Lebanon’s Obligation to Handover Suspected Syrian War Criminals

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Damascus – The Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR) issued today a report entitled: Lebanon’s Obligation to Handover Suspected Syrian War Criminals. The report said that the fall of the Assad regime in December 2014 marked a turning point, ending decades of repression, but it did not bring justice to the victims. Many leaders of the former regime fled Syria, particularly to Lebanon. Lebanon has emerged as a potential haven for those implicated in war crimes and crimes against humanity, some of whom are subject to sanctions or international prosecution. This report aims to analyze Lebanon’s international obligations, Syrian-Lebanese judicial cooperation, and the security risks arising from impunity. It also offers recommendations to the Syrian government to ensure that perpetrators are held accountable and to prevent them from finding safe haven.

The report stated that multiple independent sources documented the presence of former Assad regime officials in Lebanon, including hundreds of officers accused of serious human rights abuses. Leaked recordings in December 2025 revealed Brigadier General Ghayath Dalla residing in Lebanon and communicating with Suheil al-Hassan to plan armed operations against the Syrian government. Secret footage also showed Bassam al-Hassan, who is under US sanctions, in an apartment in Beirut. This evidence contradicts official Lebanese denials and indicates that internationally wanted individuals enjoy a comfortable and effective presence within Lebanese territory.

The report stated that Lebanon’s harboring of individuals accused of war crimes and crimes against humanity puts it at risk of violating multiple international obligations stemming from customary international law, international treaties, and UN resolutions, which legally restrict the possibility of providing safe haven to perpetrators of atrocities. Customary international law enshrines the principle of universal jurisdiction as a fundamental tool for holding perpetrators of the most serious international crimes accountable, regardless of where the crime was committed or the nationality of the perpetrators, given that such crimes affect the entire international community. This principle is linked to a fundamental obligation: the “either extradite or prosecute” rule, which prohibits states from allowing individuals suspected of serious international crimes to remain on their territory without effective legal proceedings. In such cases, the state is required to either conduct a due investigation and prosecution or extradite the individual to another state willing and able to do so, within a sound legal framework. Failure to fulfill this obligation contributes to the entrenchment of impunity and incurs the international responsibility of the state concerned. The 1949 Geneva Conventions, to which Lebanon is a party, also impose an explicit obligation to search for and prosecute individuals suspected of committing serious violations of international humanitarian law, or to extradite them to another State Party that has prima facie sufficient evidence. These obligations admit no exceptions based on political considerations or bilateral relations; they are specifically designed to prevent perpetrators of the most serious violations from escaping punishment across borders. Therefore, Lebanon’s failure to investigate, take legal action against, prosecute, or extradite these individuals constitutes a direct breach of its treaty obligations. Similarly, UN General Assembly Resolution 3074 of 1973 established the principles of international cooperation in the pursuit, arrest, extradition, prosecution, and punishment of perpetrators of war crimes and crimes against humanity, affirming that such crimes must not go unpunished. Furthermore, Principle 7 of Resolution 3074 explicitly prohibits granting asylum to any person for whom there are serious grounds to believe they have committed war crimes or crimes against humanity. Any facilitation or acquiescence by Lebanon regarding the presence of individuals accused of such crimes constitutes a direct violation of this principle. In addition to these international obligations, relations between Syria and Lebanon are governed by bilateral agreements, most notably the 1951 Judicial Convention, which regulates the extradition of criminals under specific conditions, thus reinforcing the legal framework that prevents providing safe haven to perpetrators of serious crimes.

The report stated that France set an important legal precedent based on principles of international law when, in November 2025, it formally requested Lebanon to arrest and extradite three former Syrian security officials accused of war crimes and crimes against humanity. The request was based on French arrest warrants for torture, enforced disappearance, extrajudicial killings, and later, the use of chemical weapons. Despite indications of their possible presence in Lebanon, Lebanese authorities denied any knowledge of their whereabouts and limited their actions to investigations without making any arrests, highlighting a contradiction between the available legal evidence and the official Lebanese denial.

The report concludes that Lebanon is currently harboring individuals credibly accused of war crimes and crimes against humanity, a fact documented by multiple independent sources and contradicting official Lebanese denials. This constitutes a breach of binding international legal obligations arising from customary international law, treaties, and UN resolutions, particularly the principle of the prohibition against granting asylum to perpetrators of atrocities. Despite the existence of a bilateral judicial framework with Syria that allows for the extradition of criminals, Lebanese delays and exceptions undermine the rule of law and weaken Lebanon’s credibility, especially in light of past extraditions of opponents of the former regime. This inaction also transcends the legal dimension, posing a security risk, as Lebanese territory is being used to plan activities that threaten Syria’s stability. The text concludes that achieving justice is a non-negotiable legal and moral obligation, a prerequisite for any legitimate partnership, and requires a serious commitment to ending impunity.

The report concluded with a set of recommendations:

a. To the Syrian government:
Based on the analysis contained in this report, the following recommendations are made to the Syrian government to strengthen Lebanon’s compliance with its international legal obligations and to support efforts to bring perpetrators of atrocity crimes to justice.

1. 1. Formalizing Demands Through Diplomatic Channels

The Syrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs should submit comprehensive official documentation to Lebanon through established diplomatic channels. This documentation should include lists of wanted individuals, supported by detailed evidence of the crimes attributed to them, and the legal grounds for extradition under bilateral agreements and international law, with explicit emphasis on Lebanon’s relevant obligations. This procedure establishes a clear and formal record of Syria’s demands and compliance requirements, supporting the possibility of orderly escalation should non-compliance persist.

2. Coordination with States Exercising Universal Jurisdiction:

Syria should seek effective coordination with France and other states that have issued arrest warrants or initiated legal proceedings against former officials of the Assad regime. French judicial authorities possess expertise and evidence accumulated over years of investigations, and such coordination can increase pressure on Lebanon and provide Syrian judicial authorities with valuable resources and experience. Furthermore, the delivery of coordinated diplomatic notes to Lebanese authorities could reflect a practical international consensus on the priority of accountability.

3. Utilizing Regional Diplomatic Forums:

Syria should use regional diplomatic forums to mobilize collective pressure on Lebanon. Regional states that support Syria’s unity and stability can be encouraged to exert diplomatic pressure to urge Lebanon to abide by its international legal obligations, particularly given their shared security interests in preventing the re-emergence of networks that threaten the security of both countries. Coordinated regional messaging would underscore that Lebanon’s non-compliance will have repercussions for its broader regional relations.

4. Making Cooperation on Extradition a Prerequisite for Advancing Bilateral Relations

Syria should establish clear criteria linking progress on extradition to progress in bilateral relations. While remaining open to discussing implementation mechanisms, it must be firmly emphasized that Lebanon cannot be a haven for war criminals, and that any political, economic, or security cooperation requires genuine compliance with accountability measures. Progress on this issue should also be clearly linked to progress on other bilateral matters, including economic cooperation, border arrangements, and addressing outstanding issues.

5. Developing Domestic Legal Reforms

To address any Lebanese claims regarding fair trial guarantees and to strengthen Syria’s legal and moral position in its extradition request, domestic reforms should be accelerated in line with international standards. This includes aligning national criminalization of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide with international definitions, providing transparent mechanisms for monitoring judicial proceedings, and considering the use of international judicial expertise to support domestic capacities when necessary. Such steps would reflect Syria’s commitment to due process and reduce the scope for objections concerning the fate of individuals after their extradition.

6. Engaging Lebanese Civil Society

Syria should support structured engagement with Lebanese civil society organizations, human rights groups, and political actors who prioritize accountability and reject impunity for war criminals. By building channels of cooperation with Lebanese actors committed to the rule of law, it can contribute to creating internal pressure that encourages Lebanese authorities to take concrete action. This engagement should focus on the shared interests of both countries in preventing the resurgence of networks that threaten stability and security in Syria and Lebanon.

b. To the Lebanese government:

1. 1. Adopt a clear and official position affirming that not providing safe haven to those suspected of war crimes and crimes against humanity is a legally binding obligation and assign a central body to coordinate the government’s response on this matter, involving the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Interior, General Security, the Public Prosecutor’s Office, and security agencies.
   2. Implement systematic verification and investigation procedures to determine the whereabouts of suspects within Lebanese territory. These procedures should include scrutinizing entry and residency records, strengthening legal oversight at border crossings, and taking preventative measures to prevent escape whenever there are serious grounds for doing so.
   3. Activate effective international judicial cooperation, including responding to foreign judicial requests and arrest warrants, exchanging judicial information in accordance with established procedures, and ensuring that wanted individuals are prevented from crossing borders.
   4. Establish a unified official mechanism for receiving, sorting, evaluating, and referring information and files from Syrian authorities or from countries exercising universal jurisdiction to the competent authority, while documenting the procedures undertaken to ensure institutional accountability and maximum transparency without compromising investigations.
   5. Adopt clear national protocols for dealing with those suspected of committing serious violations, balancing due process guarantees with the requirements of preventing impunity, and preventing the obstruction of cases due to political or administrative considerations.

c. The Lebanese judiciary, public prosecutors, and law enforcement agencies:

1. 1. Open preliminary investigations when there is credible evidence of suspects residing in Lebanon, and take appropriate search, investigation, and restrictive measures, as necessary, to prevent escape, and refer the cases to the competent judicial authorities within reasonable timeframes.
   2. Establish judicial contact points for international cooperation in cases of serious international crimes, facilitating the swift handling of requests for mutual legal assistance, as well as European and international requests, and ensuring procedural consistency in receiving and examining evidence.
   3. Strengthen the standards of consistency in judicial decisions and non-selectivity in dealing with wanted individuals, ensuring equal treatment and enhancing the credibility of the Lebanese state before the international community and domestic public opinion.
   4. Develop internal procedural guidelines to direct law enforcement agencies regarding the collection, verification, and documentation of information in a manner that preserves its admissibility and prevents its politicization or use outside the framework of justice.

d. The Lebanese Parliament and the relevant parliamentary committees:

1. 1. Regular parliamentary oversight of the government’s performance regarding the presence of individuals suspected of committing serious international crimes, through periodic hearings with the Ministries of Justice, Interior, Public Security, and the Public Prosecution Office, to discuss the measures taken and any obstacles encountered in their implementation.
   2. Reviewing relevant national legislation to ensure the availability of effective legal instruments for judicial cooperation and extradition, and addressing any procedural loopholes that could be exploited to obstruct accountability.
   3. Supporting the establishment of specialized units within law enforcement agencies to investigate and cooperate on serious international crimes and providing them with the necessary legal framework and resources.

e. The United Nations and international mechanisms concerned with accountability and the rule of law:

1. 1. Include the issue of not providing safe haven to perpetrators of atrocities in the institutional dialogue with Lebanon, linking it to obligations under the rule of law, judicial cooperation, and victims’ rights, thereby encouraging concrete national measures.
   2. Provide technical support to Lebanon to develop its capacity to handle serious international crimes, including establishing specialized units, improving due diligence procedures, enhancing international judicial cooperation, and strengthening the protection of witnesses and whistleblowers where necessary.
   3. Encourage practical coordination between Lebanon and relevant international bodies regarding the Syrian crisis, thereby limiting the use of Lebanese territory to reorganize or plan activities that threaten stability and security, while simultaneously upholding legal standards and human rights.

f. Interpol and relevant international police cooperation bodies:

1. 1. Enhance the exchange of operational information related to wanted individuals and regularly update data concerning their whereabouts and movements, in accordance with applicable legal frameworks, to help bridge the gap between judicial requests and practical results.
   2. Support operational communication channels between Lebanon and requesting countries and facilitate cooperation in verification and investigation matters, thereby reducing the likelihood of evasion through movement and enhancing the effectiveness of international pursuit.

g. Arab states and regional forums:

1. 1. Utilize regional channels to urge Lebanon to adhere to the principle of not providing safe havens, considering this a cornerstone of regional stability and preventing the re-emergence of networks that threaten the security of neighboring countries.
   2. Adopt coordinated regional messaging that encourages judicial and security cooperation based on the rule of law, and links bilateral and regional support for Lebanon to tangible progress on this issue, in accordance with its international legal obligations.

h. Lebanese civil society, media, and human rights organizations:

1. 1. Documenting available information professionally and systematically, and referring it to the competent judicial authorities in accordance with standards that preserve the integrity of procedures and the validity of information, and mitigate the risks of defamation or targeting without legal basis.
   2. Promoting responsible public discourse on the principle of no impunity, clarifying that accountability targets individuals accused of specific acts and does not hold any social or political group collectively responsible.
   3. Building professional partnerships with Syrian and international accountability bodies to coordinate messages and efforts, develop monitoring and verification capabilities, and support victims and their families in accordance with human rights and the rule of law.

View the full report