



الشبكة السورية لحقوق الإنسان
SYRIAN NETWORK FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

ON WORLD REFUGEE DAY:

Growing International Focus on the Return of Syrian Refugees Amid Persistent Challenges to Return

Between December 8, 2024, and the end of the first quarter of 2026, more than **three million Syrians**, both refugees and internally displaced persons, have returned, while millions of others continue to live in conditions of asylum and displacement

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The Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR), founded in June 2011, is a non-governmental, independent group that is considered a primary source for the OHCHR on all death toll-related analyses in Syria.

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INTRODUCTION

On June 20 of each year, the Syrian Network for Human Rights issues [a report or a special statement](#) to mark World Refugee Day, addressing the reality of asylum and forced displacement in Syria, reviewing the latest developments related to the conditions of refugees and the internally displaced, and the means of supporting their right to a safe and dignified return. In this context, and in cooperation with a number of immigration offices in the host countries, as well as international and local organizations, SNHR contributes to preparing reports and analyses that treat Syria as a country of origin for displacement, and to assessing the extent to which the conditions for return are available.

This year's publication comes more than a year and a half after Syria entered a transitional phase following the fall of the Bashar al-Assad regime on December 8, 2024, an event that removed one of the most prominent political and security obstacles that had been preventing the return of broad segments of Syrians to their areas of origin, without this meaning that the remaining security, legal, economic, and service-related obstacles have disappeared.

The period extending from June 2025 until the middle of 2026 witnessed a clear shift in the international discourse concerning Syria, reflected in an increasing move away from an almost exclusive focus on the conditions of asylum and displacement toward examining the issues of return, reintegration, and recovery, while warnings have continued about the deep challenges facing returnees, which still obstruct the achievement of a voluntary, safe, dignified, and sustainable return for all refugees and internally displaced persons wishing to return.

According to the relevant United Nations data and reports, and in particular the data of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), millions of Syrian refugees remain registered in the main host countries, while around 5.5 million people remain internally displaced inside Syria. Despite the recorded return of large numbers of Syrians during the recent period, these figures reflect the continuation of one of the largest displacement crises in the world in terms of both scale and complexity.

BRIEF METHODOLOGY

This report relies on the analysis of data monitored by the Syrian Network for Human Rights during the period covered, alongside a review of relevant United Nations and official data and reports, and in particular the data of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). The report distinguishes between the figures drawn from SNHR's database, especially those related to civilian victims of mines and the remnants of war, and the general United Nations estimates concerning asylum, displacement, and humanitarian needs.

The report also draws on a follow-up of SNHR's previous publications concerning the return of refugees and the internally displaced, the conditions of Syrians in some host countries, the floods that affected the displacement camps, and the legal, livelihood, and security challenges facing returnees. The report does not cite the names of victims, witnesses, or sources, nor any personal details that might reveal their identities or expose them to danger.

FIRST: SYRIAN ASYLUM AND DISPLACEMENT BETWEEN THE LEGACY OF FORCED DISPLACEMENT AND THE CHALLENGES OF RETURN

Despite the political transformations Syria has witnessed since the fall of the Bashar al-Assad regime on December 8, 2024, the country still carries a vast legacy of forced asylum and displacement, a large part of which resulted from the armed conflict and the gross human rights violations, including documented cases of forced displacement carried out primarily by the Assad regime.

Between March 2011 and the end of 2024, more than 6.8 million Syrian refugees had left the country, while the number of the internally displaced exceeded 6.9 million people. Most of them lived in conditions that did not meet the minimum of protection or basic services, which made the Syrian crisis one of the largest asylum and displacement crises in the world.

The fall of the Bashar al-Assad regime, and the marked decline in the intensity of the internal armed conflict that followed it, constituted one of the most prominent factors that encouraged the return of Syrian refugees from the host countries, and the return of the internally displaced to their areas of origin. The recorded data indicate that, between December 8, 2024, and the end of the first quarter of 2026, more than 1.5 million Syrian refugees returned from the host countries to Syria, while more than 1.8 million internally displaced persons returned to their areas of origin.

However, these figures, despite their importance, do not mean that the Syrian asylum and displacement crisis has ended. Millions of Syrian families remain unable to return, or hesitant to take this decision, due to the continuation of a host of security, economic, service-related, and legal challenges. As of the end of the first quarter of 2026, more than 9 million Syrians remain in a state of asylum or internal displacement, a portion of whom reside in the displacement camps in the north of the country, while around 15.6 million people inside Syria need some form of humanitarian assistance.

These data confirm that Syria has entered a new phase characterized by a rising number of returnees; however, return is still taking place amid complex humanitarian, economic, and service-related conditions. Therefore, the file of refugees and the internally displaced should be approached from a perspective that balances support for voluntary return with addressing the causes and challenges that still stand in the way of achieving a safe, dignified, and sustainable return for all Syrians wishing to return to their areas of origin.

Fadel Abdulghany, the Executive Director of the Syrian Network for Human Rights, says:



The rising number of returnees is not, in itself, sufficient to judge that the conditions for return have been met. The rights-based standard is that the decision to return be free and informed, and that returnees find a safe and lawful environment, basic services, and livelihoods that allow them to settle without fear or deprivation.

SECOND: THE INTERNATIONAL SHIFT TOWARD THE RETURN FILE IN LIGHT OF THE TRANSITIONAL PHASE IN SYRIA

Within the context of the political and field transformations Syria has witnessed since December 2024, the period extending from the middle of 2025 until the middle of 2026 saw a notable shift in the international discourse on the issue of Syrian refugees. After years in which international efforts had focused primarily on the humanitarian response to refugees and the internally displaced and on providing them with protection in the countries of asylum and the areas of displacement, international discussions turned increasingly toward examining the opportunities for Syrians to return to their country, the requirements for reintegrating them into their local communities, and support for the paths of recovery and reconstruction.

This shift was reflected in the expansion of bilateral and international discussions on the return of refugees and the requirements of reintegration, including the meetings the Syrian government held with European governments and international organizations. The return file became one of the core themes put forward for discussion, alongside the issues of reconstruction, early recovery, the restoration of services, and addressing the legal and administrative obstacles that affect returnees' ability to settle.

Nevertheless, the United Nations and the international refugee organizations have continued to stress that the political changes the country has witnessed do not automatically mean that the conditions for a sustainable return are available for all refugees and the internally displaced. They have also emphasized that any return must remain voluntary, safe, and dignified, and that it must be coupled with an improvement in the security, service-related, and economic conditions, and with guarantees for the protection of returnees' rights.

THIRD: THE LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS

For the purposes of this report, a rights-based, acceptable return means a return that is grounded in a free and informed decision, that takes place under safe and dignified conditions, and that seeks to be made sustainable by addressing the security, legal, service-related, and economic obstacles that affect returnees' ability to settle and rebuild their lives.

Within the context of what is being discussed internationally regarding the return of Syrian refugees to their country, the Syrian Network for Human Rights affirms that the return of refugees must rest on the principle of full voluntariness, and that it must take place amid the availability of safety, stability, basic services, and dignified livelihoods. The states hosting Syrian refugees also bear the obligation to respect the refugee's right to decide whether to return or to continue seeking protection, and to refrain from adopting any policies or measures, whether direct or indirect, that would push refugees into returning by force or under the weight of legal or livelihood pressures.

This includes respect for the principle of non-refoulement, which prohibits returning any person to a place where they may face a real risk to their life, liberty, or safety, or where they may be exposed to gross violations of their fundamental rights. Protection against refoulement is not limited to direct deportation; it also encompasses the policies or practices that render a refugee's stay practically unsustainable, thereby stripping the decision to return of its free and voluntary character.

During the past period, the Syrian Network for Human Rights monitored policies and measures in some host countries that contributed to increasing the pressures placed on Syrian refugees. The Arab Republic of Egypt was among the most prominent states that witnessed a change in its treatment of Syrians following the fall of the Bashar al-Assad regime. According to [a statement SNHR issued in April 2026](#), the Network documented a marked deterioration in the legal and humanitarian conditions of Syrians residing in Egypt during the period between January and April 2026, reflected in cases of detention that affected refugees registered with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, alongside indirect legal and livelihood pressures that may push some refugees to leave involuntarily, which raises serious concerns about Egypt's compliance with its relevant international obligations concerning the prohibition of refoulement, protection from arbitrary detention, and the guarantees of due process.

Likewise, the file of Syrian refugees in Lebanon remained, over the past year, at the heart of the political and administrative discussions related to return, amid continuing official calls to accelerate the return of refugees to Syria. This requires emphasizing that any return must rest on the refugee's free and informed will, and on a realistic assessment of the conditions prevailing in the areas of return, away from any political, economic, or administrative pressures that might affect the freedom to take the decision.

On the other hand, some Syrian refugees faced conditions that pushed them into displacement once again from the host countries themselves. Sudan is one of the most prominent examples of this, as the continuation of the internal armed conflict between the Sudanese army and the Rapid Support Forces led to a sharp deterioration in the security and humanitarian conditions, which prompted a number of Syrians to leave Sudan and search for an alternative refuge or to return to Syria. In December 2025, the Syrian government announced the implementation of an evacuation operation for a group of Syrian citizens coming from Sudan.

FOURTH: THE INTERNALLY DISPLACED AND THE CONTINUED SUFFERING OF CAMP RESIDENTS

Despite the return of more than 1.8 million internally displaced persons to their areas of origin since the fall of the Bashar al-Assad regime, and the closure of a number of displacement camps during the period between June 2025 and June 2026 after their residents left and returned to their areas of origin or moved to other areas of their choosing, the internal displacement crisis in Syria has not yet ended.

Millions of Syrians still live in a state of displacement, particularly in the camps of the north of the country, while the security developments witnessed in some areas during the period covered by this report led to new waves of displacement, which further complicated the challenges facing the Syrian government and the United Nations and humanitarian organizations in dealing with the file of the internally displaced.

In addition to the continued presence of millions of internally displaced persons, some Syrian areas witnessed new waves of displacement during the period covered by this report as a result of the outbreak of acts of violence and armed clashes. The acts of violence witnessed in Suwayda governorate in July 2025, as well as the battles that took place between the forces of the Syrian government and the Syrian Democratic Forces in the north and east of Syria in January 2026, resulted in new waves of internal displacement for tens of thousands of people, some of which was temporary, while some of it continued up to the time of preparing this report, in addition to recorded cases of seeking asylum outside Syria.

Among the most prominent cases of collective return recorded during the past year is the return of thousands of families that had been displaced from the Afrin area to other areas inside Syria over the previous years, within convoys that included returning families, which began in early March 2026 and are still continuing up to the moment of preparing this report. This return came after a change in the political and security conditions that had long been preventing the return of these families, in the context of the developments that followed the agreement signed between the Syrian government and the Syrian Democratic Forces at the end of January 2026.

The continued suffering of camp residents:

Despite the closure of a number of displacement camps in northwestern Syria after the fall of the Bashar al-Assad regime, around 1,126 camps remain in place in the north of the country, including approximately 786 camps in Idlib governorate and around 340 camps in the Aleppo countryside. These camps shelter approximately 700,000 displaced persons who live in extremely difficult humanitarian conditions, amid a continuous shortage of adequate infrastructure, sewage networks, basic services, and measures for responding to disasters and climate emergencies.



The floods and torrents that struck a number of Syrian areas on February 7 and 8, 2026, again exposed the fragility of the camps' conditions and the weakness of their capacity to provide protection to their residents. A large number of displacement camps were damaged, particularly in the western Idlib countryside, where many of them had been set up in low-lying areas close to seasonal watercourses, which made them directly exposed to the danger of flooding. This disaster left behind wide-scale material damage and affected the conditions of thousands of displaced families, within a protracted humanitarian crisis that still casts its effects on hundreds of thousands of Syrians who have not been able to leave the camps or return to their areas of origin.

In the aftermath of this disaster, the Syrian Network for Human Rights issued [an urgent relief appeal in](#) which it warned of the wide humanitarian repercussions of the floods on camp residents, and called for strengthening the humanitarian response and providing the necessary support to those affected.

Amid the continuation of these challenges, the Syrian government announced on more than one occasion during the past period its intention to work toward ending the state of internal displacement and gradually closing the camps. However, achieving these goals remains tied to the capacity of the state's institutions and the supporting parties to address the security, economic, and service-related challenges, foremost among them the wide-scale destruction that has befallen housing and infrastructure, which still obstructs the return of large numbers of the displaced and their settlement in their areas of origin.

FIFTH: CHANGES IN THE REALITY OF REFUGEE AND IDP RETURNS OVER A YEAR, JUNE 2025 TO JUNE 2026

Compared with what the Syrian Network for Human Rights presented [in its previous publication marking World Refugee Day in June 2025](#), regarding the persistence of obstacles after the fall of the Bashar al-Assad regime and the multidimensional challenges that hinder return, the period extending between June 2025 and June 2026 witnessed notable developments in the reality of the return of Syrian refugees from the host countries to Syria, and the return of the internally displaced to their areas.

The most prominent of these developments was the clear rise in the numbers of returning refugees and internally displaced persons, in the aftermath of the political transformations that followed the fall of the Bashar al-Assad regime. SNHR holds that this period was marked by a localized improvement in some service-related and security aspects, against the continuation of structural challenges that undermine the chances of achieving a safe, dignified, and sustainable return for all those wishing to return. Among the most prominent of what was monitored:

1. A partial improvement in services against a rise in costs

SNHR monitored a localized improvement in some basic services, particularly in the electricity supply, which became more regular in a number of areas, in addition to a relative stability in the availability of water. In return, this was accompanied by a marked rise in the costs of electricity and fuel, alongside an increase in the prices of basic goods since the beginning of 2026, which imposed heavy livelihood burdens on the population, amid low income levels and their lack of proportion to the costs of living.

2. Geographic disparity in the level of services and recovery

SNHR observed a clear disparity among the Syrian areas in the reality of services. Some areas witnessed an improvement in a number of basic services, while other areas still suffer from a severe weakness in infrastructure and services, particularly the areas that the Syrian government brought under its control recently, at the end of January 2026, such as parts of Raqqa and Deir Ez-Zour. The Network holds that this disparity points to the need for a more comprehensive national plan for rehabilitation and the management of the post-conflict phase.

3. A marked security improvement alongside continued fragility in some areas

The country witnessed a significant decline in the levels of direct conflict-related violence compared with the previous years, which is a positive development in itself. The security situation also witnessed an improvement in a large number of areas across the country. Nevertheless, some areas still witness disturbances and sporadic incidents, which makes the security situation uneven and not equally stable across all areas.

Accordingly, the security situation can be described as being in the process of improving, particularly since the beginning of 2026, with the persistence of elements of fragility and instability, foremost among them the presence of unregulated weapons and the persistence of local security risks in some areas of return.


4. The continued humanitarian and livelihood deterioration

The humanitarian situation remains extremely severe, as more than 90 percent of the population lives below the poverty line, and millions of Syrians suffer from food insecurity, amid a broad need for humanitarian assistance and a sharp shortage in international funding. The collapse of the Syrian pound's exchange rate against the dollar, particularly since the beginning of 2026, contributed to a rise in the prices of basic goods. These conditions, in addition to the large rise in real estate prices, whether for sale or for rent, constituted a major obstacle to returnees' ability to settle and rebuild their livelihoods.

5. Mines and the remnants of war continue as a daily threat to civilians

Landmines, unexploded ordnance, and the remnants of cluster munitions continue to constitute one of the most dangerous threats to civilians, particularly in the areas of return and the agricultural areas.

The Syrian Network for Human Rights has documented, between the fall of the Bashar al-Assad regime and June 2026, the killing of no fewer than 341 civilians, among them 88 children and 21 women, as a result of the explosion of landmines and the remnants of cluster munitions left over from the conflict, without this meaning in all cases that the party that planted or used them has been identified. Among these victims are 66 civilians, including 27 children and 4 women, who were killed since the beginning of 2026, in addition to others injured. This confirms that this danger continues to be a direct obstacle to safe return and reconstruction.



6. Partial legal reforms without sufficient guarantees

Steps were announced to reduce the impact of some politically-motivated arrest warrants, and to ease some of the travel restrictions that the Bashar al-Assad regime had imposed before its fall. These steps represent an initial indicator of an attempt to address part of the legal legacy associated with the political violations.

However, the impact of these steps still requires clear implementation mechanisms and independent judicial oversight. Moreover, the continued absence of an effective judicial apparatus and of a transparent and independent mechanism for settling pending cases limits the capacity of these measures to provide real guarantees for returnees, and keeps a segment of them in a state of legal uncertainty.

It is also notable that a broad segment of Syrians, including returnees and those still in a state of asylum or displacement, are anxious about the continued application of a number of laws and legislation that the Assad regime enacted in public and private matters. This may contribute to entrenching an unstable legal environment, and it raises concerns relating to the integrity of legal procedures, particularly with respect to cases of the restitution of rights and property. This confirms the need to activate the role of the legislative authority, through the commencement of the convening of the People's Assembly, and to work toward reviewing this legislation and amending or repealing it in line with the international standards of human rights, and in a manner that ensures the building of a just and transparent legal framework.

7. The persistence of unresolved legal situations and protection risks

A number of returnees still face unresolved legal situations and protection risks, as a result of the persistence of cases or legal and administrative restrictions that have not been adjudicated, some of which are classified among criminal cases despite their connection to a previous political context.

In some cases, this leads to the restriction of freedom of movement or the prevention of leaving the country without sufficient judicial guarantees, which raises concerns relating to the right to freedom of movement, and highlights the need to provide effective legal clarity for returnees that safeguards their protection from arbitrary restrictions.

8. The persistence of obstacles related to housing, land, and property

Despite the recording of several cases in which their owners recovered properties that had been taken from them under laws or measures adopted by the Assad regime, a large number of returnees, and of Syrians in general, still face difficulties in proving ownership or in recovering confiscated or damaged homes and properties. These obstacles are spread between prior confiscation or seizure, the damage to or loss of official records, the complexities of proving ownership, the multiplicity of administrative and legal authorities, and the weakness of the mechanisms of appeal and redress.

The matter was made more complex by the accumulation of old cases of corruption in the state's institutions during the rule of the Assad regime, and the escalation of their effects during the years of conflict that preceded its fall, alongside the overlap of powers among the local authorities and the multiplicity of legal authorities in some areas.

Despite the Syrian government's taking of initial steps, including the cancellation of precautionary seizure decisions through a presidential decree issued in May 2025, these measures remained limited in impact, because they did not cover the various forms of confiscation, because of the absence of clear implementation mechanisms to address the complexities of transferring ownership, the failure to form an independent body specialized in the restitution of properties, and the remaining of the most vulnerable groups, particularly women, in complex legal situations. These data constitute an additional and direct obstacle to the movement of return.

9. The absence of a clear reconstruction plan and the persistence of obstacles to return

The problems of the wide-scale destruction of housing in numerous areas of Syria, the absence of clear plans for reconstruction, and the weak absorptive capacity of the areas still constitute a major obstacle to a broad and sustainable return, especially in the most affected areas.

From these data, the Syrian Network for Human Rights concludes that the period extending since June 2025 witnessed a clear increase in the numbers of returning Syrian refugees and internally displaced persons, alongside a notable and localized improvement in some service-related and security indicators, with disparity among the areas and the types of services, and with the continuation of obstacles and challenges to return, particularly from the economic and livelihood standpoint and the legal standpoint.

Accordingly, the return of Syrian refugees and internally displaced persons up to the middle of 2026 remains practically possible in certain cases and areas; however, at the general level, it still does not have its conditions fully met and does not satisfy the standards of safety, dignity, and sustainability for all those wishing to return to their areas of origin.

SIXTH: RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the field reality and the analysis of the ongoing challenges, the Syrian Network for Human Rights recommends taking a set of urgent and integrated measures to facilitate the voluntary, safe, and dignified return of Syrian refugees and the internally displaced.

First: To the Syrian Government

1. Adopting a national policy for return that rests on the international principles of human rights, and that guarantees transparency, non-discrimination, free and informed choice, and the effective participation of the displaced in formulating and implementing the policies.
2. Issuing clear and just legislation to address the issues of housing, land, and property, including the proof of ownership, the restitution of property, and compensation where appropriate, while providing mechanisms of appeal and redress that take into account the most vulnerable groups.
3. Reviewing the financial policies related to official documents, reducing the fees for passports and civil documents, and facilitating the procedures for obtaining them inside and outside the country without discrimination.
4. Launching immediate support programs for returnees that include cash assistance, temporary housing, and support for livelihoods, and linking these programs to plans for local recovery and early recovery.
5. Strengthening local security in the areas of return through the deployment of regular, disciplined, and accountable security forces, the dismantling of outlaw groups, and the control of irregular weapons.

6. Guaranteeing the fair representation of women and of the survivors of violations in the decision-making processes related to return, justice, reconciliation, and reintegration.
7. Guaranteeing transparency in the management of international funding and the resources allocated to reconstruction and recovery, through the issuance of periodic reports on the aspects of spending, and cooperation with independent oversight bodies.
8. Improving the economic and livelihood reality of the population, in a manner that guarantees the minimum of access to basic goods and services, and that is proportionate to income levels and local needs.

Second: To the United Nations and Its Agencies

1. Strengthening the independent United Nations monitoring of the conditions of return, including the issuance of periodic reports based on reliable field data, and closer coordination among the relevant United Nations agencies.
2. Providing technical and specialized support to the Syrian Transitional Justice Commission and the National Commission for Missing Persons, and supporting the efforts of documentation and the uncovering of violations, especially the files of enforced disappearance and unlawful detention.
3. Funding comprehensive reintegration programs that include psychological support, education, legal support, and economic empowerment, especially in the most affected areas.
4. Expanding partnerships with the independent Syrian human rights organizations, and benefiting from their expertise in the fields of documentation, monitoring, accountability, and the assessment of protection risks in the areas of return.
5. Drawing up special protection plans for the most vulnerable groups of returnees, such as widowed women, unaccompanied children, persons with disabilities, and the families that have lost their civil documents or their ownership documents.

Third: To the States Hosting Syrian Refugees

1. Committing to the principle of non-refoulement, and not taking any measures of deportation or direct or indirect pressure toward return before the conditions for a safe and dignified return are available on the ground.
2. Providing a safe legal environment for refugees that guarantees their access to basic services, protection from discrimination, and their access to effective mechanisms for objecting to decisions of deportation, termination of residency, or the restriction of protection.
3. Adopting alternatives to detention in asylum and migration cases, and restricting any detention to the narrowest limits, on an individual basis, and for a necessary and proportionate period, while ensuring effective judicial review and the right to appeal.

4. Facilitating Syrians' obtaining of official documents through mechanisms that do not infringe on the confidentiality of the data of asylum seekers and refugees, and that do not require communication with the authorities of the country of origin except at the request of the person concerned and with their free and informed consent, and without any negative effect on their legal status.
5. Supporting awareness programs for refugees about their rights, the protection options available to them, and the conditions of return, in cooperation with independent Syrian local and community organizations.
6. Guaranteeing safe and dignified crossing procedures on the part of the host state, and coordinating the humanitarian response at the crossing points, particularly during periods of collective return or in times of crisis.

Fourth: To the Donor States and the International Community

1. Providing technical and financial support to the programs of return, early recovery, and reconstruction, through transparent and monitored mechanisms, in a manner that guarantees non-discrimination, the participation of the affected communities, and the arrival of support to the most needy areas and groups.
2. Linking the funding of return and reconstruction to the principles of human rights, justice, accountability, and non-discrimination, and to taking protection risks into account, in a manner that guarantees the sustainability of solutions and the avoidance of harm to returnees or the host communities.
3. Conducting a periodic review of the restrictive measures that have a humanitarian impact, and expanding the humanitarian and financial exceptions and mechanisms that limit their negative effect on civilians and returnees, without prejudice to the paths of accountability for the gross violations.
4. Supporting the local initiatives aimed at strengthening community reconciliation, and funding peace-building projects in the areas that witnessed sharp division or forced displacement, in a manner that takes into account the rights of victims and the needs of the affected communities.

ANNEX: THE SYRIAN NETWORK FOR HUMAN RIGHTS' VISION FOR THE RETURN OF REFUGEES AND THE INTERNALLY DISPLACED

The Syrian Network for Human Rights reiterates its vision regarding return as a national, internationally-supported path, the vision it put forward in its annual publication marking World Refugee Day last year. Proceeding from the rights-related, administrative, economic, and security challenges that still hinder the voluntary and safe return of Syrian refugees and the internally displaced, SNHR holds that facilitating this path requires an integrated national plan that rests on the following principles:

- Creating a legal and safe environment for return, through the independence of the judiciary, the activation of the legislative authority, addressing the obstacles related to housing, land, and property, and providing official documents at reasonable prices and without discrimination.
- Accelerating the rehabilitation of the infrastructure and basic services in the areas of return, with a focus on the affected or marginalized areas, in accordance with the priorities of the local population and the needs of returnees.
- Enabling the Transitional Justice Commission and the National Commission for Missing Persons, which the Syrian government established, to work toward redress for victims, the strengthening of accountability, and the uncovering of the fate of the missing, with effective participation from civil society.
- Addressing what remains of the security challenges through the control of weapons, the dismantling of undisciplined groups, and the guaranteeing of protection for civilians in all areas of return, under the supervision of accountable national security institutions.
- Launching just economic policies that aim to provide job opportunities, support local initiatives, and facilitate the social and livelihood reintegration of returnees.
- Involving refugees and the internally displaced in drawing up the policies related to their return, and guaranteeing the representation of their voice in the national arrangements connected to reconstruction, justice, and reconciliation.
- Strengthening the independent United Nations oversight of return programs, and close coordination with the United Nations agencies and the donor parties to ensure the application of the standards of dignity, freedom, and safety in all stages of return.

SNHR affirms that achieving this vision requires an effective partnership between the Syrian government, the international community, and Syrian civil society, in order to guarantee a safe and sustainable return that restores to Syrians their right to reside in their homeland without fear or deprivation.

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