

SNHR's Ninth Annual Report

on the Most Notable Violations by Russian Forces Since the Launch of Russia's Military Intervention in Syria on September 30, 2015

6,969 Civilians Killed, 44 Percent of Them Women and
Children, and **1,251** Attacks on Vital Civilian Facilities,
at the Hands of Russian Forces



Monday 30 September 2024

The Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR), founded in June 2011, is a non-governmental, independent group that is considered a primary source for the OHCHR on all death toll-related analyses in Syria.

Contents

I. Introduction & Report Methodology	1
II. Map Showing the Territorial Changes in Syria, With the Regime Recapturing More Areas Since the Start of Russia's Military Intervention in 2015 Up until Now	4
III. Russia's Use of Veto and the Rising Numbers of Civilian Deaths at the Hands of the Syrian-Russian Alliance Forces With Each Use of Veto Powers Between March 2011 and September 2024	5
IV. What Has SNHR Done About Russian Violations Against the Syrian People.....	6
V. Breakdown of the Most Notable Violations Perpetrated by Russian Forces Since the Launch of Russia's Military Intervention in September 2015, up Until September 2024, According to SNHR's Database	7
IV. Some of the Incidents Documented in the Past Year on SNHR's Database.....	18
V. Conclusions & Recommendations.....	26
Acknowledgment and Condolences.....	29

I. INTRODUCTION & REPORT METHODOLOGY

On September 30, 2015, Russia launched its military intervention in Syria, becoming a full-fledged party to the Syrian conflict. In the years since then, we have documented numerous human rights violations perpetrated by Russia's armed forces. Indeed, Moscow had adopted a very clear stance from the very beginning of the popular uprising that began in March 2011 calling for a political change and the end of the absolute, authoritarian hereditary rule of the Assad family that has ruled Syria since 1970. In keeping with this position, Russia has thrown all its political weight behind the Syrian regime. Russia has also backed the regime militarily, with actions ranging from providing military advice, to subsequently launching a direct and massive military intervention, which is wholly illegitimate, as we have explained in numerous reports, since it is based on receiving the approval of a regime that attained and has clung to power through military brute force, rather than through constitutional means or democratic elections. We have also proven that Russia's military intervention has involved innumerable human rights violations including killing, large-scale destruction, forced displacement, the use of cluster munitions, and the bombardment of vital civilian facilities.

The Russian intervention has yielded major strategic and territorial changes on the ground, with Russia's support enabling the Syrian regime to recapture many areas that had been controlled by armed opposition factions. On the diplomatic front, Russia has also become a major player in the Syrian case, acting as a primary mediator and guarantor in any international talks concerning Syria, such as the Geneva process, the Astana process, and the Sochi process. This pivotal role has enabled Russia to push forward its vision for a political resolution in Syria, which revolves around preserving the current Syrian regime in power regardless of the cost, even at the expense of the Syrian people and the Syrian state.

Moscow has not only supported the Syrian regime through carrying out aerial attacks, and providing logistic and technical support; it has supported the Syrian regime in every conceivable way, including providing supposed justifications for the use of chemical weapons, trying to undermine the credibility of the reports issued by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), exploiting cross-border humanitarian aid, using its media platforms to spread pro-regime propaganda, and trying to polish the Syrian regime's image.

In addition to these points, Russia's military intervention in Syria has also enabled the Syrian regime to escape any promises of reform, was well as relieving some of the pressure it had been facing prior to the intervention. That is to say that the Syrian regime no longer concerned itself with any political path aiming to implement a democratic change post-September 2015, and as such did not give much attention to any negotiations with the political opposition.

As Fadel Abdulghany, Executive Director of the Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR), says:



Russia has never launched even one investigation into any violations committed by its forces, nor has it held accountable any commander for the bombing of hospitals, markets, and schools despite having committed thousands of human rights violations. On the contrary, Moscow has been denying the credibility of documented reports, and calling them fabrications and misinformation, sinking to the same level as the Syrian regime. Moscow must uphold its legal responsibilities, launch serious investigations, and start compensating victims.



Report Methodology

In compiling this report, SNHR has utilized its well-developed methodology, drawing upon a diverse and extensive network of relationships and sources built up over the years in addition to attempting to pinpoint the exact Russian airbases from which attacks were launched and at which the warplanes carrying out attacks were based, as well as ascertaining the models of these aircraft and the types of weapons used. Additionally, in assigning culpability to Russian forces for certain attacks, we assessed the different nature of the attacks and the varying destructive capabilities between Russian attacks and those by Syrian regime forces. Other factors taken into consideration include the fact that Russia's air force, unlike its Syrian regime counterparts, has the ability to carry out flights and bombing runs at night, while Russian ground forces use more accurate weapons than their Syrian peers.

Determining which aerial attacks are carried out by Russian forces is a fairly straightforward process, which can be done simply by finding out the model of the plane responsible for carrying out the attack and the type of weapon used, in addition to utilizing other factors that help identify Russian warplanes. In the case of ground attacks, however, the task of identifying whether the aggressors behind an attack were Syrian regime or Russian forces is more complex. When responsibility for attacks is not assigned precisely, it is important to bear in mind that Russian forces and Syrian regime forces are parts of the same alliance and bear joint responsibility. Furthermore, most of the Syrian regime's weapons are Russian, and the Syrian regime is responsible for bringing Russia to Syria.

The report draws upon SNHR's database that has been built up through years of still-on-going daily monitoring by our monitor team. This report incorporates a statistical approach which we used to create charts showing the running count of civilian deaths at the hands of Russian forces since the start of the military intervention. These charts also show the distribution of civilian deaths by year and by governorate. The same approach was used to outline all other violations by Russian forces that we have recorded on our database. Second, we used a statistical analysis approach to analyze this data in order to quantify the human and material loss resulting from Russian attacks in Syria. This report also draws upon the work done by field researchers who collected direct accounts from survivors, victims' families, rescue workers, and media workers, utilizing our extensive network of contacts that we have built up over the past 13 years. This report contains three accounts, which we collected directly from eyewitnesses or survivors rather than from any second-hand sources. In all the interviews we conducted, we first explained the purpose of these interviews to the interviewees, who gave us consent to use the information they provided in the service of this report without being offered or given any

incentives. We have also, insofar as possible, tried to spare the interviewees any possible cause of suffering, as well as giving assurances of our commitment to protecting the anonymity of any interviewee who requested use of a pseudonym or alias. These steps are part of our internal protocols that we have complied with for years, and which we strive constantly to improve wherever possible to ensure the optimal levels of sensitivity and psychological care for the victims.

The investigations included in this report have proven that the targeted sites were in civilian areas, with no indicator of the presence of any military targets or fighters, whether affiliated with armed opposition factions or extremist Islamic groups, in their vicinity before or during the attack. The attacking party, namely Russian forces, could easily have distinguished between military positions and civilian sites, particularly given the general features of the sites targeted, as well as the data collected on those sites, such as pictures and numbers of civilian deaths, all of which show that they are civilian areas. There was also no evidence of any military target being located near the targeted areas at the time of these attacks. Even if the attacks were directed at military targets, Russian forces failed to uphold the principles of proportionality and caution in the conduct of these attacks. Furthermore, civilians were not warned prior to the attacks, as required by international humanitarian law.


SNHR also analyzed numerous relevant videos and photos posted online, or sent to us by local activists via e-mail, Skype, or via our social media platforms. Much of the footage shared by activists shows the sites of the attacks, the victims' bodies, the injured, and the massive destruction inflicted in those attacks.

We have stored copies of all the photos and videos included in this report in a secret database, as well as retaining backup offline copies on hard drives. Despite this, however, we cannot claim to have documented all the cases in light of the proscriptions and persecution inflicted on SNHR by the Syrian regime and other armed groups. For further information, please read about the methodology adopted by SNHR [here](#).

We release an annual report on September 30 every year to mark this bitter anniversary for our people and our country, using this occasion to document the violations committed by Russian forces during the previous year (between the same date, September 30, last year, and this year). In this annual report, we provide the latest, updated figures on all the violations documented in the past year and since the initial intervention in order to give some idea of the staggering magnitude of the catastrophe that Russia has inflicted on Syria in terms of casualties and material losses. These reports only document the bare minimum of the magnitude and severity of the violations perpetrated. The societal, economic, and psychological damage inflicted by Russia requires a far larger, separate report of a different kind, especially in light of the displacement of millions of Syrians who have lost their homes, possessions, and livelihoods, paving the way for the Syrian regime to seize their lands and properties.

II. MAP SHOWING THE TERRITORIAL CHANGES IN SYRIA, WITH THE REGIME RECAPTURING MORE AREAS SINCE THE START OF RUSSIA'S MILITARY INTERVENTION IN 2015 UP UNTIL NOW


Russia has backed the Syrian regime through heavy aerial attacks, as well as with logistical and intelligence support. These maps show how the scales tipped in the Syrian regime's favor with the launch of the Russian military intervention, which enabled the regime to recapture large swathes of land. Given this decisive role, it is safe to say that Russia's military intervention was the main turning point for the Syrian regime on the ground, with the regime going from having only partial control of parts of the country before 2015, to regaining control over most of Syria since the launch of the Russian military intervention in Syria. This includes recapturing East Aleppo neighborhoods in 2016; Eastern Ghouta, al-Qalamoun, Daraa, and Quneitra in 2018; and northern Hama and parts of Idlib in 2019 and 2020.



III. RUSSIA'S USE OF VETO AND THE RISING NUMBERS OF CIVILIAN DEATHS AT THE HANDS OF THE SYRIAN-RUSSIAN ALLIANCE FORCES WITH EACH USE OF VETO POWERS BETWEEN MARCH 2011 AND SEPTEMBER 2024

Over the years, Russia has given the Syrian regime all kinds of logistic, political, economic and military support. On the political front, Moscow's support was manifested by blocking any international condemnation of the Syrian regime at the UN Security Council. In fact, Russia has crippled the Security Council in regard to holding the Syrian regime accountable for the crimes against humanity it has perpetrated. Russia has used its veto powers 18 times to date, four before its military intervention in 2015, and 14 times since then, which indicates its implication in the commission of widespread violations with the Syrian regime, and its desire to shield itself from any referral to the International Criminal Court (ICC).

Russia has also voted at all Human Rights Council (HRC) sessions against any resolutions condemning the savage brutality used by the regime against Syrian dissidents, on a total of 21 occasions. On top of that, Russia has instructed its allies at the HRC, including Algeria, Venezuela, and Cuba, to vote in favor of the Syrian regime.



As a direct result, the Russian veto has crippled the UN Security Council. The repeated use of its veto powers totally hindered the international community's efforts to take effective action aimed at resolving the Syrian crisis or holding those responsible for violations accountable. Indeed, the Russian support has given the Syrian regime a political cover, emboldening it to continue its oppressive policies without any fear from an international intervention, thereby prolonging both the conflict and suffering of the Syrian people. Russia has also voted at all Human Rights Council (HRC) sessions against any resolutions condemning the savage brutality used by the regime against Syrian dissidents, on a total of 21 occasions. On top of that, Russia has instructed its allies at the HRC, including Algeria, Venezuela, and Cuba, to vote in favor of the Syrian regime.

IV. WHAT HAS SNHR DONE ABOUT RUSSIAN VIOLATIONS AGAINST THE SYRIAN PEOPLE

For over 13 years, we, at SNHR, have worked on building an extensive database cataloguing the violations committed by Russian forces since Russia launched its military intervention on September 30, 2015, by monitoring every attack carried out by Russian forces on Syrian lands. In line with the process we have outlined in our methodology for addressing incidents involving Russian forces, we investigate and analyze these attacks, and record any resulting human and material losses in civilian areas. We have been able to build a large database that constitute compelling evidence on the violations committed by Russian forces in unlawful attacks in Syria, with many of these violations amounting to crimes against humanity and war crimes.

SNHR has published news articles on the most prominent attacks by Russian forces that we have documented, especially attacks that result in human or material losses. We have also always made sure to work on [reports and investigations](#) on attacks that resulted in massacres or the destruction of primary service civilian facilities, such as hospitals and schools, or attacks that involved the use of internationally prohibited weapons by Russian forces, such as cluster munitions. That is, in addition to [our annual report that we release on September 30 of every year](#).


SNHR has worked on exposing Russia's pro-regime practices and crimes against the Syrian people since the start of the popular uprising for democracy in Syria in March 2011. These includes Russia's support in the economic, political, and [international](#) spheres. For instance, we have monitored every time [Russia has used its veto powers](#) at the UN Security Council to block the adoption of resolutions against the Syrian regime, as well as all of its votes in favor of the Syrian regime at the HRC [with other oppressive states similar to the Syrian regime](#). Additionally, [we have released four extensive reports on Russia's contribution and assistance to the Syrian regime in exploiting cross-border humanitarian aid](#). In other reports that document the attacks carried out by the Syrian-Russian alliance forces, we showed and monitored the pro-Russia media's deliberate disinformation practices, through which it fabricated narratives to justify the violations of the Syrian-Russian alliance forces in civilian areas that had fallen outside the regime's control, especially in the wake of attacks involving large massacres, or attacks that target medical facilities, or attacks that involve the use of chemical weapons.

The use of our work in many international and UN human rights reports that proved Russian forces' commission of numerous gross human rights violations as a backer of the Syrian regime means we have been the target of [barbaric smear campaigns](#) that involved paid writers writing articles to tarnish the image of SNHR, and hostile statements by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Russia's Permanent Representative to the UN Security Council. There have also been attempts to question the credibility of the data documented by our team. On top of that, SNHR's website has been the target of vicious cyberattacks in the form of distributed denial of service (DDoS), [with some of these attacks being traced back to Russia](#). Thankfully however, our team has been able to fend off these attacks, including the most vicious one that took place [in October 2021](#), following the release of our sixth report on the violations committed by Russian forces, and the announcement of a high-level event on accountability on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly meetings.

V. BREAKDOWN OF THE MOST NOTABLE VIOLATIONS PERPETRATED BY RUSSIAN FORCES SINCE THE LAUNCH OF RUSSIA'S MILITARY INTERVENTION IN SEPTEMBER 2015, UP UNTIL SEPTEMBER 2024, ACCORDING TO SNHR'S DATABASE

A. Civilian deaths

SNHR has documented the killing of 6,969 civilians, including 2,055 children and 983 women (adult female) at the hands of Russian force since the launch of Russia's military intervention up until September 30, 2024.




Civilian deaths at the hands of Russian forces are distributed by year as follows:

- **First year** (From September 30, 2015, until September 30, 2016): 3,564 civilians, including 1,029 children and 404 women.
- **Second year** (From September 30, 2016, until September 30, 2017): 1,547 civilians, including 448 children and 236 women.
- **Third year** (From September 30, 2017, until September 30, 2018): 958 civilians, including 354 children and 211 women.
- **Fourth year** (From September 30, 2018, until September 30, 2019): 447 civilians, including 79 children and 47 women.
- **Fifth year** (From September 30, 2019, until September 30, 2020): 343 civilians, including 97 children and 71 women.


- **Sixth year** (From September 30, 2020, until September 30, 2021): 51 civilians, including 25 children and five women.
- **Seventh year** (From September 30, 2021, until September 30, 2022): 33 civilians, including 14 children and three women.
- **Eighth year** (From September 30, 2022, until September 30, 2023): 11 civilians, including two children and one woman.
- **Ninth year** (From September 30, 2023, until September 30, 2024): 15 civilians, including seven children and five women.

Civilian deaths at the hands of Russian forces are distributed across governorates as follows:

- **Aleppo:** 2,789 civilians.
- **Idlib:** 2,608 civilians.
- **Deir Ez-Zour:** 715 civilians.
- **Homs:** 249 civilians.
- **Raqqa:** 241 civilians.
- **Hama:** 142 civilians.
- **Rural Damascus:** 159 civilians.
- **Hasaka:** 43 civilians.
- **Daraa:** 22 civilians.
- **Latakia:** 1 civilian.



Civilian deaths at the hands of Russian forces are distributed by year across governorates as follows:



As the graph shows, the first year (2015-2016) saw the highest number of civilian deaths, with a total of 3,564 civilian deaths, accounting for about 51 percent of all victims killed by Russian forces in the past nine years since the start of Russia's intervention, with the second year seeing the second highest number at 1,541 civilian deaths, accounting for 22 percent of the total. Meanwhile, the past year (year nine) accounted for less than one percent of the total to date. In terms of governorates, Aleppo governorate saw the highest number of civilian deaths killed by Russian forces with 41 percent, followed by Idlib governorate with about 38 percent. The graphs also show that about 44 percent of all victims killed by Russian forces since the start of the intervention have been children and women (children account for about 30 percent, or 2,055 out of 6,969; while women account for about 14 percent, or 983 out of 6,969), both notably high percentages which suggest that most of the attacks carried out by Russian forces targeted civilians.

B. Massacres


SNHR has documented no fewer than 362 massacres by Russian forces since the launch of Russia's military intervention in Syria, up until September 30, 2024.

Massacres committed by Russian forces are distributed by year as follows:


- **First year** (From September 30, 2015, until September 30, 2016): 172 massacres.
- **Second year** (From September 30, 2016, until September 30, 2017): 90 massacres.
- **Third year** (From September 30, 2017, until September 30, 2018): 59 massacres.
- **Fourth year** (From September 30, 2018, until September 30, 2019): 14 massacres.
- **Fifth year** (From September 30, 2019, until September 30, 2020): 19 massacres.
- **Sixth year** (From September 30, 2020, until September 30, 2021): Three massacres.
- **Seventh year** (From September 30, 2021, until September 30, 2022): Three massacres.
- **Eighth year** (From September 30, 2022, until September 30, 2023): We documented no massacres by Russian forces in the intervention's eighth year.
- **Ninth year** (From September 30, 2023, until September 30, 2024): Two massacres.

Massacres by Russian forces are distributed across governorates as follows:

- **Aleppo**: 133 massacres.
- **Idlib**: 121 massacres.
- **Deir Ez-Zour**: 58 massacres.
- **Homs**: 12 massacres.
- **Raqqa**: 18 massacres.
- **Hama**: Eight massacres.
- **Rural Damascus**: Seven massacres.
- **Hasaka**: Three massacres.
- **Daraa**: Two massacres.



Massacres committed by Russian forces are distributed by year across governorates as follows:



Analysis of the data on SNHR's database documenting the massacres committed by Russian forces since the launch of Russia's military intervention in 2015 shows that the first three years saw the highest numbers of massacres, with 321 massacres perpetrated during that period, accounting for approximately 89 percent of the total. By governorate, Aleppo saw the highest number of massacres, followed by Idlib, then Deir Ez-Zour. This can be explained mainly by Russia's plan to aid the Syrian regime to restore control of the vast areas it had lost control over in the early years of the popular uprising for democracy, between 2011-2015.

C. Victims among medical personnel

We have documented the killing of 70 medical workers including 12 women (adult female), at the hands of Russian forces since the launch of its military intervention in Syria up until September 30, 2024.


Medical personnel killed by Russian forces are distributed by year as follows:

- **First year** (From September 30, 2015, until September 30, 2016): 39 medical personnel, including seven women.
- **Second year** (From September 30, 2016, until September 30, 2017): 11 medical personnel, including two women.
- **Third year** (From September 30, 2017, until September 30, 2018): Nine medical personnel, including three women.
- **Fourth year** (From September 30, 2018, until September 30, 2019): Six medical personnel.
- **Fifth year** (From September 30, 2019, until September 30, 2020): Four medical personnel.
- **Sixth year** (From September 30, 2020, until September 30, 2021): One medical personnel.


- **Seventh year** (From September 30, 2021, until September 30, 2022): We documented no deaths among medical personnel at the hands of Russian forces in the intervention's seventh year.
- **Eighth year** (From September 30, 2022, until September 30, 2023): We documented no deaths among medical personnel at the hands of Russian forces in the intervention's eighth year.
- **Ninth year** (From September 30, 2023, until September 30, 2024): We documented no deaths among medical personnel at the hands of Russian forces in the intervention's ninth year.

Medical personnel killed by Russian forces are distributed across governorates as follows:

- Aleppo: 30 medical personnel.
- Idlib: 31 medical personnel.
- Deir Ez-Zour: Three medical personnel.
- Raqqa: One medical worker.
- Hama: Five medical personnel



Medical personnel killed by Russian forces are distributed by year across governorates as follows:



As shown on the graph, Russia has played a key role in the increasingly dire medical situation in the county by killing numerous medical workers and driving hundreds of others to flee in fear of being killed. The first year of Russia's military intervention saw the highest number of medical personnel among the victims killed by Russian forces - 39 in all, accounting for 56 percent of the total. This was followed by the second year, which accounted for about 16 percent of the total. Idlib governorate saw the highest number of medical personnel killed by Russian forces (31 victims), accounting for 45 percent of the total, followed by Aleppo governorate (30 victims), accounting for about 43 percent of the total.

D. Victims among media workers


SNHR has documented the killing of 24 media workers at the hands of Russian forces since the launch of Russia's military intervention in Syria up until September 30, 2024.

Media workers killed by Russian forces are distributed by year as follows:


- **First year** (From September 30, 2015, until September 30, 2016): 12 media workers.
- **Second year** (From September 30, 2016, until September 30, 2017): Two media workers.
- **Third year** (From September 30, 2017, until September 30, 2018): Four media workers.
- **Fourth year** (From September 30, 2018, until September 30, 2019): Three media workers.
- **Fifth year** (From September 30, 2019, until September 30, 2020): One media worker.
- **Sixth year** (From September 30, 2020, until September 30, 2021): Two media workers.
- **Seventh year** (From September 30, 2021, until September 30, 2022): We documented no deaths among media workers at the hands of Russian forces in the intervention's seventh year.
- **Eighth year** (From September 30, 2022, until September 30, 2023): We documented no deaths among media workers at the hands of Russian forces in the intervention's eighth year.
- **Ninth year** (From September 30, 2023, until September 30, 2024): We documented no deaths among media workers at the hands of Russian forces in the intervention's ninth year.

Media workers killed by Russian forces are distributed across governorates as follows:

- **Aleppo**: 12 media workers.
- **Idlib**: 12 media workers.



Media workers killed by Russian forces are distributed by year across governorates as follows:



As these figures show, Russian forces have targeted media workers most intensively in the governorates of Aleppo and Idlib with the death toll being split evenly between the two governorates. The first year saw the deaths of 50 percent of all the media workers killed by Russian forces to date, with 12 media workers killed that year; this was followed by the third year with four media workers killed by Russian forces, accounting for approximately 17 percent of the overall death toll to date in this category.

F. Attacks on vital civilian facilities


We documented no fewer than 1,251 attacks on vital civilian facilities, including 224 schools, 209 medical facilities, and 61 markets, at the hands of Russian forces since the launch of Russia's military intervention up until September 30, 2024.

Attacks on vital civilian facilities by Russian forces are distributed by year as follows:


- **First year** (From September 30, 2015, until September 30, 2016): 452 facilities, including 74 schools, 77 medical facilities, and 35 markets.
- **Second year** (From September 30, 2016, until September 30, 2017): 310 facilities, including 65 schools, 55 medical facilities, and 12 markets.
- **Third year** (From September 30, 2017, until September 30, 2018): 193 facilities, including 37 schools, 35 medical facilities, and eight markets.
- **Fourth year** (From September 30, 2018, until September 30, 2019): 129 facilities, including 25 schools, 24 medical facilities, and one market.
- **Fifth year** (From September 30, 2019, until September 30, 2020): 135 facilities, including 21 schools, 17 medical facilities, and two markets.
- **Sixth year** (From September 30, 2020, until September 30, 2021): 13 facilities, including two markets.
- **Seventh year** (From September 30, 2021, until September 30, 2022): 12 facilities, including one school.
- **Eighth year** (From September 30, 2022, until September 30, 2023): Three facilities, including one market.
- **Ninth year** (From September 30, 2023, until September 30, 2024): Four facilities, including one school and one medical facility.

Attacks on vital civilian facilities by Russian forces are distributed across governorates as follows:

- Idlib: 633 attacks.
- Aleppo: 409 attacks.
- Hama: 85 attacks.
- Deir Ez-Zour: 48 attacks.
- Raqqa: 37 attacks.
- Homs: 11 attacks.
- Hasaka: Seven attacks.
- Latakia: Seven attacks.
- Rural Damascus: Seven attacks.
- Daraa: Five attacks.
- Damascus: Two attacks.



Attacks on vital civilian facilities by Russian forces are distributed by year across governorates as follows:




As the graph shows, the first year of Russia's intervention saw 452 attacks on vital civilian facilities, the highest number in one year, which accounted for approximately 37 percent of all such attacks to date. The numbers have decreased as the years have gone by, with seven attacks documented in the eighth and ninth year combined, accounting for about one percent of all such attacks. Meanwhile, Idlib saw the highest number of attacks, 633 in all, accounting for approximately 51 percent of the total, with this high number due to Idlib and its vicinity remaining free of the regime's control for all these years, and thus being subjected to more attacks. While the number of attacks on vital civilian facilities has fallen to four so far this year (ninth year), this still means that Russia continues to breach the ceasefire agreement signed with Türkiye on March 5, 2020, showing that Russia has disregarded this agreement, along with many other agreements and laws.

G. Use of cluster munitions

SNHR has documented no fewer than 237 attacks using cluster munitions by Russian forces since the launch of Russia's military intervention up until September 30, 2024.

Attacks involving the use of cluster munitions by Russian forces are distributed by year as follows:

- **First year** (From September 30, 2015, until September 30, 2016): 147 attacks.
- **Second year** (From September 30, 2016, until September 30, 2017): 65 attacks.
- **Third year** (From September 30, 2017, until September 30, 2018): 20 attacks.
- **Fourth year** (From September 30, 2018, until September 30, 2019): Four attacks.
- **Fifth year** (From September 30, 2019, until September 30, 2020): No attacks involving the use of cluster munitions were documented in the intervention's fifth year.
- **Sixth year** (From September 30, 2020, until September 30, 2021): One attack.
- **Seventh year** (From September 30, 2021, until September 30, 2022): No attacks involving the use of cluster munitions were documented in the intervention's seventh year.
- **Eighth year** (From September 30, 2022, until September 30, 2023): No attacks involving the use of cluster munitions were documented in the intervention's eighth year.
- **Ninth year** (From September 30, 2023, until September 30, 2024): No attacks involving the use of cluster munitions were documented in the intervention's ninth year.




As the figures above show, Russia's use of cluster munitions was at its height in the first years of its intervention. The first year alone accounted for about 62 percent of all cluster munition attacks carried out by Russian forces to date, followed by the second year, which accounted for approximately 28 percent of the total number of cluster munitions attacks.

H. Use of incendiary weapons

SNHR has documented no fewer than 125 attacks using incendiary weapons by Russian forces since the launch of Russia's military intervention up until September 30, 2024.

Attacks involving the use of incendiary weapons by Russian forces are distributed by year as follows:

- **First year** (From September 30, 2015, until September 30, 2016): 48 attacks.
- **Second year** (From September 30, 2016, until September 30, 2017): 57 attacks.
- **Third year** (From September 30, 2017, until September 30, 2018): 20 attacks.
- **Fourth year** (From September 30, 2018, until September 30, 2019): No attacks involving the use of incendiary weapons were documented in the intervention's fourth year.
- **Fifth year** (From September 30, 2019, until September 30, 2020): No attacks involving the use of incendiary weapons were documented in the intervention's fifth year.
- **Sixth year** (From September 30, 2020, until September 30, 2021): No attacks involving the use of incendiary weapons were documented in the intervention's sixth year.
- **Seventh year** (From September 30, 2021, until September 30, 2022): No attacks involving the use of incendiary weapons were documented in the intervention's seventh year.
- **Eighth year** (From September 30, 2022, until September 30, 2023): No attacks involving the use of incendiary weapons were documented in the intervention's eighth year.
- **Ninth year** (From September 30, 2023, until September 30, 2024): No attacks involving the use of incendiary weapons were documented in the intervention's ninth year.



According to the attacks we have documented, Russian forces only used incendiary weapon in the first three years of Russia's intervention. Most of these attacks took place in the second year (approximately 46 percent of all attacks), followed by the first year (approximately 39 percent of all attacks).

I. Forced displacement

The ferocious level of violence shown in Russia's attacks has played a major role in displacement movements, with Russian attacks, in parallel with those of the Syrian-Iranian alliance, leading to the displacement of approximately 4.9 million people, most of whom have been displaced more than once.

Displacement
of about

4.9 Million
people

most of whom were displaced
more than once



Some of the victims killed in a massacre caused by an aerial Russian attack on Ahl Saraqeb IDPs Camp in Idlib - October 24, 2023

IV. SOME OF THE INCIDENTS DOCUMENTED IN THE PAST YEAR ON SNHR'S DATABASE

In the latest year of the Russian intervention (September 30, 2023, to September 30, 2024), all of the attacks carried out by Russian forces have been aerial attacks in which fixed-wing warplanes were used, according to SNHR's database. Notably, these attacks were carried out by Russian forces in support of the Syrian regime's offensive in northwestern Syria that began in October 2023, with Russia's air force carrying out several aerial attacks targeting areas in Idlib governorate. Since that offensive was de-escalated,¹ Russian aerial attacks have been limited and sporadic in nature, with long periods of time between each. Most of these attacks have been concentrated in the Syrian badiya 'desert' and areas in Idlib governorate. Still, these attacks were carried out surprisingly with no prior warning, posing a serious threat to civilians' lives and properties in the areas targeted.

SNHR spoke with Abu Amin 80,² a military field observer operating in northwestern Syria (more specifically in Idlib governorate and western rural Aleppo). Abu Amin told us about the nature of Russian attacks over the past year:

"Russian aerial attacks were somewhat less frequent compared to the year before. From last year's anniversary of the Russian intervention until this year, most of the Russian attacks that targeted northwestern Syria were carried out in areas of Idlib governorate. As we monitored aircraft movement, we recorded Russian attacks on the areas of Jebal al-Beshri and al-Sakhna and other areas in the Syrian badiya. We recorded no warnings being issued by Russian forces prior to any of their attacks. Also, about 90 percent of the Russian warplanes carrying out attacks took off from Hmeimim Airbase. In addition, in any area that saw Russian attacks, reconnaissance aircraft flew over the area one or two hours before the attack. The reconnaissance aircraft usually remains in the air during and after the aerial attack had been carried out."


Below are the most notable violations committed by Russian forces in the course of their attacks over the past year:

A. Extrajudicial killings by Russian forces in the intervention's ninth year

On Friday, October 6, 2023, fixed-wing warplanes believed to be Russian fired [multiple missiles](#) at Jafatlek Haj Hamoud village, administratively a part of Jisr al-Shoghhour city, in western rural Idlib governorate, [killing one boy](#), injuring two others, and [completely destroying many houses and other civilian properties](#). The village was under the joint control of armed opposition factions and Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). at the time of the attack.

1. On October 5, 2023, Syrian regime forces launched an offensive that involved escalated ground attacks on northwestern Syria, with aerial backing from Russian forces. The offensive was de-escalated with the end of the same month of October 2023.
2. Via WhatsApp on September 8, 2024.



↑  Houses destroyed following a Russian aerial attack on Jafatlek Haj Hamoud village in Idlib – October 6, 2023 ©SNHR

On Tuesday, October 24, 2023, at around 12:17 local time, fixed-wing warplanes believed to be Russian fired two missiles at [Ahl Saraqeb Camp for internally displaced persons \(IDPs\)](#),³ which is located in agricultural land on the southwestern outskirts of al-Hamam village, administratively a part of Jisr al-Shoghour city in western rural Idlib governorate. One of the two missiles landed on a site housing a swimming pool and farm building a few meters to the south of the camp, injuring at least one civilian. The other missile landed directly beside the IDPs' tents on the camp's south side, killing six members of the same family, all civilians, namely [two children](#) and three women, including one woman who was pregnant. [Another four, mostly children, were also injured. The attack also damaged or destroyed numerous tents and other articles owned by the IDPs, as well as facilities within the camp. The swimming pool/farm building was heavily destroyed as well.](#) Moreover, the attack drove the camp's residents to evacuate the camp and flee, since it rendered the camp effectively uninhabitable and at risk of potential future attacks.⁴ The area was under the joint control of armed opposition factions and the HTS at the time of the attack.

It should be noted that Ahl Saraqeb Camp was established in southwestern al-Hamama village in late-2019/early-2020, to house civilians who fled from the Saraqeb area in eastern rural Idlib governorate, following an offensive by Syrian-Russian alliance forces that ended with the regime recapturing the area. Before the attack on October 24, 2023, the camp was inhabited by about 49 families or 325 people (68 men, 74 women (adult female), 93 boys, and 90 girls).

The victims killed in the massacre of Ahl Saraqeb IDPs Camp in rural Idlib:

SNHR documented the killing of six civilians from the same family – two children and three women, including a pregnant woman who died along with her unborn baby, in a bombing by fixed-wing warplanes believed to be Russian that fired two missiles targeting Ahl Saraqeb IDPs Camp, also known as al-Masbah Camp, in the agricultural lands on the southwestern outskirts of al-Hamama village, administratively a part of Jisr al-Shoghour city in western rural Idlib governorate, on October 24, 2023

3. Also known as al-Masbah [Swimming Pool] Camp.

4. On July 10, 2024, SNHR recorded another attack on the [site of the camp](#) in Western Idlib by fixed-wing warplanes believed to be Russian, after it had been evacuated following the Russian attack that resulted in a massacre on October 24, 2023.

1. [Ahmad Alaa al-Ilwi, a one-year-old baby boy](#) from al-Hakoura village in western rural Hama governorate

1. [Ghazal Ali Abdullah al-Ilwi, a seven-month-old baby girl](#) from al-Hakoura village in western rural Hama governorate

2. [Adla Abdullah al-Hmoud, a 70-year-old woman](#) from al-Hakoura village in western rural Hama governorate


3. [Malak Khaled al-Ilwi, a 22-year-old woman](#) from al-Hakoura village in western rural Hama governorate

4. [Rahaf Khaled al-Ilwi, a 20-year-old woman](#) from al-Hakoura village in western rural Hama governorate

5. [Rahaf Khaled al-Ilwi's unborn baby.](#)



Visual analysis showing the site of a Russian aerial attack that targeted Ahl Saraqeb IDPs Camp in western Idlib governorate, resulting a massacre (two children and three women were killed, including a pregnant woman who died along with her unborn baby) on October 24, 2023



30 September 2024

By: SNHR

SNHR spoke with Mr. A.A.,⁵ a resident of Ahl Saraqeb IDPs Camp and a relative of one of the victims killed in the massacre inflicted by the Russian air raid there on October 24, 2023. Mr. A told us that he was with other family members harvesting olives in a grove of trees some distance from the camp when he learnt of the attack on the camp, and the bombing hit some tents where his family was living. He recalled:

“I heard the strike after we saw a warplane, probably Russian. By that point, we had gotten used to the attacks, and could distinguish Syrian warplanes from Russian ones. The warplanes came from the south, and headed for the area of the camp, known as Ahl Saraqeb Camp. As I was heading back to the camp, I learned that the wounded and the martyrs were from my family, and that they had been taken to the nearest hospital by the people who were near the bombing site, so I went directly to the hospital, and on my way I was praying to Allah to have mercy on us, and that our calamity would not be too heavy. After all, we live in tents that have no way to alleviate the explosion of missiles. When I arrived in the hospital, [I learned that] all of the martyrs that were killed died on the spot due to head trauma, while the wounded were four to five if I’m remembering correctly, including my father. The martyrs were my mother and my two nieces (who were also my brother’s daughters-in-law), and their two daughters. One of the two dead women was also pregnant, and died along with her unborn baby.”

We also spoke with A.A. about the camp and the details of the attack. He revealed that the camp had never been targeted before, and that he didn’t return to the camp until a few days after the massacre. He also told us that the camp was immediately evacuated, since it was no longer habitable, and he moved to another location with his surviving family members. He added:

“I learned that the warplane fired two missiles. One of the missiles struck the corner of the west side of the swimming pool building, which was usually rented out, near the tents, and the other missile landed by the tents about two meters from the camp that my family inhabited. The missile that landed by the tents was the one that caused the massacre and most of the damage, while the other missile injured one man who worked as a guard. The damage was massive in the camp. When I passed by the camp, I saw a crater where the tents had been, which was not too deep. I think this is because of the rocky nature of the ground in the area. The camp is located in an area that is not exposed to Syrian regime forces, and it is also far from the military headquarters of the factions that control the area.”



Some of the victims killed in a massacre caused by an aerial Russian attack on Ahl Saraqeb IDPs Camp in Idlib – October 24, 2023

5. Via WhatsApp on September 6, 2024.

SNHR also spoke with Ahmad Hammoush,⁶ a media worker operating in Idlib governorate and rural Idlib. He told us that at midday on October 24, 2023, he was in his house, when he learned through an observatory that a bombing had targeted the outskirts of al-Hamama village in western rural Idlib at around 12:19. He then rushed to the bombing site, he recalled, telling us:

“I passed by the hospital where the civil defense took the victims and the wounded, and I stayed there until the warplanes, which at that point were still overflying the area, left. The attack resulted in five martyrs from the same family, two of them infants who died with visible fear all over their faces. It was a painful sight that did not leave my mind. Three women, including one who was pregnant, were also killed. If I remember correctly, six or seven people were wounded in the attack. I left the hospital for the bombing site, which was an IDPs camp on the outskirts of al-Hamama village in the northern rural areas of Jisr al-Shoghour. When I arrived there, what I saw would have broken the heart of any human being. The targeted area was a civilian area and a place with tents. People were unable to shield themselves from the shrapnel of the thermobaric missiles that Russian forces used to target the area with Sukhoi warplanes. Tents, as everyone knows, does not protect or preserve like walls. The missiles landed between the tents in a camp that only has civilian IDPs from Saraqeb city and the rural areas of Saraqeb. There were no military positions, meaning the direct target was civilians. The missiles rendered the place a disaster area, since the tents were interconnected and close to one another, so much so that I saw punctured tents all along the 300 meters I walked. I also saw large pieces of shrapnel, one of which was the remnants of a missile, about half a meter long. The remnants were made from a thick, chrome-colored metal. There was also a crater about one meter deep, created by the missiles. We learned that the place was targeted using Russian warplanes from the observatories that monitor aircraft movement from the airbases, and also by eye, since Russian aircraft is completely different from the aircraft of the Assad forces. All of the victims were in the tent closest to the missile that landed. Before the attack, there was a reconnaissance aircraft in the air. This was also the first time that camp had been targeted. It was evacuated following the attack. From what I saw, there were two missiles, one that landed on the outskirts of a farm, which is usually rented out with a swimming pool near the camp, and the other one that I filmed was by the tents.”

6. Via Microsoft Teams on September 7, 2024.



On Monday, December 25, 2023, at around 21:47 local time, two fixed-wing warplanes (Su-24) believed to be Russian⁷ fired four missiles at [Alata area](#)⁸ on the southeastern outskirts of Armanaz town in western rural Idlib governorate. The attack struck a house inhabited by an IDP family originally from the Jabal al-Zawiya district of southern rural Idlib governorate, killing five civilians, namely [a man, his wife, and three of their children, and injuring another boy](#). [The house and the surrounding area were also heavily destroyed in the attack](#). The area was under the joint control of armed opposition factions and the HTS at the time of the attack.

It should be noted that this Russian airstrike was carried out in tandem with Orlan-30 reconnaissance aircraft flying over the area. Additionally, Vadim Kulit, deputy head of the Russian Reconciliation Center for Syria, [said in a press](#)⁹ conference that Russian Aerospace Forces had carried out strikes in Idlib governorate, targeting “sites of illegal armed groups that have been involved in carrying out provocative attacks against sites of the Syrian government.” As usual with Russia and its ally the Syrian regime, however, he failed, to acknowledge that one of these airstrikes struck a house inhabited by civilians, resulting in this massacre.

The victims killed in the massacre of Alana area near Armanaz town in rural Idlib – December 12, 2023

SNHR documented the killing of five civilians – a man, his wife, and three of their children, on December 25, 2023, in a bombing by two fixed-wing warplanes (Su-24) believed to be Russian that fired four missiles at Alata area on the southeastern outskirts of Armanaz town in western rural Idlib governorate. The bombing hit a house inhabited by an internally displaced family originally from Jabal al-Zawiya district in southern rural Idlib.

1. [Anas Khaled Murad](#), a man from Kafr Shlaya village in southern rural Idlib.
2. [Fatia Murad](#), a woman from Kafr Shlaya village in southern rural Idlib who was Anas's wife.
3. [Khaled Anas Murad](#), a seven-year-old boy from Kafr Shlaya village in southern rural Idlib.
4. [Mohammad Anas Murad](#), a five-year-old boy from Kafr Shlaya village in southern rural Idlib.
5. [Amina Anas Murad](#), a nine-year-old girl from Kafr Shlaya village in southern rural Idlib.





Victims killed in a massacre caused by a Russian airstrike on Alata area near Armanaz town in Idlib – December 25, 2023 ©SNHR

7. The two warplanes took off from Hmeimim Military Airbase in rural Latakia at around 21:30 local time.
8. The area is named after Alata Ancient Palace.
9. Was held on December 26, 2023 (the day following the massacre).

On the morning of Thursday, February 29, 2024, fixed-wing warplanes believed to be Russian carried out two airstrikes, in which four missiles were fired, targeting agricultural land on the western outskirts of Idlib city. [The missiles struck a furniture workshop in the agricultural area, killing one civilian](#), and injuring five others, including a child. Additionally, [the site and its vicinity were partially destroyed and heavily damaged](#). After Civil Defense workers and activists had rushed to the scene to help the victims, Russian fixed-wing warplanes carried out two other airstrikes, firing four missiles at the same area, causing further heavy destruction, although no more casualties were documented, since the people who had gathered were able to evacuate the area before these second airstrikes. The area was under the joint control of armed opposition factions and HTS at the time of the attack.

It should be noted that the owners of the workshop were using a former chicken farm building in the area as their operation headquarters.



 ↑ Destruction following a Russian air raid on a furniture workshop in western Idlib city
February 29, 2024

B. Attacks on vital civilian facilities by Russian forces in the intervention's ninth year

On Friday, October 6, 2023, fixed-wing warplanes believed to be Russian fired missiles at a chicken farm in al-Shakhib village, located near al-Z'aneya town, administratively a part of Jisr al-Shoghour city in western rural Idlib governorate, [injuring one girl and one woman](#). Additionally, [the chicken farm building was heavily destroyed](#). The area was under the joint control of armed opposition factions and the HTS at the time of the attack.

On Friday, October 6, 2023, fixed-wing warplanes believed to be Russian fired missiles at [Bdama town](#), administratively a part of Jisr al-Shoghour city in western rural Idlib governorate. One of the missiles landed near the local dispensary, partially destroying the surrounding perimeter fence and slightly damaging the dispensary's equipment. The attack that day also injured 14 civilians, including four children and four women, and [destroyed](#) many houses and civilian properties. The town was under the joint control of armed opposition factions and the HTS at the time of the attack.



Ⓜ ↑ Damage following a Russian air raid near the dispensary in Bdama town in Idlib
October 6, 2023

On Saturday, October 21, 2023, fixed-wing warplanes believed to be Russian fired a missile that landed near al-Quneitra Elementary School in al-Quneitra village in western rural Idlib governorate. The attack slightly damaged the school building and the surrounding [perimeter fence](#). The village was under the joint control of armed opposition factions and HTS at the time of the attack.

V. Conclusions and Recommendations

Legal conclusions

- The Russian regime has long been involved in supporting the Syrian regime, which has committed war crimes and crimes against humanity against the Syrian people, by providing political support in different international circles, and by providing the regime with weapons and military expertise. Russia's direct military intervention on the side of the regime since 2015 is a stark manifestation of this support. Such support to a regime involved in crimes against humanity constitutes a clear violation of international law and makes the Russian regime subject to accountability, under the principle of command responsibility
- The Russian military intervention in Syria is wholly unlawful, despite taking place at the Syrian regime's request, because the Syrian regime seized power in Syria in an illegitimate manner through elections that took place under the grip of the security apparatus.
- Russian military intervention has been used to prolong and perpetuate the Syrian regime's violations against the Syrian people, many of which constitute crimes against humanity and war crimes. Thus, Russia's military intervention is a violation of international law and even a form of direct involvement in the war crimes perpetrated.
- Russia has used its UN veto 14 times since its direct military intervention was launched, despite becoming a party to the Syrian conflict. This is a clear violation of the Charter of the United Nations. Those vetoes have provided the Syrian regime with impunity for its crimes giving it a sense of absolute protection from any prosecution. Such use of the UN veto is arbitrary and fundamentally contradicts human rights.
- The Russian authorities have failed to launch any serious investigations into any of the attacks carried out by their forces included in this report or in any previous reports. The Russian leadership, both military and political, bear responsibility for those attacks, based on the principle of command responsibility under International Humanitarian Law,⁹ since they did not prevent the attacks, nor did they punish those responsible. Rather, the widespread and repeated nature of the attacks indicates that they can only be a state policy authorized from the very top of the Russian leadership hierarchy, which means that these leadership officials are involved in and should be held accountable for crimes against humanity and war crimes. Therefore, sanctions should be imposed by the world's countries targeting all those involved in these barbaric attacks.
- The Russian regime has categorically violated UN Security Council Resolutions 2139 and 2254 which provide for the cessation of indiscriminate attacks. It has also violated Article 8 of the Rome Statute by committing the crime of intentional murder, which constitutes a war crime.
- We affirm that the incidents of bombardment cited in this report targeted unarmed civilians, which means that the Russian forces have violated the provisions of international human rights law which protects the right to life. In addition, this bombardment has been carried out extensively in a non-international armed conflict and as a widespread attack in many cases, amounting to war crimes, with these attacks meeting all the relevant criteria.

10. International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Rule 152 of the international humanitarian law. <https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/customary-ihl/v1/rule152>
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Rule 153 of the international humanitarian law. <https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/customary-ihl/v1/rule153>

- Russia has hindered the political process and both caused and steadily worsened a horrific humanitarian crisis for millions of IDPs by preventing the free movement of UN cross-border humanitarian assistance. It has also participated with the Syrian regime in displacing the vast majority of IDPs. This constitutes a violation of the Geneva IV Convention relative to the protection of civilian persons in times of war.
- According to documented statistics, a substantial proportion of the victims were children and women, which constitutes a violation of both the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women.

Recommendations

UN Security Council

- The use of a UN veto in the case of a state involved in a conflict should not be allowed. Russia is directly involved in the Syrian conflict and is using its UN veto for its own and the Syrian regime's benefit, although both are parties to this armed conflict.
- Take further measures following the adoption of UNSCR 2254, which clearly demands that all parties "immediately cease any attacks against civilians and civilian objects as such, including attacks against medical facilities and personnel, and any indiscriminate use of weapons, including through shelling and aerial bombardment."
- Refer the Syrian case to the International Criminal Court and hold all those involved accountable, including the Russian regime whose involvement in perpetrating war crimes has been proven beyond any doubt.
- Seriously seek to fulfil a political transition towards democratic government in accordance with the Geneva Communiqué and UNSCR 2254.
- Impose UN economic and military sanctions on the Syrian and Iranian regimes which have been and are still directly involved in perpetrating war crimes and crimes against humanity against the Syrian people.

International Community

- In light of the Security Council's division and complete paralysis, action should be taken at the national and regional levels to form alliances to support the Syrian people, increase support for relief efforts, and endeavor to employ universal jurisdiction for those crimes within national courts in fair trials to hold all perpetrators to account.
- Support the political transition process and put pressure on the parties to oblige them to implement the political transition within no more than six months so that most violations stop, and millions of displaced people can make a safe and stable return to their original homes.
- In light of Russia's continued use of the UN veto, despite the ongoing perpetration of war crimes and crimes against humanity by the Syrian regime, it is imperative that the international community form an international civilized alliance outside the UN Security Council with the aim of protecting civilians in Syria from attacks conducted by Russia and the Syrian regime.

- Impose economic sanctions against the Russian regime for committing war crimes and crimes against humanity in Syria, for continuing to violate the sanctions imposed against the Syrian regime, and for assisting it in breaching UN Security Council resolutions, including those regarding non-recurrence of using chemical weapons and barrel bombs, similar to the sanctions imposed on Russia over its illegal intervention in Ukraine.
- As a member of the International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect (ICRtoP), SNHR has repeatedly called for the implementation of the principle of 'Responsibility to Protect' (R2P), in dozens of studies and reports. After exhausting the previous political steps, from the Arab League, then Kofi Annan's plan and all the following statements calling for the cessation of hostilities and Astana agreements and after the passage of so much time, action should be taken under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to implement the 'Responsibility to Protect' principle, which was adopted by the UN General Assembly. Despite this, however, the UN Security Council is still obstructing the protection of civilians in Syria.
- Renew pressure on the UN Security Council to refer the case in Syria to the International Criminal Court.
- Seek to transfer the Syrian issue to the UN General Assembly.
- Unequivocally condemn the violations of the Russian regime and compel it to bear its legal and material responsibility for the reconstruction of vital buildings and facilities in Syria that were destroyed in bombardment by Russian forces. Compel the Russian regime to compensate all victims affected by Russian violations.

Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic (COI)

- Conduct extensive investigations into the incidents included in this report and clearly hold Russian forces responsible if sufficient evidence is found of their involvement.

UN Office of High Commissioner of Human Rights (OHCHR)

- Issue a statement condemning the violations perpetrated by Russian forces in Syria on the occasion of the eighth anniversary of Russia's military intervention in Syria, clearly pointing out the catastrophic repercussions of this intervention on the Syrian people and state and condemning Russia's use of its UN veto in the Syrian regime's favor.

UN Special Envoy to Syria

- Call for rapid implementation of a democratic political transition process that restores victims' rights and reflects the principles of transitional justice, without limiting this to the moribund political solution in the ineffectual constitutional committee.

Russian Regime

- Put an end to support for the current Syrian regime and apologize to the Syrian people for all violations committed by Russian forces.

- Russia, as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, must uphold its obligations in preserve international peace and security, instead of undermining them by supporting a regime that is involved in crimes against humanity and war crimes against its people.
- Support a genuine political transition away from the hereditary ruling family and brutal security apparatuses, with such a transition constituting the only way to achieve security, stability and reconstruction for the country.
- Launch investigations into the incidents included in this report, make their findings available to the Syrian public and hold the perpetrators accountable.
- Provide compensation for, reconstruct and reequip all damaged centers and facilities, and compensate the families of all victims killed and all survivors wounded in attacks by the current Russian regime.
- Completely cease the bombing of hospitals, protected objects and civilian areas and uphold customary humanitarian law.
- Rebuild and restore residential buildings and shops destroyed by Russian military forces and compensate victims for the entire duration of their displacement.

European States and the European Union

- Impose economic sanctions on Russia for the crimes against humanity and war crimes it has perpetrated in Syria.
- Clearly condemn Russia's heinous violations in Syria and allow the application of universal jurisdiction to prosecute it for those violations.

International and humanitarian organizations

- Document violations and publish reports: Enhance the efforts to document human rights violations in Syria and publish such work on a wide scale to raise international awareness.
- Provide psychological and social support for the victims: Provide programs to psychologically and socially support survivors and victims' families to help them heal.

Media outlets

- Shed light on violations: Intensify the media coverage on violations being committed in Syria, in order to put more pressure on the involved parties.
- Combat media misinformation: Work on exposing and combating misinformation media campaigns that try to justify or deny violations.

Acknowledgment and Condolences

We wish to extend our most heartfelt condolences to the families of the victims, to interviewees and all those whose ordeals we have documented, and to everyone else affected. We also wish to express our most sincere gratitude to the local activists and victims' families for their invaluable contributions to this report.



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No justice without accountability

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