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Fadel Abdulghany
On 18 May 2026, the Council of the European Union delisted seven Syrian entities from the sanctions list imposed under Regulation No. 36/2012. Among these entities were the Ministries of Defence and Interior, the two institutions that transitional-justice literature identifies as requiring reform during the transitional phase.
This decision represents the final stage in a path of gradual and sequential rollback of the European Union’s restrictive measures, which began with the suspension of sanctions in February 2025, continued with the lifting of sectoral economic sanctions under Regulation No. 2025/1098 in May 2025, and now culminates in the full institutional delisting of the Syrian security ministries.
The political and legal implications of this step are far more significant than the technical mechanics of sanctions administration. What the European Union has done is to confer institutional legitimacy on the post-Assad security sector, without attaching binding conditions related to security sector reform, vetting, or accountability.
The trajectory of the EU’s sanctions architecture toward Syria had already taken a notable direction with the suspension of sanctions in February 2025. That phase introduced a legal innovation, namely the insertion of a new article, Article 15a, into Regulation 36/2012, which granted the competent authorities in EU Member States the power to release frozen funds or economic resources of the Ministries of Defence and Interior, with a «deemed authorization» mechanism whereby a non-response within five days is treated as approval.
The May 2026 decision eliminated the need for this authorization entirely. It thus became possible for governments, contractors, and financial institutions in Europe to channel funds to these two ministries without having to clear each case individually. The practical consequence is that the path is now open for EU-funded security sector reform programs, procurement, training, and technical assistance to flow directly through the official Syrian security architecture.
The United Kingdom had already lifted its designations against these same ministries in April 2025, and so the European Union’s step came to align with it. With the full reactivation of the 1977 Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and Syria on 11 May 2026, the cumulative effect is the normalization of economic and institutional relations between Europe and the Syrian government during the transitional phase.
The EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Kaja Kallas, framed the decision in explicit political terms, stating that it «sends a clear political signal of the EU’s commitment to re-engage with Syria». At the same time, the Council renewed the designations imposed on individuals and entities linked to the fallen Assad regime, extending them until June 2027, on the stated basis that «networks linked to the former Assad regime still retain their influence and pose a danger that undermines the transitional process».
This dual move is characterized by a deliberate calibration, as the European Union distinguishes between the transitional state as an institution worthy of engagement, and the residual networks of the former regime as ongoing threats. The logic here rests on selective recognition, whereby institutional legitimacy is granted to the new government, while punitive pressure is maintained against specific actors of the former regime.
Human Rights Watch, in a letter addressed to the Council of the European Union ahead of the high-level political dialogue on 11 May, called for the adoption of a «more-for-more» approach, whereby the deepening of EU-Syria relations would be tied to verifiable progress in security sector reform, civilian oversight, command responsibility, and vetting. It does not appear that the European Union’s decision conditioned any of these criteria; the delisting was handled through the annual review mechanism, rather than as part of a structured process linked to specific reform milestones.
From the perspective of international criminal law, the institutional delisting of the Ministries of Defence and Interior from the European sanctions lists has no effect on the principle of individual criminal responsibility, as this responsibility remains entirely independent of the sanctions regimes adopted by states and regional blocs. The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia clearly established this principle in its jurisprudence on individual criminal responsibility, regardless of official capacity.
Likewise, the individual designations imposed on Assad-era commanders and officers remain in force, with their attendant asset freezes and travel bans, in addition to the continued arms embargo imposed under the security sanctions regime. This pattern falls within a coordinated convergence in Western policies, on the part of the United States of America, the United Kingdom, the European Union, and Canada.
This alignment points to shared calculations, namely facilitating Syria’s economic recovery and preventing the transitional government from becoming dependent on non-Western actors. The delisting of the Ministries of Defence and Interior is the last institutional normalization measure preceding full diplomatic recognition; it removes the final category of restrictions that had treated the core security apparatus of the current Syrian state as the legal equivalent of the Assad-era institutions it has replaced.
Originally published on the Syrian newspaper Al-Thawra website (in Arabic)
