HomeStatementsOpinionSyria and the US Terror Lists… More Than Just a Signature

Syria and the US Terror Lists… More Than Just a Signature

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WASHINGTON DC, UNITED STATES – NOVEMBER 10: (—-EDITORIAL USE ONLY – MANDATORY CREDIT – ‘ SYRIAN PRESIDENCY / HANDOUT’ – NO MARKETING NO ADVERTISING CAMPAIGNS – DISTRIBUTED AS A SERVICE TO CLIENTS—-) United States President Donald Trump meets with Syrian President Ahmed Shara at the White House in Washington DC , November 10, 2025. (Photo by Syrian Presidency/Anadolu via Getty Images)

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Fadel Abdulghany

The United States designated Syria a state sponsor of terrorism back in 1979, which is the longest such designation for any country on the list. And during the 17 months that followed the fall of the Assad regime, the United States ended its comprehensive sanctions program imposed on Syria, repealed the Caesar Act, lifted the designation of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) as a foreign terrorist organization, removed President Ahmad al-Sharaa from the United States’ Specially Designated Global Terrorists list and from the Security Council’s sanctions regime No. 1267, and replaced its broad sanctions architecture with a narrower, conduct-based framework. Despite this, Syria remains listed on the state sponsors of terrorism (SST) list. The explanation for this doesn’t trace back to a political inertia, but rather to binding legal procedures. Therefore, the removal of a state from the state sponsors of terrorism list is a legal process governed by federal law, and this process, despite its notable progress, hasn’t been completed yet. 

The procedural catalyst for the current phase was Executive Order No. 14312, which the President Donald Trump signed on June 30, 2025. This order, at the same time, terminated the Syrian sanctions regulations, revoked six foundational executive orders, and removed 518 individuals and entities from the Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) list, including the Central Bank of Syria. It also replaced the previous sanctions architecture with a narrower system, the Promoting Accountability for Assad and Regional Stabilization Sanctions (PAARSS), which targets individuals associated with Assad, human rights violators, Captagon smugglers, those responsible for proliferation activities linked to Syria’s chemical weapons program, the groups affiliated with the Islamic State (ISIS) and al-Qaeda, and Iranian proxies. And in a separate and distinct procedural step, the executive order directed the Secretary of State to review Syria’s designation as a state sponsor of terrorism. This review and the termination of the broader sanctions proceed on two different legal tracks. According to Al-Monitor’s reports, the State Department has completed that review, and the matter awaits the final signature of the Secretary of State Marco Rubio. If this is accurate, then it represents an important administrative step. However, the Secretary’s signature alone doesn’t constitute a removal in itself, contrary to what numerous media outlets and social media pages have circulated. That’s because there are, under American law, two legal tracks for revoking the state sponsors of terrorism designation, derived from the Export Administration Act and the Arms Export Control Act. The first requires the President to submit a certification to Congress stating that the designated government hasn’t provided any support for international terrorism in the preceding six months, accompanied by assurances that it won’t do this in the future. As for the second track, it applies at a time where a “fundamental change in the leadership and policies” of the government occurs, and it also requires assurances of non-repetition. In both cases, an official presidential certification must be sent to Congress, thereby triggering a mandatory review period of 45 days before the revocation enters into legal effect. During this period, Congress may pass a joint resolution of disapproval to prevent the removal. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy has assessed that the six-month certification track is the most legally defensible in Syria’s case, because it’s built on a specific and verifiable evidentiary record. Based on this, the legal sequence proceeds as follows: the Secretary’s decision, then the official presidential certification, then the notification to Congress, then the 45-day review period, followed by the formal removal. As of May 24, 2026, the sending of a notification to Congress hadn’t been publicly confirmed. The original basis for Syria’s designation in 1979 rested on American assessments of the Assad regime’s support for the armed Palestinian factions, its strategic alliance with Iran, and its material support for organizations designated as terrorist under American law, including Hezbollah. The designation remained continuously in effect throughout Bashar al-Assad’s rule, supported by Syria’s facilitation of the passage of foreign fighters into Iraq, the entrenchment of Hezbollah’s military infrastructure in Lebanon, and its documented use of chemical weapons. As for the practical consequences of the state-sponsor-of-terrorism designation, they differ from those imposed under the sanctions based on the executive orders, and they also operate on an independent legal basis. These consequences include restrictions on American foreign assistance under the Foreign Assistance Act, a ban on defense exports and sales under the Arms Export Control Act, tightened controls on dual-use exports, restrictions on financial transactions, and a legal obligation on the American representatives in the international financial institutions to oppose loans and assistance to designated states. The designation also creates major legal risks for the companies, the financial institutions, and the governments of third states that deal with the designated state, which may expose them to secondary designations and civil or criminal penalties under American law. These consequences continue independently of any waiver granted at the executive level through other instruments. 

The volume of the waivers already granted through those other instruments is large, and the chronological sequence here is important for understanding what happened. On May 23, 2025, the Secretary of State used the 180-day waiver authority over the Caesar Act sanctions in a temporary measure. On June 30, 2025, Executive Order No. 14312 permanently terminated the comprehensive sanctions program. On July 7, 2025, the State Department revoked the designation of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham as a foreign terrorist organization. On November 6, 2025, the Security Council adopted Resolution 2799, removing President Ahmad al-Sharaa and the Interior Minister Anas Khattab from the 1267/1989/2253 sanctions regime. On November 7, 2025, the State Department formally removed al-Sharaa from the Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) list, in his individual capacity as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT), and that was a day before his visit to the White House. On December 18, 2025, Congress repealed the Caesar Act entirely and permanently under Section 8369 of the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2026, by a House of Representatives vote of 312 to 112 and a Senate vote of 77 to 20, which is what removed from the statute books the legal framework that had allowed, over six years, the imposition of secondary sanctions against any person or entity dealing commercially with the Assad government in key economic sectors. On February 27, 2026, the Security Council’s Sanctions Committee unanimously removed Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham and all its known aliases, including Jabhat al-Nusra and Jabhat Fatah al-Sham, from the 1267 sanctions regime, thereby ending the asset freeze, the travel ban, and the arms embargo imposed since 2014. As of that date, there were no longer any UN measures specific to Syria in effect. Despite this accumulation of the waivers, the state-sponsor-of-terrorism designation is still in place, and its continuation carries consequences that the parallel measures can’t cancel. Hence, it raises concerns related to reputation and imposes legal risks that deter the international banks, the correspondent banking networks, and the multilateral development finance institutions from dealing with Syria, even in the cases where there are no technical restrictions preventing specific transactions. The removal of Syria from the list would eliminate a formal barrier to the provision of direct assistance from the American government to the Syrian government, would normalize Syria’s access to the facilities of the IMF and the World Bank, and would reduce the legal-risk calculations of the third parties contemplating investment or trade. The process has advanced, but the legal notification to Congress and the subsequent 45-day review period remain pending procedural requirements under American law. It’s hoped that these steps will be completed soon, and that Syria will be lifted from this list, the continuation of which has become an extension of the burdens of the Assad era and its heavy effects. 

Originally published on The New Arab website (in Arabic) 

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