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Fadel Abdulghany
Circular No. 26, issued by the Ministry of Justice on 29 June 2026, doesn’t amend the Cybercrime Law in Syria; it attempts to do something narrower in scope, however it is still of an important effect, represented in restricting how that law is applied in practice. The circular isn’t a law nor a legislative decree, but rather a ministerial procedural and organizational directive, whose practical content concerns the Public Prosecution and the judicial police.
The circular cannot, by its own authority, abolish crimes or create them, redraw the boundaries of criminal jurisdiction, or amend a legislative act; what it can do is regulate how the Public Prosecution and the judicial police exercise their powers relating to criminal proceedings, detention, and wanted notices. Hence, the relevant question isn’t whether the circular abolishes the Cybercrime Law, for it cannot do that, but whether it restricts its procedural application in a meaningful way.
Upon reading the circular, it becomes clear that it imposes five procedural restrictions. It directs the referrals to the judicial police, restricting them to the crimes whose detection requires a preliminary or technical investigation, such as digital fraud, unauthorized access, and crimes committed by unknown perpetrators. It obligates the Public Prosecution competent for cybercrime cases to direct the judicial police not to detain the suspect, present him to the Public Prosecution, or issue a wanted notice against him, which is an order circulated to determine the location of a person or bring him in, except after reviewing the case record and obtaining an explicit written decision.
It affirms that pretrial detention is an exceptional measure, which may not be resorted to except where its legal conditions are met, such as the danger of destroying evidence, influencing witnesses, or fleeing, or the existence of an imminent danger to the victim or society. It also confines future wanted notices to serious crimes, cases of genuine technical necessity, or the failure of a suspect who has been duly notified to appear, and imposes, in addition to that, a review of the wanted notices currently in force in cybercrime cases by committees of members of the Public Prosecution, formed in every judicial district under the supervision of the Attorney General.
These restrictions, combined, target three practices that raised concerns about the disproportionate application of the Cybercrime Law: the routine referral of complaints to the judicial police even when there is no technical investigation required, the presentation of suspects and their detention without a prior written prosecutorial decision, and the wide or insufficiently justified issuance of wanted notices and the extension of their validity. Each one of these practices has affected personal liberty before any court has issued a ruling.
By requiring a written prosecutorial decision as a precondition for restrictive measures, reaffirming the exceptional nature of pretrial detention, and ordering the subsequent review of the existing wanted notices, the circular addresses the procedural space in which a complaint relating to a cybercrime can turn into a restriction on liberty before any judicial determination. To this extent, the circular limits the effect of the Assadist law.
Certain points must be noted when the circular deals with the judicial authority. Its call for adherence to the procedural controls doesn’t raise a problem when it is addressed to the Public Prosecution and the judicial police, since they are both subject, under the Judicial Authority Law, and within certain limits, to a hierarchical prosecutorial administration; however, it becomes constitutionally sensitive when it is addressed to trial or investigating judges, or when the Judicial Inspection Department and the Attorneys General are tasked with following up on implementation in a manner that may reach judicial discretion itself.
The sound distinction here is the following: the circular may bind the Public Prosecution and the judicial police to procedural guarantees, however it cannot direct judges in their assessment of the evidence, or in their decisions relating to detention, release, or the merits of the case. An official clarification that separates procedural oversight from control over judicial discretion would remove the confusion raised by the current wording.
This clarification can also define with precision some of the central terms of the circular. “Pure cybercrimes”, “serious crimes”, “urgent technical necessity”, and “imminent danger” are all phrases that carry consequences touching personal liberty, thus they are in need of an operational definition.
It remains unsettled whether the phrase “the remaining crimes” refers to the cybercrimes that don’t require a technical investigation, or to crimes in general. The distinction between crimes of digital expression and crimes committed against digital systems is necessary for the coherence of the entire system, and without objective criteria the exception can swallow the rule. This distinction protects the victims as well; for the cases involving extortion, hacking, threats, or the publication of private images may still require an urgent technical investigation, provided that the intervention remains lawful, necessary, and proportionate.
The review of the existing wanted notices faces the same problem; for unless the committees operate according to written criteria and reasoned decisions, with a right to reconsideration, the procedure risks appearing selective. Therefore, the circular limits the Cybercrime Law procedurally, not substantively, for it cannot address the ambiguity of the penal provisions which made the wide application possible, nor narrow the crimes whose loose wording still reaches everyday expression.
This reform falls within the competence of the legislative authority, and the Ministry has acknowledged that by announcing the study of the law in preparation for its amendment. Until that happens, the circular operates as a corrective to the exercise of the authority of the Public Prosecution and the police, and its practical effect depends on whether the vague terms will be read restrictively, whether the review committees will operate with transparency, and whether the restrictions on referral, arrest, and detention will be enforced with the consistency the text requires.
Originally published on the Syrian newspaper Al-Thawra website (in Arabic)
