of life. Some of the detainees held there died due to torture. I was then transferred to Adra Central Prison, where I was able to see my family for the first time. For 10 months, they never knew my whereabouts. When I was in Adra Central Prison, I learned that I’d received a 10-year prison sentence with no right to appeal, without appearing before a judge. After three years, an amnesty decree was issued and I was released in June 2014. After my release, I was stripped of all my civilian and military rights, and my transferrable and non-transferrable assets were seized. I was summoned to security branches multiple times. To this day, I am still dealing with the effects of torture, which caused a hernia in two of my spinal vertebrae from when I was severely beaten in Sednaya Military Prison, in addition to leg injuries;”

SNHR’s video interview with survivor Mohannad al-Haj Yousef

Yasser Tawfiq, born in 1989, a clothes designer from Eastern Ghouta in Rural Damascus governorate, was living in al-Zahera neighborhood in Damascus city when he was arrested on Saturday, May 5, 2012, by Syrian regime forces in a raid on his home. Yasser was transferred several times, and received a life sentence from the First Military Field Court. He was, however, subsequently released from Suwayda Central Prison on April 21, 2020.
SNHR interviewed Yasser Tawfiq about his detention and trial.24

“When the demonstrations started, I founded a coordination group in the town to coordinate the protests. On May 5, 2012, my house in Damascus was raided by personnel from the [regime’s] Raid Squad 215. I was arrested along with my brother and taken to Branch 215, where I was tortured. On December 1, 2012, we were informed we were being put on trial. They put us in a bus and transferred us to the Military Field Court in al-Qaboun area. It was a three-story building. On the way, we were severely beaten. My case was with the First Field Court on the first floor. I entered the courtroom handcuffed and blindfolded. They took my blindfold off and the judge at the time was Mohammad Kanjou, and with him was Major [Raed] Loay al-Afsh, and another civilian person. He asked me where I came from, and I answered. The civilian person said that my family is a bad one. He asked me how many demonstrations I was involved in, and I denied being involved in any. They took me out of the courtroom, and I was held after the trial in the Military Police’s branch in al-Qaboun area in Damascus. On December 4, 2012, I was transferred to Sednaya Military Prison, and then to Adra Central Prison on December 24, 2012. During my time in Adra Prison, I submitted what is known as a “situation inquiry” to find out my sentence. I was told I had no sentence yet, and my charge was ‘conspiracy’. My family tried multiple times to hire a lawyer and file an appeal, but to no avail, because my case was being handled by the Military Field Court. On September 13, 2013, I filed a second request and found out I’d received a life sentence on charges of being involved in acts of terror. When an amnesty decree was issued on June 12, 2014, I was included and my sentence was reduced from 20 years to 20 years. At the end of 2014, I was accused with other prisoners of arranging a mutiny; those accusations stemmed from malicious intentions. I was then transferred to Suwayda Central Prison on February 2, 2015. Another amnesty decree was released in 2018, and my sentence was reduced from 20 years to 13 years and six months. I remained in Suwayda Prison until 2020, when my sentence was reduced to seven years and six months, and I was released on April 21, 2020.”

Ammar Hassan al-Hamwi, born in 1996, from Khan Sheikhoun city in rural Idlib governorate, was living in Damascus where he was a student at Damascus University’s Department of Literature and Humanities when he was arrested by Syrian regime forces on Saturday, February 1, 2014, on his way back from work in al-Sheikh Saed in Damascus city. Ammar was transferred multiple times, and his case was referred to the Military Field Court in Damascus on August 16, 2016, over charges of committing acts of terror. A decision was issued to release him on November 3, 2016, and he was released from Hama Central Prison on Sunday, November 6, 2016.

SNHR interviewed Ammar al-Hamwi about his detention and trial.25
“I was working in a restaurant in al-Mazza area in Damascus. On my way home from work in al-Sheikh Saed neighborhood near al-Mazza Highway on Saturday, February 1, 2014, around 2:00 am, there were security officers waiting for me to come home beside my residence in al-Sheikh Saed near al-Mazza Highway. They arrested me and arrested my friends who lived with me in my home. They took us to Branch 215 in Damascus, and I was transferred then to Branch 248, and then to Sednaya Military Prison. I experienced all types of torture in my detention. In May 2015, when I was in Sednaya Military Prison, I was transferred to the Military Field Court near the Literature Department in Damascus University in al-Barmka area in Damascus. I was transferred in a closed car for transferring prisoners. We entered through a big gate to a big open area that is part of the court’s headquarters. They took me with two other detainees to a small room to the right side of the entrance. When they called my name, they took me to the judge’s room and the court reporter was also there. He [the judge] only asked me about my name, and then told me to exit the room. They took me back to Sednaya Military Prison, where I stayed until September 2016, when they called for my name, and told me that I would be released thanks to an amnesty from the president concerning those who were arrested while being younger than the legal age. When I left Sednaya Military Prison, I was transferred to Hama Central Prison, and the judge did not allow my release until after an official letter was sent from the First Military Field Court to Hama Central Prison, which took two months until I was released from Hama Central Prison on November 6, 2016.”

Bayan Mahmoud, born in 1985, an activist in the popular uprising, from Damascus city, was arrested in early-2013 by Syrian regime forces in Damascus city. She was released from Adra Central Prison in Rural Damascus governorate as part of a prisoner exchange deal between Syrian regime forces and armed opposition factions in late-2013.

SNHR interviewed Bayan Mahmoud about her detention and trial26

“When the uprising began, I got involved in coordinating demonstrations and relief activism. I was arrested on my way home in a Damascus area, when I was stopped by 13 regime officers. They searched for my laptop in my home. They later, at some point during my interrogation, got the laptop and got all the information. Afterwards, they put me in a car, and took me to Branch 215, where I was held for six months. Forty days into my stay in Branch 215 I was referred to the investigation

26. Interview conducted in 2022.
committee and I faced nine charges, including an assassination, bombings and funding terrorism, taking part in demonstrations, and trying to damage the state’s image, as well as what is known as ‘sex jihad’, in addition to my media and relief activism, and my activism in the makeshift hospitals, and contacting foreign parties. During that time, I learned that my case was referred to the Field Court. I was kept in Branch 215 under the custody of the Military Investigation Committee, until I was transferred to Branch 248, and then to the Military Police branch in al-Mazza along with other detainees, in preparation for our transfer to Rukn al-Din Police Station. I was then transferred to Adra Central Prison, where my family was able to reassign my case to the Counterterrorism Court by paying money and intermediaries and hiring a lawyer. I was released along with other female prisoners as part of a prisoner exchange deal between Syrian regime forces and armed opposition factions. However, I am still wanted by the Court.”

Obada Mohammad, born in 1990, a civil and relief activist during the popular uprising, from Sednaya town in Rural Damascus governorate, was a student living in al-Tadamun neighborhood in Damascus city when he was arrested on Sunday, August 3, 2014, by Syrian regime forces at the Immigration and Passport Directorate in the city. Obada was transferred several times, and a ruling ordering his release was issued by the Military Field Court on December 29, 2015. He was released from Adra Central Prison in Rural Damascus governorate on January 3, 2016.

SNHR interviewed Obada Mohammad about his detention and trial:

“I was 24 years old when I was arrested. I was involved in the protests and was a relief and civil activist. On August 3, 2014, at noon, I was arrested from the Immigration and Passports Directorate in Damascus city, where I was trying to obtain a passport. I was filing the necessary paperwork when an employee took me to a room with three others. We stayed there until the end of the workday. They put us in a bus and transferred us to al-Khatib Branch, where I was held for seven months, after which I was transferred to the State Security Directorate’s branch in Kafrsousa in Damascus on February 12, 2015. I was kept there for three months. On May 19, 2015, I appeared before the judge of the Second Military Field Court in an administrative building in the same branch, and my trial lasted for less than a minute. The next day, I was transferred with other detainees to the Military Police branch in al-Qaboun area, and from there to Sednaya Military Prison in Rural Damascus. I suffered harsh conditions in my detention and experienced torture, especially in Sednaya Military Prison, where they use starvation as a method of torture. On July 22, 2015, I was transferred to the building of the Military Court in al-Mazza area, and from there to Adra Central Prison. An order for my release was issued on December 29, 2015, and I was released on Sunday, January 3, 2016. They took me to the Military Police in al-Qaboun and I was immediately conscripted into the military.”

Interview conducted on January 21, 2023.
Obada added that during his trial at the Second Military Field Court he did not attend any of the five sessions, as he was being held in Adra Central Prison in Rural Damascus, where he faced charges of committing acts of terror that led to the death of a human being. He was also prohibited from appointing a lawyer. His family was able to attend a session called ‘a pleading session’ to prove his innocence, due to his family’s ability to secure some witnesses.

Radwan K., was held in the ‘Red Building’ in Sednaya Military Prison from October 22, 2012, until April 2, 2014. He spent the entirety of his detention in the Red Building, and was tried by the Military Field Court. Over the course of one-and-a-half years he observed executions being carried out by Syrian regime forces in Sednaya Military Prison, with many of the families of detainees held with him being informed of their loved ones’ deaths and receiving their ID cards from the Military Police in al-Qaboun in Damascus.

Radwan told SNHR: “Detainees would be gathered together every two weeks, mostly on Mondays, in the outgoing dormitory, and in other times in nearby rooms depending on the number. They were put in lines before sunrise while blindfolded with their backs bent over. About 10 minutes after they were taken to the outgoing dormitory, we would hear the sounds of buses. Those buses would come back, one after another, in a way that led you believe that the detainees who’d been in the buses were taken to a place that’s not too far away. This happened for the first time while I was in Sednaya on December 3, 2012, when they took seven detainees from our room - one person from Homs city from the Junblat Family, and the rest from al-Haffa area in rural Latakia. They were all under the same case in the Field Court. Their names are Hosam al-Samar, Mohammad al-Samar, Hassan Layla, and Omar Lahham aged 50, and Ziad and Mohammad Bashaq about two years later. When I left Sednaya, I ascertained that Syrian regime forces returned their IDs to their families, meaning they were executed after they took them form our room with dozens of other detainees.”

Abdul Rahman D., a former prisoner in Sednaya Military Prison, was released as part of a prisoner exchange deal between Syrian regime forces and armed opposition factions at the end of 2014. He was arrested by personnel from the Syrian regime’s Branch 215 on July 19, 2013, from his home in al-Midan neighborhood in Damascus. Abdul Rahman managed an anti-regime website, and had no military affiliations. During interrogation at Branch 215, in order to spare himself further agonizing daily torture and beating, he ‘confessed’ falsely to killing government officers. After seven months in Branch 215 in Damascus, he was transferred to Sednaya Military Prison, where he learned that he was to be tried by the Military Field Court on charges of killing government personnel and planning to bomb a government forces checkpoint in Damascus city; he received the death penalty 50 days into his detention in Sednaya, during which he was prohibited from seeing his family, hiring a lawyer, or even inquiring about his trial sessions.

Abdul Rahman told SNHR: "I was transferred from Branch 215 with about 20 other detainees. When we arrived in Sednaya Military Prison, we were sorted according to our files which contain details on the type of court, offense, and whether or not a detainee’s allowed to have visits. I was transferred to the Red Building, and remained in a solitary cell for 16 days, without any officer or prison staff talking to me. After the 16 days, I was taken to a deputy’s office, and he asked me to sign with my fingerprints on some paper, and told me I was with the Field Court, and described me as a terrorist. He told me he would make sure I got the harshest punishment possible, in addition to the insults."
Afterwards, they took me to a cell with about 36 detainees in it, most of them were military servicemen. Some of them were on trial by the Field Court, while other did not know what type of trial they were getting, but all of them were still awaiting a sentence - prison or execution. I remained in that cell for about month, during which four detainees died [due to] poor health and the prison administration’s refusal to transfer them to a hospital. Three military detainees were taken to an unknown place. We heard leaks from prison personnel that they were executed for ‘treason and working with the terrorists’. Subsequently, I was summoned by an officer who told me that I’d received the death penalty, and asked me to sign the sentence papers with my fingerprints without seeing them because my eyes were blindfolded. I tried to find out how they’d arrived at that verdict without me even appearing before a judge, but the officer was very hot-headed and threatened to torture me. They brought me back to the cell without me knowing anything else, except that I had a death penalty. I stayed in that cell for four months, waiting for the date of the execution. Then, suddenly, a patrol came and transferred me to the State Security branch in Damascus. On the way, the officers were mocking me and telling me that I was about to be executed. I stayed in the State Security branch for 15 days, and then we were taken in a truck with 35 other detainees, at which point I learned for the first time that we would be released in exchange for the regime securing a high-ranking officer. I am still receiving treatment in Jordan because of the torture and conditions I suffered in Branch 215 and Sednaya Prison.”

Hassan al-Fajr, born in 1985, a philosophy graduate and regime military conscript from al-Sahriya village, which is administratively a part of Shahshabo area in western rural Hama governorate, was arrested on Sunday, September 11, 2011, by Syrian regime forces from his place of service al-Mstouma Camp in rural Idlib governorate. On April 12, 2012, he was tried by the Military Field Court. He was released by Syrian regime forces in 2019.

SNHR spoke to Hassan Fajr via phone in September 2020:

“I was a military servicemen serving in al-Mstouma Camp in rural Idlib. I was arrested by Military Security personnel from the camp, and was taken to the Military Security branch in Idlib city on charges of working with the terrorists. I was detained there for three months, during which I suffered all kinds of torture and degradation. I was then transferred to security branches in Damascus city, such as the Military Interrogation Branch, Palestine Branch, and lastly Sednaya Military Prison. On April 12, 2012, I was taken to the Field Court in Damascus city, and appeared before the Court’s security committee. I was asked if I worked with the terrorists, and I answered, ‘No’, so the judge said, ‘He denied his statements’. I was never told what was my sentence or charges. I was then taken to Sednaya Military Prison, where I suffered torture, deprivation of food and sleep, for eight years, without knowing what fate awaited me. In August 2019, I was released from Sednaya Military Prison.” Hassan added that he did not know why he was released until he asked a warrant officer who told him he’d been released because his sentence ended. During his imprisonment, Hassan was not allowed to contact any family members or appoint a lawyer.
XI. Samples from SNHR’s Document Archive of Sentences Issued by Military Field Courts

A sentence notice issued by the Military Field Court in 2011 against a detainee who’d been tried. The document states, ‘Death sentence for convictions of committing acts of terror that resulted in the loss of the life of a human being’. This sentence was reduced to a life sentence with hard labor.

A sentence notice issued by the Military Field Court in 2012 against a detainee who’d been tried. The document states, ‘Death sentence for convictions of committing acts of terror that resulted in the loss of the life of a human being’. This sentence was reduced to a life sentence with hard labor.

Decision of inclusion in the general amnesty which mentions the sentence given to detention survivor Mohannad Haj Yousef by the Military Field Court, namely a ‘10-year prison sentence with hard labor on charges of conspiring to commit acts of terror’.

XII. Most Notable Victims Executed as a Result of Summary Trials By Military Field Courts

Abdul Basit Mahmoud Saber, born in 1988, from Zebdeen village in eastern Rural Damascus governorate, was arrested in September 2012 by Syrian regime forces at a checkpoint known as al-Nasim Checkpoint near al-Mleiha town in Rural Damascus governorate. He has been classified as forcibly disappeared ever since, with the Syrian regime denying his detention and refusing to allow anyone, even a lawyer, to visit him. On Monday, July 9, 2018, his mother obtained a document from the civil registry’s office indicating that he had died on November 24, 2014. SNHR can confirm that Syrian regime forces have still not returned his body to his family, and we suspect that he received the death penalty from the Military Field Court.

Document given by the civil registry’s secretary to the family of the victim Abdul Basit Mahmoud Saber. Under ‘Notes related to the incident of death’ The document reads in Arabic: ‘Military Field Court 7265, dated January 7, 2018’
Mohammad Yousef Ghalawi, born in 1994, was living in al-Aydeen Camp for Palestinian refugees in Homs city when he was arrested in 2015 by Syrian regime forces. On Thursday, June 21, 2018, the General Association for Palestinian Refugees (GAPR) informed his family that he had died, following the GAPR’s receipt of an official letter from the Public Prosecutor of the Second Military Field Court informing it of Mohammad’s death on September 25, 2015, without specifying the place of death, or returning his body to his family.

Ja’far Ya’rub Abu S’eifan, from al-Shaajara town in western rural Daraa governorate, was aged 18 when he was arrested by personnel from the Syrian regime’s Military Security Intelligence Directorate in July 2018 from Ma’reya Camp for internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Hawd al-Yarmuk area in western Daraa governorate. On Thursday, October 31, 2019, the Military Field Court in al-Qaboun neighborhood in Damascus delivered an official letter to his family indicating that Ja’far died on June 4, 2019, at the Raid Squad 215’s branch in Damascus city.

Mudar Khaled al-Nabou, from Ma’aret Harma village in southern rural Idlib governorate, was a student at Damascus University’s Department of Literature when he was arrested in Damascus city by Syrian regime forces in August 2011. He was sentenced to death by the Military Field Court and has been classified as forcibly disappeared ever since, with the Syrian regime denying detaining him and refusing to allow anyone, even a lawyer, to visit him. On Thursday, April 29, 2021, his family learned that he had died. SNHR can confirm that he was in good health when he was arrested. SNHR suspects that he received a death sentence from the Military Field Court in Sednaya Military Prison in Rural Damascus governorate. We can also confirm that his body has not been returned to his family.
SNHR spoke to Mudar’s brother, Mu’men al-Nabou, who told us: “My brother Mudar was an activist in the uprising in Damascus city. He was arrested by Syrian regime forces in August 2011, after a friend of his, who was a regime officer, lured him to the Political Security Directorate’s branch in Damascus. He was held there for nearly a year under investigation. He was then transferred several times to different security branches, until he was finally transferred to Adra Central Prison in Rural Damascus governorate in 2014, when he was sentenced to death by the Military Field Court.”

Mu’men adds, “My mother visited my brother regularly, and he was in good health. His weight was 80 kilograms. In 2016, he was transferred to Sednaya Military Prison in Rural Damascus. When his mother visited him for the first time one month after he was transferred to Sednaya Prison, he was in a very poor state of health, dropping down to 35 kilograms. He would be tortured before and after every time we visited him. After several visits, we decided to stop the visits in fear of him being tortured. He would send us letters regularly with detainees who had been released. In 2020, we hired a lawyer to release him and he asked for large fees, but all his attempts failed. In April 2021, the lawyer told my mother to visit the Military Police’s branch in Damascus city to receive the papers confirming that he died in April 2021, without returning his dead body.”

Mohammad Abdul Karim al-Jundi from Nawa city in western rural Daraa governorate, was arrested in April 2011 by Syrian regime forces in Nawa city over his involvement in the anti-regime demonstrations. He has been classified as forcibly disappeared ever since, with the Syrian regime denying detaining him and refusing to allow anyone, even a lawyer, to visit him. On Sunday, April 11, 2021, Mohammad’s family learned that Syrian regime forces had executed him in a detention center on July 10, 2013, after he was sentenced to death by the Military Field Court in Damascus.

We spoke to a relative of Mohammad al-Jundi’s, also named Mohammad al-Jundi, who told us that Syrian regime forces arrested Mohammad from his home in Nawa city: “He was arrested because of his involvement in the uprising and the anti-regime protests in Daraa. He was taken to a security branch in Damascus city. At the beginning of 2012, he was transferred from Damascus city to Suwayda Central Prison, and his family was unable to visit him. He remained in Suwayda Prison until the beginning of 2013, when he was transferred to the Raid Squad 215’s branch in Damascus city, and that was the last time we heard any news about him.”

Mohammad adds, “On April 11, 2021, Mohammad’s family visited the Military Security’s branch in Damascus city, where they received his IDs, in addition to a document confirming that he died on July 10, 2013, without returning his body.”

Ibrahim Sayel al-Amarin, a former armed opposition fighter from Nawa city in western Daraa governorate, was arrested on Saturday, November 3, 2018, by Syrian regime forces. He had agreed to a security settlement with the Syrian regime. His family was last able to visit him on January 6, 2021, at Sednaya Military Prison in Rural Damascus governorate. On Monday, March 22, 2021, Ibrahim’s family learned that Syrian regime forces had executed him on February 22, 2021, at Sednaya Military Prison, after he was sentenced to death by the Military Field Court in Damascus. SNHR can confirm that his body has not been returned to his family.

SNHR spoke to a friend of Ibrahim’s and his family’s, named Mohammad al-Hourani. Mohammad told us: “Ibrahim was a fighter with the armed opposition. After Syrian regime forces took over Daraa, he agreed to a security settlement. He was arrested by Syrian regime forces in Nawa city, and was transferred multiple times to different security branches. He was last transferred to Sednaya Military Prison in Rural Damascus governorate. His family learned he’d received a death sentence from the Military Field Court in Damascus, and were able to visit him for the last time on January 6, 2021, at Sednaya Military Prison. On March 22, 2021, the lawyer told the family that he’d been executed in Sednaya Military Prison, but the death documents that the family obtained indicate that he died of a heart attack on March 22, 2021.”

Ali Walid al-Masri, born in 1999, from al-Mzayreeb town in western rural Daraa governorate, was arrested on Monday, September 24, 2020, by Syrian regime forces on the road connecting Daraa city and al-Mzayreeb town. He has been classified as forcibly disappeared ever since, with the Syrian regime denying detaining him and refusing to allow anyone, even a lawyer, to visit him. On Tuesday, November 29, 2022, Ali’s family learned that Syrian regime forces had executed him in a regime detention center, after he was sentenced to death by the Military Field Court in May 2022. SNHR can confirm that Ali’s body has not been returned to his family.

SNHR spoke to a friend of Ali’s, named Hussein al-Ashqar, who told us:

“Ali was arrested a few hours after he was released from the State Security’s branch in Aleppo city. He was transferred to Kuweires Airport in rural Aleppo governorate, and from there to al-Mazza Airport in Damascus. He was held in the Air Force Intelligence Directorate for a year and a month, before he was transferred again to Sednaya Military Prison on November 11, 2021. Since he was first arrested, his family had tried their best to get him released or visit him, but nothing came of that, so they hired a lawyer to follow up on his case and try to get him released. The lawyer told them that Ali was transferred to the Military Field Court and then executed. The lawyer also showed them the sentence document and the month when the sentence was carried out, which was May 2022.”

31. Via phone on December 20, 2022.
XIII. The Most Notable Figures Involved in Executions Based on Summary Trials by the Syrian Regime’s Military Field Courts between March 2011 and August 2023

The Syrian regime is a highly centralized structure. SNHR uses the definitions of the customary international humanitarian law that holds commanders and higher-ranking individuals responsible for war crimes committed by their subordinates pursuant to their orders, or “if they knew, or had reason to know, that the subordinates were about to commit or were committing such crimes and did not take all necessary and reasonable measures in their power to prevent their commission, or if such crimes had been committed, to punish the persons responsible.” Moreover, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) expands on this principle and applies it to crimes against humanity committed in times of peace or war, as well as war crimes. The Rome Statute also holds commanders and senior officials, including civilian ones, responsible for such criminal acts. Even if fighters are simply obeying the orders of their superiors, they share part of the responsibility in the eyes of international law. SNHR has repeatedly warned, in numerous reports and statements, of the risk of committing acts that lead to war crimes or crimes against humanity. Even more, international law states that even being coerced to commit war crimes, crimes against humanity, or genocide is not accepted as a defense except in extreme situations where the only option presented is kill or be killed.

The Syrian regime and all its various institutions are involved in committing widespread and systematic violations, many of which qualify as crimes against humanity and war crimes. Anyone who ordered, incited, encouraged, participated in, aided, or facilitated those crimes is also implicated. The most prominent of the regime institutions are its military and security agencies. Truth-finding commissions and international investigation commissions would disclose the names of individuals implicated in violations, which is a view that SNHR has adopted for years. SNHR has repeatedly called on the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic (COI) to disclose the names of individuals that have been verifiably involved in committing gross violations that constitute crimes against humanity and war crimes.

Hundreds of the commanders of the regime’s security and army institutions, as well as military and security committees, have been implicated in the violations committed against the Syrian people and the Syrian state since 2011. SNHR possesses a large database containing thousands of items of information on individuals involved in the commission of violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law, the positions they held, and the most notable violations in which we documented their involvement. We ensure that this database is regularly updated, and we have shed light on many of these figures in numerous reports and statements over the past 12 years.

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With regard to executions based on summary trials and the enforced disappearance crimes related to said executions, the four main regime security directorates - the Military Security Intelligence Directorate, Air Force Intelligence Directorate, General Intelligence Directorate, and Political Security Directorate, were the bodies primarily responsible for transferring and referring victims to Military Field Courts after arresting, torturing, and forcibly disappearing those victims in detention centers affiliated with the four security agencies. In addition to these four institutions, there are a number of military and civilian prisons which are well known for these practices. The documents and data which SNHR has collected indicate that at least 62 regime branches were responsible for arbitrary arrest and enforced disappearance practices, and subsequent executions, which were committed in line with a broad methodology that was set in motion in accordance with decisions issued from the very top of the regime's power hierarchy, starting with the President of the Republic, who directly controls the ministries of interior and defense, the National Security Bureau, and their various security agencies and security and military committees. In this context, it should be noted that decisions on appointments, promotions, and transfers of officials heading security agencies are taken through the orders and decrees issued exclusively by the President of the Republic. The appointment of heads of security agencies is such a sensitive and complex process that is carried out in absolute secrecy. As such, we rely on cross-checking our database of archived documents on those involved in human rights violations, and on the accumulation of information we obtain from detention survivors and defected officers.

We believe that disclosing the names of those involved in violations is a form of exposure and accountability before the public, first at the local level, and secondly at the international level. We also believe that it is important that the families of the victims and the forcibly disappeared know the identities and details of their enemies in order to ensure that these figures are held accountable by the courts and legal bodies that we hope will eventually be established as an essential part of the transitional justice process. We also do this in the hope that exposing these figures’ names may deter them from repeating their violations, and so that others know that anyone who commits crimes against the Syrian people may be exposed before the whole of Syrian society, including their own families and communities, as well as being exposed by the media, and subsequently before local and international courts. We will also spare no effort to achieve the goal of ensuring that as many of those criminal figures as possible are included on international terrorism and economic sanctions lists.

Some of the names of figures highlighted here may be duplicated, since they have held and been promoted to different positions and ranks.

**President of the Republic**

The officers who held the position of minister of defense from March 2011 until August 2023

As mentioned earlier, Military Field Courts report to the Ministry of Defense in the Syrian regime’s government, with its rulings being approved by the defense minister. As such, everyone who’s occupied this post should be considered primarily involved in the practices of enforced disappearance and executions based on summary trials that were directed by the Military Field Courts.

**Lieutenant General Ali Habib**

Born in 1939, Ali Mahmud Habib was a Lieutenant General (Emad) from Safita city in eastern rural Tartus governorate. Habib graduated from the Military Academy in Homs governorate in 1962 and enrolled in various military preparatory courses, including leadership, general staff, and higher general staff. He rose among the ranks of the Syrian military until he was named Major General (Liwa) and Lieutenant General in 1998. He was named the commander of the Mechanical Infantry Division in 1984, and Commander of the Special Forces in 1994. In 2002, he was appointed Deputy Chief of General Staff, before being promoted to the rank of Chief of General Staff on May 11, 2004. He received another promotion on June 3, 2009, when he was appointed Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Syrian Army and Armed Forces and a Minister of Defense, before being relieved of his ministerial duties on August 8, 2011. He died on March 20, 2020.

**Lieutenant General Dawoud Rajiha**

Born in 1947, Dawoud Abdullah Rajiha from Irbeen city in Rural Damascus governorate attained the rank of Lieutenant General (Emad). He graduated from the Military Academy in Homs governorate in 1968 with specialty in field artillery and enrolled in various military preparatory courses, including leadership, general staff, and higher general staff. He rose among the ranks of the Syrian army, assuming the rank of a Major General (Liwa) in 1998 and a Lieutenant General (Emad) in 2005. He held many military positions, such as battalion commander and brigade commander, as well as deputy director and director of many military bodies within the military. He was named Deputy Chief of General Staff in 2004. In 2011, he was appointed as the Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Syrian Army and Armed Forces and as Minister of Defense, as well as Deputy Prime Minister. He was designated on the list of sanctions by the US Department of Treasury in March 2011. He died in the bombing of the National Security headquarters in Damascus that took place on July 18, 2012.
Lieutenant General Fahd al-Freij

Born in 1950, Fahd Jasim al-Freij from al-Rahjan village in eastern rural Hama governorate, is a Lieutenant General (Emad). He graduated from the Military Academy in Homs in 1971 with a specialty in armored vehicles, rising among the ranks of the Syrian military until being named Chief of the General Staff in 2005, and promoted to the rank of a Lieutenant General (Emad) in 2009 and then Emad Rukn. In August 2011, he was appointed as the Deputy Chief of General Staff, and in July 2012, he was appointed the Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Syrian Army and the Minister of Defense, as well as Deputy Prime Minister. He was relieved of his duties on January 1, 2018.

Lieutenant General Ali Ayyoub

Born in 1952, Ali Abdullah Ayoub is a Lieutenant General (Emad) from al-Bahlouliya village in northeastern rural Latakia governorate. He graduated from the Military Academy in Homs with specialty in armored vehicles in 1973. He rose among the ranks of the Syrian army until he was named Commander of the Republican Guard’s Brigade 103, and then the First Corps in the Army. In September 2011, he was named Deputy Chief of the General Staff, and was promoted to Lieutenant General (Emad) in 2012. He was also the Chief of the General Staff. In early-2018, he was named the Deputy Commander-in-Chief and the Minister of Defense, as well as Deputy Prime Minister. He was relieved of his duties on April 28, 2022.

Lieutenant General Ali Abbas

Born in 1964, Ali Mahmoud Abbas is a Lieutenant General (Emad) from Ifra village in Wadi Barada in northern Rural Damascus. He graduated from the Military Academy in Homs with a specialty in armored vehicles in 1985. Between 1997 and 2006, he was sent to participate in various preparatory courses and programs in Pakistan, the United Kingdom, Sweden, and the Netherlands. In 2017, he appeared in one of the pro-regime newspapers as head of the Military Institute for Foreign Languages. He was a Major General (Liwa) by 2021, and assumed the position of Deputy Chief of General Staff in April 2022. He was subsequently named the Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Syrian Army and Minister of Defense and was promoted to a Lieutenant General (Emad) two days later, and has been serving in that position ever since.
Directorship of the Military Police in Damascus between March 2011 and August 2023

The Military Police institution is one of the executive apparatuses of the Military Field Courts. The Military Police is also the body that mainly handles the carrying out of executions and all related arrangements, as well as the entity that largely handles the burial of the executed victims’ bodies, which is usually a separate process from the burial of the victims who died due to torture and medical negligence. Executions are usually carried out in Military Prisons or some security branches.

  2012-2016: Unidentified.
- Major General Ryad Habib Abbas (April 1, 2018-).

Officers who assumed positions and responsibilities in the Military Field Court (2011-2012)

- Major General al-Sheikh Jaber al-Kharfan, Director of the Mobilization Department and Head of the First Field Court
- Major General Haydar Tawfiq Haydar, Director of the Military Survey & Deputy Head of the First Field court
- Brigadier General Judge Mohammad Hassan Kanjou, Head of the Military Public Prosecution & the Public Prosecutor of the Military Field Court
- Major General Mohammad Rajab, Head of the Military Police & Head of the Second Field Court
- Brigadier General Adib Samandar, Deputy Head of the Second Field Court, and Head of the Second Military Police Branch in Damascus
- Brigadier General Jamal Abbas, Head of Investigation and Prisons Department in Damascus
- Brigadier General Adib Qanou of the Military Police branch in Damascus
- Captain Samer Deeb Abbas, Member of the First Field Court, and then Public Prosecutor of the Second Military Field Court 2015
- Judge Ali al-Khalaf, Member of the First Military Field Court
- Captain Mahmoud Ali Khalilouf, Public Prosecutor of the Second Military Field Court 2018

Heads of the Sednaya Military Prison in Rural Damascus Governorate

**Tal’at Mahfoud**

Born in 1958, Tal’at Mahfoud was a Brigadier General (Amid Rukn) from al-Breikhiya village in eastern rural Tartus governorate. He graduated from the Military Academy in Homs governorate with the rank of lieutenant and was assigned to the Military Police. He assumed the position of commander of the volunteer squads, or holders of law degrees who joined the mandatory military service in Police School. In May 1998, he was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel (Muqaddam), and was then appointed as head of Tadmur Military Prison in Homs governorate. In 2004, he was promoted to Colonel (Aqid) and assumed the position of head of the Military Police in Latakia governorate until 2006, when he was reassigned as head of Tadmur Military Prison. In 2008, he assumed the position of head of Sednaya Military Prison until May 7, 2013. On May 9, 2013, Tal’at was shot dead by armed opposition fighters on the road between al-Tal and Mnein in Rural Damascus governorate.

**Ibrahim Suleiman**

Born in 1964, Ibrahim Suleiman is a Colonel (Aqid Rukn) from Fajleit village in eastern Tartus governorate. He graduated from the Military Academy in Homs governorate in 1985, joining the Division 83 Infantry. By 2005, he was the head of interrogation at the Military Police branch in Homs governorate. In 2009, he was promoted to Colonel (Aqid Rukn), and assumed the position of head of the Military Police branch in Homs governorate, before becoming the head of the Military Police’s Prisons Division. In May 2013, he was appointed as head of Sednaya Military Prison, remaining in that post until November 2013, when he was named the head of the Military Police in al-Qaboun in Damascus city. He was subsequently promoted to head of the Military Police in the area, serving in that position until his retirement.

**Adib Samandar**

Born in 1962, Adib Samandar is a Brigadier General (Amid) from al-Qalaea village in southern rural Latakia governorate. He graduated from the Chemical Military Academy in al-Yahoudiya area in Latakia governorate in 1983. He rose among the ranks of the Syrian regime military until he assumed the position of head of interrogation at the Military Police branch in Idlib governorate in 2003. In 2010, he was named the head of the Military Police branch in Latakia governorate, before being transferred to Damascus where he was named head of the city’s Military Police agency. On October 1, 2013, he assumed the position of the head of Sednaya Military Prison, where he remained until March 2014 when he was transferred to the administration of the Military Police.
Mahmoud Ahmad Ma’touq

Born in 1970, Mahmoud Ahmad Ma’touq was a Brigadier General (Amid Rukn) from Fadyou village in southern rural Latakia governorate. He graduated from the Military Academy in 1992 with a specialty in air defense. In 2002, he was sent to Russia to attend a six-month training program. In 2008, he graduated from the course of Leadership and General Staff course at al-Rukn Academy. He was with the administration in the Military Police until 2013, when he assumed the position of head of Sednaya Military Prison as a Brigadier General (Amid Rukn). On January 13, 2018, Syrian regime authorities announced his death.

Wasim Suleiman Hassan

Born in 1969, Wasim Suleiman Hassan was a Colonel (Aqid) from Btghramou village in southern rural Latakia governorate. After graduating from the Military Academy in Homs governorate in 1991 with a specialty in infantry, he was assigned to the Republican Guard. In 2006, he was transferred to the Military Police in al-Qaboun in Damascus city, where he attended a training program. He was a captain in Battalion 230 of the Third Unit of the Military Police. In 2014, he was appointed as the assistant director of Sednaya Military Prison, remaining in that position until 2017, when he was promoted to head of the prison as a Colonel (Aqid). In 2020, he was transferred to the administration of the Military Police in al-Qaboun, and subsequently retired. In 2021, Syrian regime forces announced he had died of a heart attack.

Osama Mohammad al-Ali

Born in 1971, Osama Mohammad al-Ali is a Brigadier General (Amid) from Safita city in eastern Tartus governorate. After graduating from the Military Academy in Homs governorate in 1994 with a specialty in infantry, he was assigned to the Military Police and rose among its ranks. In 2010, he was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel (Muqaddam), and served as captain in Sednaya Military Prison. In 2016, he was named head of the Military Police branch in al-Qameshli city in Hasaka governorate. In 2018, he was appointed as assistant director of Sednaya Military Prison as a Colonel (Amid), before he was promoted to Brigadier General (Aqid) to serve as the head of Sednaya Military Prison, the position he has remained in ever since.

Directorship of the Military Judiciary since March 2011

- Major General Murhaf Khadr al-Homsi: August 18, 2009-December 12, 2013
- Major Mohammad Kanjou Hassan, December 12, 2013-January 1, 2023
- Major Geenral Yazan Ahmad al-Homsi: January 1,2023-
XIV. Conclusions and Recommendations

Legal conclusions

The Syrian regime has eroded the state judiciary’s authority, placing it under its own full control, doing the same with the state’s legislative authority. In effect, there is today only one ruling authority, namely the executive authority, which is in the hands of the head of the republic and the security agencies that report to him. The Syrian regime is a bona fide dictatorial, totalitarian regime which explicitly and blatantly violates the principle of the separation of powers.

The Military Field Court is not an independent court (there is no separation of powers), nor is it impartial. The fact that it was not established according to the rule of law means that it contravenes many texts in international human rights law (mainly Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights), and international humanitarian law. The UN Human Rights Committee has stated that any criminal conviction issued by a body that is not an independent and impartial court and was not founded in accordance with the law does not fulfill the requirements of Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

At every stage of the legal process, before, during and after trial, the Military Field Court contravenes the requirements of a fair trial, most notably the inviolable right to defense.

The regime’s prosecution service in these courts has failed to present any concrete evidence against detainees except for confessions extracted under torture. The regime prosecution service has also failed to prove its claims that detainees’ confessions have been provided voluntarily rather than coerced. The regime’s criminal use of torture against detainees to extract confessions constitutes crimes against humanity, more particularly given its widespread and systematic nature, according to Article 7 of the Rome Statute. Therefore, all cases that have been constructed through the use of torture are dismissible and unlawful.

All the sentences handed down by this political/security court are unlawful, because they were the result of unlawful trials.

Child defendants are subjected to the same procedures as adults in every stage of trial, in blatant violation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child which Syria has ratified.

The Syrian regime has violated international customary law and Article 3 of the Geneva Convention by carrying out those trials in the context of an internal armed conflict, since the court was not established in accordance with the law, nor is it even remotely an independent, impartial, and fair court. The denial to any person of their right to a fair trial qualifies as a war crime according to the Rome Statute of the ICC.

According to Article 8 (2) (c) (iv) of the ICC’s Elements of a Crime, in the event that “there was no previous judgement pronounced by a court, or the court that rendered judgement was not “regularly constituted”, that is, it did not afford the essential guarantees of independence and impartiality, or the court that rendered judgement did not afford all other judicial guarantees generally recognized as indispensable under international law”, which applies to the Military Field Court which has also handed down death sentences in the context of a non-national armed conflict, these judgements, i.e., the death sentences issued by the Military Field Court, constitute a war crimes.

The Syrian regime intends to paint a dreadful picture of the fate of those who called for political change to deter others doing the same. Besides the Syrian regime’s continued killings by bombardment, torture, and enforced disappearance, this court has become another instrument used by the regime to intimidate and degrade the Syrian people.

The Syrian regime has disposed of many of the people who called for a political change through this court by imprisoning them for protracted years, sentencing them to death, and seizing their properties.

This security/political court contravenes multiple articles of the current Syrian constitution, such as Articles 51, 133, 134, and 154. This is why all the documents of international law, and the Syrian constitution will have no effect as long as the current regime/security apparatus stays in power.

In its current form and structure, this security/political court, is an important source of funding for the regime’s various security branches and the court’s judges and members in a broader sense, meaning that it relies on extorting detainees’ families and taking advantage of their desperate, traumatized mental and emotional state. In such terrible conditions, these desperately worried families are willing to pay massive sums of money just to learn any information about their loved ones or in the hopes of securing their release.

Even after release, detainees who were tried by this security/political court and have served their arbitrary sentences and been set free face extraordinary challenges. Their properties and assets are seized, in accordance with the laws of this court, and will struggle to find any job in a state institution.

Recommendations

UN Security Council and the UN

Find ways and mechanisms to implement Security Council resolutions 2041, 2042, 2139, and Paragraph 12 of resolution 2254 that concern detainees and forcibly disappeared persons in Syria.

There will be no resolution to the detainees issue and to how they are tried in such a primitive barbarian manner without a political transition to a governing system that respects democracy, human rights and the separation of powers. This political transition must be done in line with a timetable of no more than a year.

Adopt a Security Council resolution that condemns those security/political trials that haunt a large proportion of the detainees in Syria, and repeals all the arbitrary judgements rendered by this court.

Work on putting an end to the crimes against humanity (torture and enforced disappearance) and the war crimes (execution) committed against the detainees in Syria, and take urgent action under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.
Syrian regime allies, most notably Russia

- Condemn these barbaric, exceptional courts established by the Syrian regime, and call on the regime to dissolve them and repeal all their rulings and sentences, including the seizure of properties and assets.

- Apply pressure on the Syrian regime to repeal all laws that contravene international human rights law and are phrased in such a vague, broad way that can be used in any number of ways against political opponents.

- Call on the Syrian regime to separate powers and stop its intrusion over the judicial and legislative branches of government.

- End the support for a regime that is arranging these political trials that can be described as the most horrendous and horrific in modern history. Supporting a regime that commits such acts is effectively being involved in the crimes against humanity and war crimes that the Syrian regime is perpetrating against detainees and their properties.

- Help dissolve the security apparatuses that operate manpower that exceed those of the army and pose a direct threat to Syrian society, the judiciary, and fundamental human rights.

EU and EU Member States

- Support the efforts to document human rights violations in Syria which aim to expose the horrific practices of the Syrian regime, their continued nature, and their violation of the principles of international law.

- Take further action to expedite the process of a political transition towards democracy and human rights.

Allocating relief aid to detention survivors after the Military Field Courts had seized their properties.

- The situation in Syria is still dire in terms of respecting basic human rights. Any citizen can be arrested given the vague nature of these vague broad laws. As such, we recommend that refugees are not repatriated to Syria until a political transition comes to be. There will be no stability and safety in Syria, as long as the Syrian regime and its Military Field Court exist.

UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)

- Issue a statement condemning the practices of the Syrian regime in these political, political security trials, as well as condemning the practices and judgements of these courts.
Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic (COI)

- Document and condemn the practices and methods of the Syrian regime that contravene the principles of international law, specifically those security/political courts founded by the regime, in the report on arbitrary arrest in Syria. We are more than willing to contribute and help with these efforts.

International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism (IIIM)

- Add this crucial issue to the primary agendas of investigation.

Syrian regime

- It is not enough to dissolve the Military Field Court. All political/security courts must be dissolved as well, and their rulings repealed, especially with respect to detainees who were arrested in the context of the popular uprising, since those rulings lack the most basic foundations of justice and blatantly contravene international law.

- Return the seized properties and assets to the detainees.

- Release prisoners of opinion with no restrictions and conditions, and clarify the fate of the missing, compensate the affected, and end the toying with their fate and extortion of their families.

- Cease treating the Syrian state as a private family property.

- Cease the terrorization of the Syrian society through enforced disappearance, torture, and death under torture.

- Cease the tampering with the constitution and laws, and the use of said laws in service of the goals of the ruling dynastic regime, and adopting laws with ill intentions.

- Uphold all the legal and material ramifications, and compensate all victims and their families from the resources of the Syrian state.

Arab League

- Condemn the barbaric sentences issued by this security/political court.

- Wholly and strictly reject readmitting the Syrian regime into the Arab League in light of its continued involvement in crimes against humanity and war crimes.

Acknowledgment and Solidarity

We wish to extend our most heartfelt gratitude to the families, eyewitnesses, and survivors for their help in finding the truth. We stand in solidarity with the families and friends of the detainees and forcibly disappeared persons and their quest to have justice.